Febres Morales v. Challenger Caribbean Corp.

• Citation: 8 F.Supp.2d 126
• Decision Date: 18 March 1998
• Docket Number: Civil No. 96-1798(HL).
• Parties: Clemente FEBRES MORALES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CHALLENGER CARIBBEAN CORP., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

8 F.Supp.2d 126

Clemente FEBRES MORALES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CHALLENGER CARIBBEAN CORP., et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 96-1798(HL).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

March 18, 1998.

Jose L. Gonzalez-Castaner, Gonzalez-Castaner, Morales & Guzman, San Juan, PR, Juan R. Gonzalez-Munoz, Gonzalez Munoz & Quinones Tridas, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Francisco M. Ramirez-Rivera, Martinez, Odell & Calabria, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

LAFFITTE, District Judge.

Before the Court is a motion for partial summary judgment filed by Defendants Thomas & Betts Corporation and Thomas & Betts Puerto Rico Corporation (collectively "T & B"). Thomas & Betts Corporation is a publicly owned corporation with its headquarters in Tennessee. Thomas & Betts Puerto Rico is one of its subsidiaries. Another subsidiary, Thomas & Betts Caribe, Inc., operates a plant in Vega Baja, Puerto Rico engaged in the manufacturing of electronic terminals and plastic components. Plaintiffs are nine individuals who claim that they were terminated from their positions in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA")¹ and Puerto Rico Law 100.² Plaintiffs have also brought a claim under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA").³ T & B does not seek summary judgment on the COBRA claims.

The Court reviews the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and draws all reasonable inferences in their favor. See LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir.1993). In February 1994, Thomas & Betts Corporation purchased Challenger Caribbean Corporation ("Challenger"). Challenger owned and operated manufacturing facilities in Canóvanas and Vega Baja, Puerto Rico. Plaintiffs were all "administrative" or non-union employees at the Canóvanas plant. In December 1994, it was announced that the Canóvanas plant would be shut down and its operations would be consolidated with the plant in Vega Baja.⁴

In April and May of 1995, Plaintiffs were dismissed from their positions at the Canóvanas plant. All Plaintiffs were over the age of forty at the time of their dismissal.⁵ Ten other administrative employees were similarly denied positions in Vega Baja.⁶ There were, however, seventeen other administrative employees from the Canóvanas plant who were offered work at the Vega Baja plant. Thirteen of them were over forty.⁷ The T & B personnel who made the decisions on who should be dismissed were Frank Domenech, the plant manager for Thomas & Betts Caribe, Ojel Rodríguez, the plant manager for Challenger Caribbean, and Ramón Becker, the human resources manager for Thomas & Betts Caribe.⁸

In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that T & B's conduct violated the ADEA. They make claims based on both a disparate treatment theory and a disparate impact theory. They also claim that T & B's conduct violated Puerto Rico Law 100. T & B moves to dismiss these claims in its motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiffs have opposed the motion. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part the motion.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has satisfied this requirement, the nonmoving party has the burden of presenting any facts that demonstrate a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 841. The nonmovant must do more than show "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). An issue is genuine when, based on the evidence, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.

1. Disparate impact under the ADEA

In their fourth cause of action, Plaintiffs claim that even if T & B's conduct in its reorganization was uniformly applied, it had a disparate impact on employees over forty and therefore it violated the ADEA. A disparate impact claim is based on an employment practice which, although facially neutral, affects a protected group more harshly than other groups and which is not justifiable by a business necessity. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1854-55 n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977); Bramble v. Amer. Postal Workers Union, 135 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir.1998). The plaintiff need not prove a discriminatory motive in a disparate impact claim. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. at 1854-55 n. 15.

A Title VII plaintiff may bring a disparate impact claim. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 853, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k) (West 1994). Generally, the analyses of Title VII and the ADEA claims are interchangeable. Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 535 n. 9 (1st Cir.1996); Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 421 n. 4 (1st Cir.1996). With regard to disparate impact claims, however, it is unclear whether the two statutes should be treated equally. The Supreme Court has yet to make a definitive holding on whether a disparate impact claim may be brought under the ADEA. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 1706, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993) ("[W]e have never decided whether a disparate impact theory of liability is available under the ADEA."). Additionally, the First Circuit has yet to resolve this issue. See Bramble, 135 F.3d at 26. In a concurring opinion in the Hazen Paper decision, Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Thomas cast doubt on the viability of a disparate impact claim under the ADEA. See Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 618, 113 S.Ct. at 1710 ("[T]here are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA."); see also Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945, 947-48, 101 S.Ct. 2028, 2030, 68 L.Ed.2d 332 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari and questioning whether a discriminatory impact claim may be brought under the ADEA).

In the wake of the Hazen Paper decision, a split has developed in the circuits over this issue. A number of courts have analyzed the ADEA's statutory language, legislative history, and policy and have concluded that the ADEA does not give rise to a disparate impact claim. See Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1006-10 (10th Cir.1996); DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732-34 (3rd Cir.1995) (Greenberg, J., concurring); E.E.O.C. v. Francis W. Parker School, 41 F.3d 1073, 1076-78 (7th Cir. 1994); Hyman v. First Union Corp., 980 F.Supp. 38, 39-46 (D.D.C.1997); Fobian v. Storage Technology Corp., 959 F.Supp. 742, 746-47 (E.D.Va.1997); Martincic v. Urban Redevelopment Auth., 844 F.Supp. 1073, 1077-78 (W.D.Pa.1994); but see Camacho v. Sears, Roebuck de Puerto Rico, 939 F.Supp. 113, 118-22 (D.P.R.1996) (allowing a disparate impact claim under the ADEA). The courts that have found a disparate impact claim after Hazen Paper have generally done so in reliance on pre-Hazen Paper precedent or have done so without examining either the statute or the impact of the Hazen Paper opinion. See District Council 37 v. New York City Dept., 113 F.3d 347, 351 (2nd Cir.1997) (relying on pre-Hazen Paper precedent); Mangold v. California Public Utilities Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1995) (relying on one pre-Hazen Paper case and one post-Hazen Paper case which in turn relied only on pre-Hazen Paper precedent); Houghton v. SIPCO, Inc., 38 F.3d 953, 958-59 (8th Cir.1994) (recognizing a disparate impact theory under the ADEA without explanation and without discussion of Hazen Paper); Diehl v. Xerox Corp., 933 F.Supp. 1157, 1165-66 (W.D.N.Y.1996) (relying on pre-Hazen Paper precedent).

For the following reasons, this Court sides with those courts which have held that a disparate impact claim is not cognizable under the ADEA. First, and most importantly, the statute's language does not support a claim of disparate impact. Section 623(a), which defines what employer practices are unlawful, prohibits conduct which is done "because of [the] individual's age." 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(1) & (2). Motive is not material to a disparate impact claim. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. at 1854-55 n. 15. Rather, the key question is only whether the challenged conduct more harshly affects one group than another. Bramble, 135 F.3d at 26. By contrast, the language in section 623(a) indicates that motive is material in an ADEA claim — an employer's conduct is unlawful if it is done because of the employee's age. The Court may not read into the ADEA a cause of action which does not jibe with the statute's language. See Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1007; Hyman, 980 F.Supp. at 41-42.

Second, the ADEA states that it shall not be unlawful for an employer

(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business, or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age....

29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f). The Equal Pay Act prohibits employers from discrimination based on sex in paying employees for equal work. 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(d)(1) (West 1978). This statute permits pay...