Fecteau v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 90-1584

• Decision Date: 21 August 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-1584,90-1584
• Citation: 585 So.2d 1005
• Parties: 16 Fla. L. Weekly D2209 Barbara E. FECTEAU and Edward Fecteau, Appellants, v. SOUTHEAST BANK, N.A. and Jody Grier, as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Robert W. Grier, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1005

585 So.2d 1005

16 Fla. L. Weekly D2209

Barbara E. FECTEAU and Edward Fecteau, Appellants, v. SOUTHEAST BANK, N.A. and Jody Grier, as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Robert W. Grier, Appellees.

No. 90-1584.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Fourth District.

Aug. 21, 1991.

Joseph S. Karp and Pamela Lund of Joseph S. Karp, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellants.

Mark P. Gagnon and John Jorgensen of Scott, Royce, Harris, Bryan & Hyland P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for appellees.

HERSEY, Judge.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment terminating appellants' right of exclusive possession. The issue is whether there is a genuine question of material fact as to whether that right was an incident of support or whether it was part of a settlement of property rights. Subsidiary issues are whether the underlying agreement is ambiguous requiring a relaxation of the parol evidence rule and, in turn, the applicability of the Deadman's statute, section 90.602, Florida Statutes (1988).

Appellant, Barbara Grier Fecteau, and her then-husband, Robert W. Grier, entered into a written agreement in 1968 as part of dissolution proceedings. Paragraph four of that agreement, titled "House for Wife," provided:

Husband hereby agrees to furnish to Wife a house to be mutually selected by the Husband and Wife, the exclusive use and occupancy of said house to be in the Wife so long as the terms and conditions of this Agreement are fully complied with. Wife agrees to execute any and all documents necessary for the purchase of said house, provided, however, Husband agrees to save and hold harmless the Wife from any obligations incurred by said signing. Husband further agrees to make all payments for the purchase of said house, as well as payments for taxes, fire insurance and other coverage as may be required by a lending institution regarding the purchase of said house. Wife agrees to maintain said house in as good condition, ordinary wear and tear excepted, as said house shall be in at the time of purchase.

In 1969 the agreement was modified to provide that Grier would build a house for appellant on a lot he owned. He did in fact build the house and appellant moved in with her new husband, co-appellant Edward Fecteau. Robert Grier died in 1980. Nine years later the personal representatives of his estate paid off the mortgage on the property and filed suit to oust appellants from possession. The complaint alleged that appellants' right to possession was an incident of support which terminated upon the death of Robert Grier. Appellees sought possession in Count I and in Count II sought a declaratory judgment as to their rights in the property. They thereafter moved for summary judgment on Count II. The trial court, determining that the agreement was not ambiguous and that the paragraph in question was clearly a support obligation which terminated upon the death of Robert W. Grier, entered summary judgment for appellees.

As indicated earlier, the issue which is presented for our determination is whether, on this record, a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether paragraph four of the "Separation and Property Settlement Agreement" constitutes satisfaction of a support obligation, as the trial court held it "clearly" did, or whether it was part of the property settlement aspect of the agreement.

The only provision of the original agreement which specifically deals with support payments is paragraph six. It requires a weekly payment of $100.00 to the wife from the husband for a period of one year. Interestingly, the parties include language that the husband will make such payments "realizing that there is no legal obligation upon the husband to do so...." This is at least some indication that, for whatever reason, the parties recognized that the husband had no obligation to continue to support the wife.

It is also interesting to note that custody of the children is given to the husband, rather than to the wife, so any provision to furnish shelter is unlikely to relate to child support. In the paragraph immediately preceding the agreement of the husband to provide a house for the wife, the latter relinquishes all claims to the marital abode and to all of the real estate and other corporate interests owned by the husband. The very strong inference which arises from the relationship of these provisions, one to the other, is that the husband agreed to furnish a house for the wife in exchange for relinquishment by wife of her interests, if any, in husband's business ventures and the marital abode. This is reinforced by the absence of child support obligations and the parties' apparent recognition of lack of any spousal support obligation.

Further support for this line of reasoning emerges from examination of the circumstances existing at the time the parties modified the original agreement in September of 1969. The modification required that, rather than purchase a house for appellant, the former husband would build one for her on a lot he owned (or would shortly acquire). The fact is that at the time of this modification (as evidenced by her new name) the former wife, appellant, already had remarried. Certainly the former husband, appellees' predecessor in title, had no continuing obligation of support at that time, particularly in view of the lack of any child custody support-related obligation. One possible and logical explanation is that the former husband was fulfilling the property settlement aspect of the original agreement in consideration of the former wife's continued performance of the obligations imposed upon her in regard to the former husband's business interests.

Finally, there is the fact that the former husband did in fact construct a house on the lot he owned, title to which he retained, and the fact that the former wife and her new husband took possession and lived in the house for the remainder of the former husband's life (and continue to do so).

A separation agreement is a contract subject to interpretation like any other contract. Bingemann v. Bingemann, 551 So.2d 1228, 1231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), rev. denied, 560 So.2d 232 (Fla.1990).

Where the terms are unambiguous, the parties' intent must be discerned from the four corners of the document. Robert C. Roy Agency, Inc. v. Sun First Nat'l Bank, 468 So.2d 399, 405 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 480 So.2d 1295 (Fla.1985). "[W]here a contract is clear and unambiguous in its terms the court may not give those terms any meaning beyond that expressed." Biltmore Sys., Inc. v. Mai Kai, Inc., 413 So.2d 458 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). In the absence of ambiguity, the language itself is the best evidence of the parties' intent and its plain meaning controls. Acceleration Nat'l Serv. Corp. v. Brickell Fin. Servs. Motor Club, Inc., 541 So.2d 738 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 548 So.2d 662 (Fla.1989).

On the other hand, "[w]hen a contract is ambiguous and the parties suggest different interpretations, the issue of the proper interpretation is an issue of fact requiring the submission of evidence extrinsic to the contract bearing upon the intent of the parties." Bacardi v. Bacardi, 386 So.2d 1201, 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). When there are two reasonable interpretations, summary judgment is inappropriate because there is a genuine issue of material fact. Gulfstream Bank, N.A. v. Barnett Bank of South Florida, N.A., 438 So.2d 67 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Quayside Assocs., Inc. v. Harbour Club Villas Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 419 So.2d 678, 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) ("[w]here ... the terms of a written instrument are disputed and reasonably susceptible to more than one construction, an issue of fact is presented which cannot properly be resolved by summary judgment.").

Appellees allege that the contract is clear and has only one true meaning, and that the court would have to violate the intent of the contract to create an ambiguity. We disagree. There was more than one reasonable interpretation of...