Feiden v. Feiden

• Decision Date: 22 June 1989
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 1,1,2
• Citation: 542 N.Y.S.2d 860,151 A.D.2d 889
• Parties: Norman R. FEIDEN, Respondent, v. Harry M. FEIDEN, Respondent, and James H. Tully, Jr., as Conservator of the Property of Frank T. Feiden, Appellant. (Action) James H. TULLY, Jr., as Conservator of the Property of Frank T. Feiden, Appellant, v. Harry M. FEIDEN et al., Respondents. (Action)
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 860

542 N.Y.S.2d 860

151 A.D.2d 889

Norman R. FEIDEN, Respondent, v. Harry M. FEIDEN, Respondent, and James H. Tully, Jr., as Conservator of the Property of Frank

T. Feiden, Appellant.

(Action No. 1.)

James H. TULLY, Jr., as Conservator of the Property of Frank

T. Feiden, Appellant, v. Harry M. FEIDEN et al., Respondents.

(Action No. 2.)

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

June 22, 1989.

DeGraff, Foy, Conway, Holt-Harris & Mealey (Carol A. Hyde, of counsel), Albany, for appellant.

Kingsley & Towne (John P. Kingsley, of counsel), Albany, for Harry M. Feiden, respondent.

Before KANE, J.P., and CASEY, MIKOLL, YESAWICH and HARVEY, JJ.

KANE, Justice Presiding.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Kahn, J.), entered July 27, 1988 in Albany County, which, inter alia, dismissed the conservator's cross claim in action No. 1 and the complaint in action No. 2.

On January 11, 1986, Frank T. Feiden conveyed his farm, consisting of approximately 41 acres, to his two sons, Harry M. Feiden and Norman R. Feiden. ¹ Two deeds were executed and the property was divided between the two sons, with Harry receiving a greater share than Norman. A will previously executed had apparently divided the property equally between the two sons. In 1982, Frank had been diagnosed with organic brain syndrome or Alzheimer's disease and was placed in an adult home in 1984. However, in 1985 after being admitted to a hospital for surgery, the home could no longer care for him. It was while he was at the hospital, waiting to be admitted to a nursing home, that he signed the deeds. As a result, Norman commenced action No. 1 against Harry and Frank seeking to have the deeds set aside on the grounds of incompetency and undue influence. Thereafter, a conservator was appointed for Frank, who commenced a separate action (action No. 2) against the sons to set aside the deeds on similar grounds. The two actions were consolidated for trial and, at the close of the conservator's case, the claim of undue influence was dismissed. After trial, Supreme Court upheld the deeds' validity, finding that the proof was insufficient to show that Frank was incompetent when he executed the deeds. This appeal by the conservator ensued.

We turn first to the question of Frank's competency. A party's competence is presumed and the party asserting incapacity bears the burden of proving incompetence (see, Matter of Gebauer, 79 Misc.2d 715, 719, 361 N.Y.S.2d 539, affd. 51 A.D.2d 643, 378 N.Y.S.2d 653). Persons suffering from a disease such as Alzheimer's are not presumed incompetent and may execute a valid deed (see, 43 NY Jur 2d, Deeds, § 23, at 208; see also, Matter of Betz, 63 A.D.2d 769, 404 N.Y.S.2d 737). Furthermore, it must be shown that, because of the affliction, the person was incompetent at the time of the transaction (see, Matter of Bush, 85 A.D.2d 887, 888, 446 N.Y.S.2d 759). It has been stated that the inquiry is whether the person's mind was "so affected as to render him wholly and absolutely incompetent to comprehend and understand the nature of the transaction" ( Aldrich v. Bailey, 132 N.Y. 85, 89, 30 N.E. 264; see, Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd. of City of N.Y., 25 N.Y.2d 196, 202, 303 N.Y.S.2d 362, 250 N.E.2d 460).

In this case, the medical testimony as to Frank's mental capabilities was conflicting. One physician testified that in 1985 Frank was unable to handle his financial affairs, and one psychiatrist stated that between August 1985 and February 1986 Frank would have been unable to understand the consequences of the deeds. However, another psychiatrist testified to the contrary, noting that Frank "had lucid intervals" and could not be called "wholly incompetent". Further testimony revealed that an attorney initially contacted by Norman to draw up two deeds dividing the land equally decided not to have Frank sign those deeds because he was unsure of his competency. However, a second attorney contacted by Harry and who ultimately obtained Frank's signature on the deeds at issue testified very clearly and explicitly as to what occurred at the time of Frank's signing of the deeds. This testimony of the transaction indicated that Frank understood what he was signing, was aware that Harry was receiving more property and had the mental capacity to execute the deeds. ² Additionally, the nursing summary notes for January 10, 1986 through January 12, 1986 stated that Frank was "alert and oriented", although he suffered from "periods of confusion and disorientation".

We are aware that since this case was tried without a jury, we have the power to weigh the probative force of the conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony and grant a judgment different than the trial court's if the evidence so warrants (see, Cordts v. State of New York, 125 A.D.2d 746, 749-750, 509 N.Y.S.2d 166). However, due deference must be given to the Trial Judge's decision as he was in a better position to assess the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses (see, id.). Here, although the medical evidence...