State v. Cooke

• Decision Date: 26 October 1877
• Citation: 24 Minn. 247
• Parties: The State of Minnesota v. Charles L. Cooke
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

24 Minn. 247

The State of Minnesota v. Charles L. Cooke

Supreme Court of Minnesota

October 26, 1877

The defendant was arrested and tried before a justice of the peace for the offence of selling intoxicating liquors within the corporate limits of the city of Rochester, on May 10 1877, contrary to the provisions of section 3, c. 34, Sp Laws 1876. It appeared, upon the trial, that on April 3 1877, an election was held in the city of Rochester, pursuant to the said chapter, and it was then determined, in the manner therein provided, that no licenses should be granted for the sale of intoxicating liquors in said city, either by the common council or the board of county commissioners. To justify the sale, the defendant gave in evidence a license from the common council of the city of Rochester, issued December 1, 1876, authorizing him to sell intoxicating liquors within said city for the term of twelve months from its date; the ordinance of the city under and pursuant to which the license was issued; and other proof to the effect that he paid to the treasurer of said city, for the aforesaid license, the sum of $ 200; that no part of said sum had ever been paid or tendered back to him; that the said license had never been revoked by any of the authorities of said city that he had never received any notice of the result of the said election; and that the sale in question was at the place and in accordance with the terms of the license.

The defendant thereupon moved to be discharged, which motion was overruled, and the court then adjudged that he pay a fine and the costs, and in the meantime stand committed. From this judgment the defendant appealed, on questions of law alone to the district court of Olmsted county, Mitchell, J., presiding, and the said judgment having been affirmed by the said court, the defendant appealed to this court.

Judgment affirmed.

Chas. C. Willson and C. M. Start, for appellant.

The general scope and object of the statute was the regulation of the subject of new licenses, and section 3 ought not be extended in its application so as to embrace old licenses. Attorney General v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 139; Estate of Ticknor, 13 Mich. 44; Bank v. Hale, 59 N.Y. 53; Bryant v. Livermore, 20 Minn. 313; Grimes v. Bryne, 2 Minn. 92, (106.) It is not to be presumed that the legislature intended to revoke existing licenses, without notice and without compensation to the holders, and the court should not give the statute such effect by construction.

Moreover, the law itself is unconstitutional, as an attempt to delegate the law-making power to the people of the city of Rochester, not as a municipal body, but as individual electors. The vitality of the law depends upon the vote of the people, and not upon the judgment of the legislature. Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279; State v. Weis, 33 Iowa 134; Geebrick v. State, 5 Iowa 495; Barto v. Himrod, 8 N.Y. 483; Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342; Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 484; Rice v. Foster, 4 W. & S. 58.

R. H. Gove, City Attorney, and H. C. Butler, County Attorney, and George P. Wilson, Attorney General, for respondent.

The statute was a complete and mandatory law at the date of its approval, not dependent upon the vote of the people of Rochester, and therefore constitutional. It prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquor, under certain penalties, upon the happening of a certain event, and that event has happened. There is here no delegation of the law-making power to the people of the city of Rochester, but merely a direct submission to them of the question, which was formerly indirectly submitted to them through their common council, whether licenses shall or shall not be issued. There is in this no delegation of a new power, but merely permission to exercise an old power in a new way. This matter of issuing licenses is a mere police regulation, and therefore a proper subject for submission to the people of the locality, since it is only allowing less extensive powers than a municipal charter could confer. Cooley Con. Lim. 123; Com. v. Bennett, 108 Mass. 27; Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491; S.C. 13 Amer. Rep. 716.

Licenses are mere temporary permits to do what otherwise would be unlawful; they are not property in any legal sense, (Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N.Y. 657,) and holders thereof are bound by subsequent legislation. Bish. on St. Crimes, § 1001.

Finally every intendment ought to be made in support of legislative enactments, and they are not to be declared invalid except for the plainest and most conclusive reasons. Fell v. State, 42 Md. 71; S.C. Amer. Rep. 83...