Leger v. Kelley
| Citation | 19 Conn.Supp. 167,110 A.2d 635 |
| Decision Date | 13 October 1954 |
| Docket Number | No. 22199,22199 |
| Court | Superior Court of Connecticut |
| Parties | Roger LEGER v. Charles F. KELLEY et al. |
Suisman & Shapiro, New London, for plaintiff.
William L. Beers, Atty. Gen., Louis Weinstein, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the named defendant.
McGuire & McGuire, Now London, for defendant The Stonington Auto Station.
The plaintiff, a minor, brings this action by his mother as next friend against Charles F. Kelley and The Stonington Auto Station. He claims damages for injuries, alleged to have been caused from broken glass in the windshield of his father's automobile, received on May 15, 1953, while a passenger in a 1938 Chrysler passenger automobile owned and operated by his father when it was in collision with another automobile.
In the first count the plaintiff alleges that the defendant Kelley was negligent in that he is alleged to have originally accepted an application and caused or permitted said automobile to be registered on December 23, 1952, and granted a renewal registration on or about February 28, 1953, although the automobile was manufactured after July 1, 1937, and was not equipped in its windshield with approved safety glass as provided in § 2447 of the General Statutes (as amended, Cum.Sup.1953, § 1033c). In the second count damages are claimed against the defendant Stonington Auto Station based upon misrepresentation and breach of warranty.
The defendant Kelley demurs to the complaint on several grounds which are divided into three parts. The first part of the demurrer is addressed to the complaint in so far as it purports to atate a cause of action against the defendant as commissioner of motor vehicles. The grounds stated in substance are that in attempting to sue the defendant as commissioner of motor vehicles it is in effect a suit against a state without its consent, and further that it is not alleged that the state has authorized the plaintiff to sue this defendant as an administrative officer of the state.
Plaintiff's counsel in argument claim that the suit is against Kelley individually and disclaim any intention of suing him as commissioner of motor vehicles, and administrative officer. While it is true that the writ and complaint in general does refer to him by name only, yet in paragraph 1 it is alleged that he 'was the duly appointed, qualified and active commissioner of motor vehicles within and for the State of Connecticut.' Furthermore the alleged negligence is claimed to be based upon a breach of duty in the performance of § 2447. That section refers only to the commissioner of motor vehicles as such.
It is fundamental that no suit will lie against the state without its consent unless specifically allowed by statute. In Munson v. MacDonald, 113 Conn. 651, 660, 155 A. 910, 914, the court said: 'As highway commissioner he would be a proper party to the appeal for a reassessment, but no action for damages would lie against him in his representative capacity for acts done in pursuance of his duty as a state officer.'
In so far as the complaint by its allegations appears to state a cause of action for damages against the defendant Kelley as commissioner of motor vehicles in his representative capacity, the grounds of demurrer in this respect are sound.
The next part of the demurrer is addressed to the complaint in so far as it purports to state a cause of action against the defendant Kelley individually. As indicated above, plaintiff's counsel claim that the suit is against the defendant Kelley individually. The grounds stated in substance are that the proximate causal connection between the alleged violation of duty and the injuries is not sufficiently alleged, and that the alleged breach of duty is one owed to the public generally rather than to this plaintiff individually.
It is essential that it appear that the violation of the statute was the proximate cause of the injury sustained. Feehan v. Slater, 89 Conn. 697, 701, 96 A. 159; Genishevsky v. Fishbone, 109 Conn. 58, 60, 145 A. 54. A plaintiff must not only prove a violation of the statute concurrent with the injury but also that a condition to which the statute directly relates had a causal connection with his injuries. Knybel v. Cramer, 129 Conn. 439, 444, 29 A.2d 576. The allegations of the complaint as it now stands are not sufficient in this regard.
No case directly in point in Connecticut or elsewhere has been cited or found on the question whether a defendant holding a state office as commissioner of motor vehicles can be held liable individually in negligence. The question must be approached from general legal principles. The statute, § 2447, referred to in the complaint has been amended in subsection (a) thereof by § 1033c of the 1953 Cumulative Supplement, which reads in part as follows: 'The commissioner of motor vehicles shall not register any motor vehicle manufactured after July 1, 1937, unless the windshield, the doors, windows and glass partitions are equipped with safety glass of a type approved by him * * *.'
The rule of official responsibility appears to be that 2 Cooley, Torts (4th Ed.) p. 385; see also 43 Am.Jur. 84.
The law seems to be clear that if the duty discharged is a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Coleman v. E. Joliet Fire Prot. Dist.
...as the origin of the public duty rule: Trautman v. City of Stamford, 32 Conn.Supp. 258, 350 A.2d 782, 784 (1975) ; Leger v. Kelley, 19 Conn.Supp. 167, 110 A.2d 635, 638 (1954) ; Sawicki v. Village of Ottawa Hills, 37 Ohio St.3d 222, 525 N.E.2d 468 (1988) ; DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 652......
-
Campbell v. City of Bellevue
...as an individual, and that he has suffered a special and peculiar injury by reason of its nonperformance.' (Leger v. Kelley, 19 Conn.Sup. 167, 110 A.2d 635, 636 (1954), aff'd, 142 Conn. 585, 116 A.2d 429 Somewhate illustrative of the exception to the general rule are the cases of Smullen v.......
-
Massengill v. Yuma County
...229; Scott v. City of New York, 2 A.D.2d 854, 155 N.Y.S.2d 787, aff'd., 9 N.Y.2d 764, 215 N.Y.S.2d 72, 174 N.E.2d 745; Leger v. Kelley, 19 Conn.Sup. 167, 110 A.2d 635, aff'd., 142 Conn. 585, 116 A.2d 429; Mechem, Public Officers §§ 598--600; 65 C.J.S. Negligence § In Leger v. Kelley, supra,......
-
Nelson v. Freeman, 80-0874-CV-W-1.
...at length, affirmed a decision of the Superior Court of Connecticut sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, Leger v. Kelley, 19 Conn.Sup. 167, 110 A.2d 635 (Conn.Super.Ct.1954), aff'd, 142 Conn. 585, 116 A.2d 429 (Conn. 1955). The Superior Court had concluded, in an opinion quoting Section ......