Feehan v. Slater

• Decision Date: 17 December 1915
• Citation: 96 A. 159,89 Conn. 697
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: FEEHAN v. SLATER.

96 A. 159

89 Conn. 697

FEEHAN

v. SLATER.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 17, 1915.

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Joseph P. Tuttle, Judge.

Action by James E. Feehan against Frank Slatel. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Bernard F. Gaffney, of New Britain, for appellant. William J. Malone and Newell Jennings, both of Bristol, for appellee.

RORABACK, J. The complaint described the plaintiff's injuries as follows: At the time of the accident he was the owner and carrying on an entertainment business in the nature of a revolving carriage or merry-go-round, which required his attendance shortly thereafter at New Britain, Conn., and at the Stafford Fair to be held at Stafford Springs, Conn. As a result of the accident and injuries, he was unable to fulfill his business arrangements at either New Britain or at Stafford Springs, and has been unable to perform any work or labor, and has suffered and sustained damages, as a result of the accident and injuries, which prevented the prosecution of the plaintiff's business.

The answer to these allegations, in substance, was a general denial. It was conceded that the plaintiff, when injured, was the owner and operator of a machine called a "merry-go-round." During the summer of 1914 he had conducted this business in various towns in Connecticut. For several days prior to October 3, 1914, his machine had been operated upon the Connecticut fair grounds, in the town of Berlin. His engagement at this place terminated upon the day last mentioned. He was injured by a collision with the defendant's automobile while walking along the highway with one of his employés from the Berlin depot to the fair grounds. While so walking side by side they heard the horn of the defendant's automobile, which was behind them and going in the same direction. When they became aware of the presence of the automobile the employé turned to the right, and the plaintiff to the left, to allow the automobile to pass them. The plaintiff was overtaken by the defendant's car, which struck and injured him. In addition to these facts, the plaintiff offered evidence to prove and claimed to have proven that before and after the collision the defendant was running his car at an excessive rate of speed; that the plaintiff and his companion did not know of the approach of the car until it was within a few feet of them; that he was compelled to dash to the left-hand side of the road onto a grass plot in his attempt to avoid a collision with the defendant's car. The plaintiff also offered evidence to prove, and claimed to have proven, that as a result of this accident he was prevented from personally attending to and supervising his business engagements at New Britain and Stafford Springs, and that he was unable in any way to engage in business up to the time this suit was brought; that the business of the plaintiff in operating and supervising this revolving carriage could only be carried on under his own personal supervision. The estimated income of this business, above expenses, was $45 per day. He also offered evidence of profits or income received daily from his machine in Naugatuck, Terryville, Bristol, and several other places where he had operated it during the summer of 1914.

The defendant offered evidence to prove that, when he saw the two men upon the highway, he sounded his horn and reduced the speed of his car; that he saw them turn and look at his automobile, when one turned to the right; the other, the plaintiff, after he had turned to the right, then turned to the left and ran across the highway towards the defendant's automobile; that when he discovered this action of the plaintiff the defendant again reduced the speed of his car and attempted to pass the plaintiff upon his left side, but the plaintiff continued to run to the left until he was directly in front of the automobile, when he was struck and injured.

The plaintiff obtained a verdict for $1,000, and the case is now before us upon exceptions to the charge of the court as it was given.

The first reason of appeal recites a long passage in the charge which contains several distinct and independent propositions of law; thus leaving it uncertain which particular error is claimed to have been committed by the trial court. It may be assumed, however, from the argument and brief of counsel, that the defendant contends that the trial court failed to lay down a rule of law which would properly guide the jury as to the plaintiff's duty to have exercised reasonable care at the time and place in question. In like manner it may be also inferred from this reason of appeal that the defendant contends that the jury should have been instructed that the plaintiff could not recover if it appeared from the evidence that he turned to the left, instead of turning to the right, at or about the time he was injured. In that portion of the charge in which the trial court...