Feenberg Pipe & Supply Co. v. Matthews

• Decision Date: 17 September 1935
• Docket Number: Case Number: 26214
• Parties: FEENBERG PIPE & SUPPLY CO. et al. v. MATTHEWS et al.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

1935 OK 796

49 P.2d 76

173 Okla. 473

FEENBERG PIPE & SUPPLY CO. et al. v. MATTHEWS et al.

Case Number: 26214

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Decided: September 17, 1935

Syllabus

¶0 1. MASTER AND SERVANT--Workmen's Compensation--Review of Awards--Reversal Where Findings not Supported by Competent Evidence.

The findings of the State Industrial Commission are final and binding on this court where there is competent testimony to support such findings, but where there is no such testimony, such findings may be reversed as a matter of law.

2. SAME--Evidence Required to Excuse Claimant's Failure to Give Statutory Notice of Injury.

The State Industrial Commission is not authorized by the provisions of section 13358, O. S. 1931, to excuse the failure to give notice required by that section in the absence of any competent evidence.

Original action in the Supreme Court by the Feenberg Pipe & Supply Company, and/or Feenberg Supply Company (own risk) for review of order and award of the State Industrial Commission made in favor of W. D. Matthews. Award vacated.

R. V. Lewis and Remington Rogers for petitioners.

Luther Bohanon, A. P. Murrah, J. I. Gibson, and Leonard H. Savage, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

¶1 This is an original proceeding in this court to review an award of the State Industrial Commission in favor of W. D. Matthews, claimant, and against Feenberg Pipe & Supply Company, and/or Feenberg Supply Company, respondent. The employer is the petitioner here. The parties will be hereafter referred to as the petitioner and claimant.

¶2 The sole question presented for our determination is whether there was any competent evidence to support the fourth finding of fact as made by the Commission. This finding recites:

"That the respondent, within 30 days of said accidental injury, had actual knowledge of said accidental injury and was not prejudiced by the failure of the claimant to given written notice."

¶3 It is the contention of the petitioner that notice was not given by the claimant as required by law, and that there is absolutely no evidence to sustain either portion of the above finding made by the Commission, and that consequently the Commission was without authority of law to make such finding.

¶4 It is not contended that the claimant gave notice of his alleged injury in the manner required by the provisions of section 13358, O. S. 1931. The employee's first notice of injury and claim for compensation was made and filed with the State Industrial Commission on October 23, 1934. Claimant testified, however, that the foreman in charge of his employer's business was present, when the alleged accident occurred on August 8, 1934.

¶5 Section 13358, supra, provides that the failure of the employee to give the notice therein required bars a claim for compensation unless the employee shall by affirmative proof show that such notice could not have been given, or that his employer was not prejudiced by the failure to give such notice. There is in the record before us no affirmative proof that the notice required by said section could not have been given. The claimant seeks to excuse his failure on the ground of actual notice, and maintains that this was sufficient under the rule announced by this court in Olsen Drilling Co. v. Claxton. 152 Okla. 293, 4 P.2d 1045, and City of Kingfisher v. Jenkins, 168 Okla. 624, 33 P.2d 1094, but the evidence of the claimant does not support this contention. On the contrary, it shows a failure to apprise either the petitioner or its foreman of the nature and extent of claimant's alleged injury and a failure to afford the employer an opportunity to investigate the claim or to render medical attention on behalf of claimant. And further shows that this neglect on the part of claimant continued even after he had placed himself under medical care of his own choosing. The evidence further fails to show that claimant ever manifested any intention of claiming compensation from the employer until long after it was too late for the employer to make any investigation regarding the claim, or to render any medical assistance to the claimant. In Norman Steam Laundry v. State...