Camacho v. Sears, Roebuck de Puerto Rico

Decision Date17 September 1996
Docket NumberCivil No. 94-2055 (PG).
PartiesAida CAMACHO, Angel Mercado, Plaintiffs, v. SEARS ROEBUCK DE PUERTO RICO, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

José A. Gallart, Hato Rey, P.R., for Plaintiffs.

María Santiago de Vidal, San Juan, P.R., for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

PEREZ-GIMENEZ, District Judge.

This age discrimination claim is before the Court on Sears' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated herein, the motion is DENIED as to Camacho's Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim, but GRANTED as to her Employee Retirement Income Security Act claim.

Background

The following summarizes those of plaintiff Camacho's allegations which have record support, presented in the light most flattering to her claim. Greenberg v. Union Camp Corp., 48 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir.1995).

Aida Camacho began her career with Sears in July 1972 when she was 27 years old. In 1987 she transferred to the Household Goods Department (HGD) at the Sears branch in Carolina, working as a sales clerk. By 1992 she was the senior and only full time employee in the HGD, earning $8.85 per hour. Her six colleagues in the department were all part-time employees who, it seems, earned half Camacho's salary and received no benefits. Camacho was the de facto supervisor of the HGD, responsible for training the "part-timers," and assuring the general functioning and orderliness of the department.1 Camacho's performance appraisals for the years 1989-92, though making no reference to her supervisory duties, demonstrate that she performed at or above Sears' expectations.

Camacho's troubles began sometime in the Spring of 1992, when Sears appointed a new manager — identified only as "Mr. Alverio" — for the division of which the HGD was a part. Relations between Alverio and the plaintiff began poorly, and seem only to have gotten worse with time. Within a week of his arrival, Alverio held one-on-one meetings with all employees except the plaintiff. Shortly thereafter, Alverio began transferring various of Camacho's supervisory responsibilities to Alicia Cruz Quiñones, a woman Camacho had trained two years earlier. In 1992, Cruz Quiñones was 25 years old. Though a "part-timer," Cruz Quiñones' hours were increased to 40 per week.

Camacho testifies that Alverio ignored her in all respects, even refusing to greet her in the morning. More importantly, Alverio would not transmit management instructions to Camacho, preferring, instead, to communicate matters such as price changes to Cruz Quiñones. Thus, Cruz Quiñones became the new de facto head of the HGD. Cruz Quiñones' authority was further increased when she was put in charge of the HGD's cash register.

The cash register appears to have been an important symbol. One incident, which Sears has not denied in any material respect, involved the installation of a new cash register. Over the course of three days, Alverio called each employee, one at a time, to receive training on the new machine. All of the employees in the department received the training except Camacho.

The coup de grace occurred sometime in May or June of that year. In a meeting with Alverio and another Sears manager (identified as "Mr. Ibáñez"), Camacho was told that Sears was establishing a new salary structure for all employees. Camacho, as would many of the other employees in the Division, was to receive $4.25 per hour plus one percent commission, effectively reducing her guaranteed salary by more than 50 percent.2

Perhaps anticipating that Camacho would not accept the new wage, Alverio and Ibáñez also suggested the following: (1) a severance package; (2) resign and reapply as a "part-timer;" or (3) accept the new terms and hope to be assigned later to a higher paying position. Camacho was told that her new salary would take effect on June 28, 1992, and that she had eight days to sign the waiver, which was then placed before her. After asking about her pension — and being told that she was too young to collect any portion of it — Camacho left the meeting.

Shortly thereafter Camacho contacted an attorney. She also began discussions with various Sears officials to determine whether her options were really as limited as Alverio and Ibáñez said. Ibáñez later told Camacho that he would inquire of other Sears' facilities about the availability of other suitable positions, but he never approached Camacho with a firm offer.

Camacho also spoke with two other Sears managers (Dora Ortiz and Pedro de la Torre) who "led Camacho to believe" that Sears regularly instituted such dramatic salary restructurings in order to induce the older employees to resign.3 At the end of June 1992, Camacho left for a three week vacation which had, apparently, been scheduled for some time.

Upon her return to work near the end of July, Camacho found her name conspicuously absent from the HGD's duty roster. She nonetheless resumed her normal hours, and concedes that she did so without interference or seeking an explanation from Sears management. Further fueling Camacho's suspicions that Sears was "getting rid of her," however, was the failure of her paycheck to be ready the next pay day. Upon bringing this omission to the paymaster's attention, a hand-drawn check was prepared.

Also during August 1992, Camacho began seeing a psychologist affiliated with Sears' Employee Assistance Program. Dr. Myrna Candelario's treatment report documents Camacho's growing depression, and nascent alcohol use. Dr. Candelario traced the source of Camacho's depression to her job-related anxieties. Although nothing to this effect appears in the treatment report, Camacho stated in her deposition that

she Dr. Candelario told me that I couldn't continue in that situation, that I had to talk to the manager so that he could change my job, and that if he did not do that that I should resign because that was going to affect me a great deal and she diagnosed depression.4

Stating that she felt that she had no other choice, Camacho resigned on August 29, 1992. She spurned Alverio's and Ibáñez' attempts to dissuade her, which she felt were insincere.

The subsequent years have not been good to Camacho. Her drinking grew into alcoholism and her depression worsened. These factors apparently ended her relationship with her long-time companion, Angel Mercado, who is also a plaintiff in this case. Camacho has not worked since leaving Sears, though she apparently visits her old workplace frequently.

Based on the above allegations, Camacho claims damages and seeks relief under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., as well as Puerto Rico's anti-discrimination and wrongful discharge statutes, "Law 100," 29 L.P.R.A. § 146, and "Law 80," 29 L.P.R.A. § 185a, respectively. Camacho further alleges that Sears' conduct was motivated, at least in part, to deny her pension, and thus invokes the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1140. Also in the mix are tort claims for emotional distress under Article 1802 of Puerto Rico's Civil Code.5

Sears has moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment, of course, is only appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). As Sears has asserted a lack of supporting evidence (as well as failure to state a cognizable claim), Camacho's burden at this point is to "establish the existence of a triable issue which is both genuine and material to her claim." Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343, 347 (1st Cir.1993).

Camacho's ERISA Claim

Sears has moved for summary judgment on Camacho's ERISA claim. To make out a claim for unlawful pension discrimination in violation of § 510 of ERISA, Camacho must show that Sears "was motivated by the specific intent of interfering with the employee's ERISA benefits. ERISA provides no relief if the loss of an employee's benefits was incidental to, and not the reason for, the adverse employment action." Lehman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 74 F.3d 323, 330-31 (1st Cir.1996) (internal quotation and citations omitted). As Camacho has presented no evidence to support her ERISA claim, Sears' motion is GRANTED.

Camacho's ADEA Disparate Treatment Claim

Camacho's age discrimination claim is predicated on two alternative theories of liability. First, she claims "disparate treatment." "Disparate treatment is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their age.... Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment." Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1854 n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) (citation omitted).

Motions for summary judgment in disparate treatment claims alleging wrongful, constructive discharge are evaluated under the well-known McDonnell Douglas framework. Greenberg v. Union Camp Corp., 48 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir.1995). To establish a prima facie case, Camacho must show (i) that she was over 40 years of age (and therefore protected by the ADEA) at the time of the events in question, (ii) that her job performance was sufficient to meet Sears' legitimate expectations, (iii) that she was constructively discharged, and (iv) that Sears replaced her with a person of roughly equivalent qualifications. Id.

The recitation of the facts, above, demonstrates that factors (i), (ii) and (iv) are clearly satisfied. Sears argues vigorously, however, that Camacho was not constructively discharged. To establish a claim of constructive discharge the evidence must show that "the new working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • Mullin v. Raytheon Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • April 20, 1998
    ... ... 5 But see Camacho v. Sears ... Page 173 ... Roebuck de Puerto Rico, 939 ... ...
  • Bramble v. American Postal Workers Union, Afl-Cio, 95-497L.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
    • May 2, 1997
    ...Congress, however, has never codified the disparate impact theory with respect to the ADEA. See. e.g., Camacho v. Sears Roebuck de Puerto Rico, 939 F.Supp. 113, 119 (D.P.R.1996). Although Title VII analysis has been applied to analysis under the ADEA in numerous contexts, see. e.g., Caron v......
  • Febres Morales v. Challenger Caribbean Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • March 18, 1998
    ...(E.D.Va.1997); Martincic v. Urban Redevelopment Auth., 844 F.Supp. 1073, 1077-78 (W.D.Pa.1994); but see Camacho v. Sears, Roebuck de Puerto Rico, 939 F.Supp. 113, 118-22 (D.P.R.1996) (allowing a disparate impact claim under the ADEA). The courts that have found a disparate impact claim afte......
  • Bramble v. American Postal Workers Union, C. A. No. 95-497L (D. R.I. 5/__/1997)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
    • May 1, 1997
    ...Congress, however, has never codified the disparate impact theory with respect to the ADEA. See, e.g., Camacho v. Sears Roebuck de Puerto Rico, 939 F. Supp. 113, 119 (D.P.R. 1996). Although Title VII analysis has been applied to analysis under the ADEA in numerous contexts, see, e.g., Caron......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT