Febus v. Sanchez
| Decision Date | 16 December 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 11- 1428 (GAG) |
| Parties | JOSE MONTALVO FEBUS, et. al., Plaintiffs, v. RICHARD SANCHEZ, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Jose Javier Montalvo Febus ("Plaintiff" or "Plaintiff Montalvo") among others1 (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed the instant action seeking compensatory damages against Police Officer Richard Sanchez ("Defendant").2 (Docket No. 1) The action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of Plaintiff's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff Montalvo alleges violations of his constitutional rights in connection with the investigation and prosecution for the murder of Freddie Laboy-Valentin. Id. Plaintiffs further invoke the court's supplemental jurisdiction for claims arising under Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 & 5142. Pending before the court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all claims, or, in the alternative, qualified immunity. (Docket Nos. 46 & 47.) Plaintiffs filed their opposition at Docket Nos. 60 and61.3
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "An issue is genuine if 'it may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party' at trial, and material if it 'possess[es] the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law.'" Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994). The nonmoving party must then "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). If the court finds that some genuine factual issue remains, the resolution of which could affect the outcome of the case, then the court must deny summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and give that party the benefit of any and all reasonable inferences. Id. at 255. Moreover, at the summary judgment stage, the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Id. Summary judgment may be appropriate, however, if the non-moving party's case rests merely upon "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Forestier Fradera v. Municipality of Mayaguez, 440 F.3d17, 21 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Benoit v. Technical Mfg. Corp., 331 F.3d 166, 173 (1st Cir. 2003)).
Prior to establishing the relevant factual background, the court must first rule on Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiffs' opposing statement of material facts at Docket No. 66. Defendant contends Plaintiffs' opposition is in violation of Local Rule 56(c) and 56(e) and, therefore requests the motion for summary judgment at Docket Nos. 46 and 47 be treated as unopposed.
Local Rule 56 (c), also known as the anti-ferreting rule, requires an opposing party to admit, deny or qualify the facts of the moving party, and to explain the reasons for denials or qualifications with record citations. D.P.R. CIV. 56(c). Rule 56(e) states:
Facts contained in a supporting or opposing statement of material facts, if supported by record citations as required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted unless properly controverted An assertion of fact set forth in a statement of material facts shall be followed by a citation to the specific page or paragraph of identified record material supporting the assertion. The court may disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation to record material properly considered on summary judgment. The court shall have no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically referenced in the parties' separate statement of facts. D.P.R. CIV. 56(e).
P.R. Am. Co. V. Rivera-Vazquez, 603 F.3d 125, 131 (1st Cir. 2010).
Plaintiffs' opposing statement does not cite or reference record evidence in support of its assertions as mandated by the Local Rules. In response to Defendant's motion to strike, Plaintiffs request leave to file an amended opposing statement to include references to record evidence as required by Local Rule 56(c). (Docket No. 67.)
Irrespective of the above, Plaintiffs' amended opposition raises yet another issue. The amended opposing statement maintains the same exact allegations as the original. However, Plaintiffs appropriately modified their opposing statement only as to the Rule 56 violations to include references to a sworn statement attached as an exhibit. (See Docket No. 67-1.) Plaintiffs presented a sworn statement signed by Plaintiff Montalvo and executed on September 9, 2013, roughly two and a half months after Defendant's motion for summary judgement and four months after the conclusion of discovery.4 This sworn statement is the only record citation Plaintiffs cite to support their opposition. In sum, Plaintiffs' sworn statement suggests, via hearsay evidence, Plaintiff's knowledge of Defendant Sanchez's proposal to Sandell Vazquez that she alter her testimony in order to frame him for the murder of Freddie Laboy Valentin. It further reads that Freddy Laboy Velazquez, father of the deceased, told Defendant that, "to the best of his knowledge, and from the information he possessed, his son was like a brother to [Plaintiff Montalvo] and he was convinced that [Plaintiff Montalvo] was not the one who murdered his son." (Docket No. 67-2.)
Rule 26(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictates the mandatory disclosures parties must provide to each other during discovery. When a party fails to comply with these disclosures, Rule 37 states that "[i]f a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless." FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1); see Ortiz-Lopez v. Sociedad Española de Auxilio Mutuo y Beneficencia de P.R., 248 F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 2001) ()).
Because Plaintiffs submitted Montalvo's sworn statement for the first time at this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiffs' sworn statement is in clear violation of Rule 26. For this reason, thecourt will not allow Plaintiffs to supply this evidence on a motion. Plaintiffs justify not having presented the sworn statement at an earlier stage in litigation because they were unable to contact Plaintiff. (Docket No. 67.) They state that "it was prepared and ready to be signed and filed." Id. The court cannot excuse Plaintiffs' untimely filing. Plaintiffs should have notified the court of Montalvo's alleged disappearance. However, despite Montalvo's alleged vanishing act, prior notice to the court was not given. Based on the above, and pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs are not allowed to present the sworn statement at Docket No. 67-2 as evidence.5
Consequently, the court GRANTS Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiffs' opposing statement of material facts at Docket No. 66 and DENIES Plaintiff's leave to file an amended opposing statement of material facts at Docket No. 67. Thus, Defendant's statement of uncontested facts at Docket No. 47 is deemed admitted.
On April 26, 2010, Freddie Laboy Valentin died after being shot with a firearm. (Docket No. 47 ¶ 3.) Defendant Sanchez is a homicide investigative agent for the Puerto Rico Police Department ("PRPD") assigned to the Criminal Investigation Bureau in Guayama, Puerto Rico. Id. ¶¶ 1-2. Defendant Sanchez was assigned to investigate Laboy Valentin's death. Id. ¶ 4. After the shooting, Defendant Sanchez interviewed Laboy Valentin's father, Freddie Laboy Velazquez. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. Laboy Velazquez informed Defendant Sanchez that Edimarie Sandel Vazquez was with Laboy Valentin at the time of the shooting. Id. ¶ 7. Defendant Sanchez conducted a preliminary interview with Sandel Vazquez. Id. ¶ 8. On May 6, 2010, Defendant formally interviewed Sandell Vazquez. Id. ¶ 9. During the interview, she gave Defendant details about Laboy Valentin's death and provided a description of the author. Id. ¶ 10. As a result of the investigation, Plaintiff Montalvo became asuspect of Laboy Valentin's murder. Id. ¶ 12.
Prosecutor Elba Melendez from the Puerto Rico Department of Justice was assigned to the case. (Docket No. 47 ¶ 14.) During the course of the investigation, Defendant attempted to locate Plaintiff Montalvo to execute a line-up but was unable to do so. Id. ¶ 15. Fo...
To continue reading
Request your trial