Feek v. Township Board of Bloomingdale

Decision Date10 October 1890
Citation47 N.W. 37,82 Mich. 393
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
PartiesFEEK v. TOWNSHIP BOARD OF BLOOMINGDALE.

Application for mandamus.

CHAMPLIN C.J.

The relator asks for a mandamus to compel the township board to approve a liquor bond presented to the board by the relator under Act 313 of the Public Acts of 1887. The township board refused to entertain jurisdiction for reasons stated in their answer to the petition as follows: "The said respondents further show unto the court that the said township board refused to approve said bond of the said John W. Feek, said bond being presented to said board as a liquor bond for said Feek who was desirous of and intended to engage in the business of selling and keeping for sale spirituous and intoxicating liquors at retail in said township, for the reason that the board of supervisors of the county of Van Buren, in which said township is situated, in pursuance of Act No. 207 of the Public Acts of the Legislature for 1889, adopted a resolution prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors, or any mixed liquor or beverage any part of which is intoxicating, as provided in section 13 of said act. That before the adoption of said resolution by said board of supervisors, the will of the qualified electors of said county was ascertained whether or not the manufacture of liquors and the liquor traffic should be prohibited within the limits of said county; and that, in order to ascertain the will of the electors aforesaid by an election, as provided in said Act 207, all of the provisions of sections three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, and all the other provisions of said law in regard to the election therein provided, were in every particular complied with and performed, and, upon the canvass of the votes of the said board of supervisors, as required by law, it was ascertained that a majority of the legal voters of said county had voted in favor of prohibiting the manufacture of liquors and the liquor traffic in said county. The election aforesaid was held on Monday, the 24th day of February, 1890. That the result of the county canvass showed a majority of all the legal votes cast were in the affirmative of the proposition to prohibit within said county the manufacture of liquors and the liquor traffic, and the said board of supervisors, after the canvass as aforesaid, so determined and declared, and thereupon the said board of supervisors did adopt a resolution by a majority vote of all the members elect ordering the prohibition within the limits of said county of Van Buren of the manufacture, sale, keeping for sale, giving away, or furnishing of any vinous, malt, brewed, fermented, spirituous, or intoxicating liquors, and prohibiting the keeping of a saloon, or any other place, where such liquors are manufactured, sold, stored for sale, given away, or furnished. That said resolutions were adopted at the meeting of the board of supervisors at which said canvass was made, and more than forty days before the 1st day of May, 1890, and that all the provisions of section 13 of said act, so far as the same refers to the duty of said board of supervisors, was fully complied with and performed by said board of supervisors. The respondent avers and states that all the steps required to be taken and performed under Act 207 aforesaid, to ascertain the will of the legal electors of Van Buren county aforesaid in regard to the manufacture of liquor and liquor traffic therein, have been taken, and that the election was legal and valid, and the affirmative proposition aforesaid legally adopted and so determined by the said board of supervisors, and the resolution aforesaid of said board of supervisors also was legally adopted, and respondents submit to this honorable court that said Act 207 is not unconstitutional and void, but, on the contrary, is legal and valid, and that it was the duty of respondents to refuse to act on said bond, and that the mandamus ought to be denied." Counsel for relator insists that Act No. 207 is unconstitutional for the following reasons: " First, because the said law embraces more than one object; second, because the objects are not all embraced in the title; third, because the bill under its title as published is a new bill introduced after the first fifty days of the legislative session had expired; fourth, because the act authorizes the board of supervisors of a county to spread upon their records the independent action of the county clerk, without proof of such action, and to make it evidence that cannot be contradicted; fifth, because, in terms, said act confers judicial power upon the board of supervisors; sixth, because said act contains no provision for giving notice of the popular election to township boards and common councils, who have authority under it to designate the places for such election to be held; seventh, because the said act confers the final power upon the board of supervisors to declare an illegal election a valid one; eighth, because the act confers upon the board of supervisors the power to adopt irrepealable legislation; ninth, because the act does not provide for definite publication of the resolution of the board of supervisors; tenth, because proof of publication is not made necessary in proof of the law; eleventh, because the legal act of posting a United States internal revenue receipt is made evidence of crime; twelfth, because the act assumes to delegate legislative power to the people of counties; thirteenth, because said act attempts to delegate to the people of counties the power to supersede and suspend, not only the general laws of the state in force at the time of the passage of said act, but also such general laws as may be passed in the future; fourteenth, because said act does not take effect upon the judgment and determination of the legislature, but upon the judgment and determination of the people of the counties acting jointly with the board of supervisors. And for the further reason that said act is opposed to the constitutional provisions and policy designed to secure representative government."

Act No. 207 is entitled as follows: "An act to prohibit the manufacture, sale, keeping for sale, giving away, or furnishing of vinous, malt, brewed, fermented, spirituous, or intoxicating liquors, or any mixed liquors, or beverage, any part of which is intoxicating, and to prohibit the keeping of any saloon or other place for the manufacture, sale, storing for sale, giving away or furnishing of such liquors or beverages, and to suspend the general laws of the state relative to the taxation and regulation of the manufacture and sale of such liquors in the several counties in this state under certain circumstances; to authorize the qualified electors of the several counties in this state to express their will in regard to such prohibition by an election; and to authorize and empower the board of supervisors of the several counties, after such election, if they shall determine the result to be in favor of such prohibition, to prohibit the manufacture, sale, keeping for sale, giving away, or furnishing of any such liquors, or of the keeping of a saloon or other place for the manufacture, sale, storing for sale, giving away, or furnishing of the same within their respective counties; and to provide for penalties and rights of action in case of its violation." It is claimed that the act embraces two distinct objects in its title, viz.: " First, to prohibit the manufacture, sale, etc., of liquors in the several counties of this state: second, to authorize and empower the board of supervisors of the several counties to prohibit such manufacture and sale." In order to ascertain whether the title of the act embraces more than one object, the whole act must be examined and considered. And as the whole act seems to be involved in the objections raised to its validity, the act, for convenience of reference, wil be found printed, post, p. 44. Viewing this act as a whole, we find it to be a law, the object of which is to prohibit the manufacture, sale, etc., of intoxicating liquors at the option of the local authorities of any county in this state. In reaching that object, the legislature saw fit to provide for delegating to the board of supervisors the authority to legislate or to make a certain order upon the subject. Prohibition is the end provided for, and the board of supervisors are constituted the means to attain that end. The object is single, and all the instrumentalities are designed to attain that object. I can see no constitutional objection to the title of the act.

In discussing the questions raised, I shall follow the arrangement contained in the brief of the counsel for relator, and the next question discussed by him is under the head of "Irrepealable Legislation." Attention is called to section 13 of the act, wherein it is provided that after the resolution of prohibition takes effect, it shall not be subject to...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT