Fed. Rubber Co. v. Indus. Comm'n
| Decision Date | 16 December 1924 |
| Parties | FEDERAL RUBBER CO. ET AL. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ET AL. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Dane County; E. Ray Stevens, Judge.
Action by the Federal Rubber Company and another against the Industrial Commission and Fred Lentzner to set aside on award of the Commission. From a judgment sustaining the award, plaintiffs appeal. Reversed.
Claimant's right eye was injured September 15, 1913, in the course of his employment by the plaintiff Federal Rubber Company. He was disabled till a short time after December 23, 1913, and compensation was paid him during his disability, and his medical and hospital expenses were paid by his employer. It was ascertained by claimant in December, 1913, that the sight of his right eye was totally destroyed for industrial purposes, but no claim for such destruction of sight was made until October 24, 1921, when he filed a claim with the Industrial Commission. It made an award in the sum of $1,078.39, and the plaintiff began an action in the circuit court for Dane county to set it aside, because barred by the six-year statute of limitations. The court affirmed the award of the Industrial Commission, and, from a judgment entered accordingly, the plaintiff appealed.
H. L. Ekern, Atty. Gen., and Mortimer Levitan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.
VINJE, C. J. (after stating the facts as above).
[1] The appeal presents the question whether the claim of an injured employee, for a permanent injury under the Workmen's Compensation Act (St. 1923, §§ 102.01-102.29), who has been paid temporary compensation, is barred by the six-year statute of limitations section 4222, subd. (4); the claim being a liability created by statute other than a penalty or forfeiture, and no other limitation being prescribed.
So far as we have been able to discover, only two provisions for barring claims are contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act. One relates to the compromise of claims, and provides that an application to review, set aside, modify, or confirm it must be made within one year from the time of such compromise. Section 102.16, subd. 1, Stats. 1923. The other provides that, where no notice of injury is given, and no payment of compensation is made within two years of the accident, the claim shall be wholly barred. Section102.12, Stats. 1923. It will readily be seen that the present case does not fall under either provision, because here notice was given, and temporary compensation was paid, and there was no compromise settlement.
[2] The trial court came to the conclusion in effect that, since the claim of the employee did not in terms come within any statute of limitations, none applied to it. It held that the proceeding before the Commission was not an action within the meaning of the statute, section 4222, subd. (4) and hence the provisions of that section did not apply to it. While we concur in saying that the enforcement of a claim under the Compensation Act is not the prosecution of an action as defined by statute, we nevertheless reach the conclusion that the limitation statutes apply to it. There can be no question that, before the enactment of the Compensation Act a cause of action founded upon personal injury was barred in six years. What the Legislature did was to take away this cause of action and substitute for it claim and proceeding under the Compensation Act, making no change, as to this claim, when it should be barred. Since the revision of 1878 down to and including the statutes of 1923, the title of the chapter has been “Limitations of Commencement of Actions and Proceedings,” and under it has appeared the provisions that claims filed with a city or county board, or a county court, should be deemed the commencement of an action. Section 4242, Stats. 1913. Later, and by chapter 553, Laws of 1917, as to claims filed against cities and counties, the time began to run when the claim was disallowed, and not when it was filed, and the time for bringing the action was limited to six months. The enforcement of a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act is certainly a proceeding coming well within the title of chapter 330, relating to limitations of actions. To resolve a doubt the title to an act may be resorted to. State ex rel. McMannan v. Thomas, 150 Wis. 194, 136 N. W. 623, and cases cited.
When we consider the fact that the Workmen's Compensation Act was enacted to secure a certain, speedy, and inexpensive...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bouchard v. State Emps. Ret. Comm'n, SC 19754
...Protection Cabinet v. Kentucky Ins. Guaranty Assn. , 972 S.W.2d 276, 281 (Ky. App. 1997) ; Federal Rubber Co. v. Industrial Commission , 185 Wis. 299, 300–301, 201 N.W. 261 (1924).We observe that there is greater consensus that no statute of limitations will be applied to such proceedings w......
-
Autio v. Proksch Const. Co., 9
...court imposed a similar limitation judicially upon the Wisconsin compensation law in Federal Rubber Company v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin (1924), 185 Wis. 299, 201 N.W. 261, 40 A.L.R. 491. The persuasive dissent in that case is applicable to 'The old law of master and servant was sc......
-
Eldridge v. Idaho State Penitentiary
...N.Y. 374, 114 N.E. 805.) Baur v. Court of Common Pleas, 88 N.J.L. 128, 95 A. 627, not only does not support the apparent holding in Federal Rubber Co., supra, but absolutely contrary thereto, because it held that a statute passed in 1913, limiting the time within which to inaugurate a proce......
-
Works v. Koepsel
...is further contended that the statute of limitations has run on applicant's claim. It was held in Federal Rubber Company v. Industrial Commission, 185 Wis. 299, 201 N. W. 261, 40 A. L. R. 491, that the general six-year statute of limitations applied to claims for compensation. It is pointed......