Felder v. City of Tacoma, 38171

• Decision Date: 09 June 1966
• Docket Number: No. 38171,38171
• Citation: 68 Wn.2d 726,415 P.2d 496
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Ned E. FELDER and Gwendolyn G. Felder, husband and wife, Appellants, v. The CITY OF TACOMA, a municipal corporation, John P. Bridges and Jane Doe Bridges, husband and wife, Respondents.

Page 726

68 Wn.2d 726

415 P.2d 496

Ned E. FELDER and Gwendolyn G. Felder, husband and wife, Appellants, v. The CITY OF TACOMA, a municipal corporation, John P. Bridges and Jane Doe Bridges, husband and wife, Respondents.

No. 38171.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 2.

June 9, 1966.

Lee, Krilich & Anderson, Nile E. Aubrey, Tacoma, for appellants.

Bateman, Reed, McClure & Moceri, Gerald R. Moran, Seattle, for respondents.

BARNETT, Judge. ^*

We are again concerned with a rearend automobile collision. Plaintiffs, occupants of the lead car, appeal from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict in favor of defendants.

Ned Felder and his wife Gwendolyn, plaintiffs (appellants), were returning home from Tacoma, where they had been Christmas shopping, on the evening of December 7, 1963. Their destination was Fort Lewis, Washington, where Mr. Felder was stationed as a member of the armed forces. They were traveling upon Pacific Avenue, the main arterial leading south from Tacoma. It was dark, the hour being approximately 8:30 p.m., and raining. Still within the limits of the city, plaintiffs approached the intersection of Pacific and 25th; Mr. Felder was driving. When he was approximately 'two and a half car lengths' from the intersection (from his own testimony), Mr. Felder glanced upward, his eye catching a flash of yellow from the traffic light controlling the intersection. Thinking that the light was about to change from yellow to red, Mr. Felder brought his automobile to a stop. Moments later, a Tacoma city bus struck him from behind, propelling his car some 40 feet into the intersection. The testimony conflicted on the length of time plaintiffs were stopped before being hit. When asked by the driver of the bus why he had stopped at the intersection, Mr. Felder replied that he had stopped for a red light. It was then discovered by Mr. Felder that the controlling traffic signal was a Flashing yellow light, contrary to what he had assumed.

Plaintiffs brought this suit against defendants (respondents) City of Tacoma and John P. Bridges, the driver of the bus, for personal injuries and property damage sustained as the result of the accident. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs' motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial was denied.

Plaintiffs make four assignments of error. In the first it is claimed that the issues of defendant driver's negligence and Mr. Felder's contributory negligence should not have gone to the jury. Put simply, plaintiffs contend that, under the undisputed facts, defendant bus driver was negligent as a matter of law, and that this negligence was the sole proximate cause of the collision. RCW 46.60.080 provides, in part:

It shall be unlawful for the operator of any motor vehicle to follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of any such public highway.

The primary duty of avoiding a collision between two vehicles traveling in the same direction falls upon the driver of the following automobile. Izett v. Walker, 67 Wash.Dec.2d 895, 410 P.2d 802 (1966); Miller v. Cody, 41 Wash.2d 775, 252 P.2d 303 (1953). In the absence of an emergency or unusual conditions, the following driver is negligent if he collides with the forward vehicle. Flaks v. McCurdy, 64 Wash.2d 49, 390 P.2d 545 (1964); Miller v. Cody, supra. RCW 46.60.230 provides, in part:

Whenever, at any point, traffic is controlled by traffic control signals or signs exhibiting * * * different colored lights * * * said lights * * * shall indicate and apply to drivers of vehicles and pedestrians as follows:

Flashing yellow: When a yellow lens is illuminated with rapid intermittent flashes, drivers of vehicles may proceed through the intersection or past such signal only with caution.

It is implicit in this statutory requirement that drivers stop at such signals when not to do so might be harmful to others. It therefore follows that all drivers approaching such signals are warned that forward vehicles, upon reaching the hazardous area, might stop in the interests of safety. Signals of this type are forwarnings of potentially dangerous conditions. Vehicular stops at such intersections are to be anticipated. At the very least, the reasonable, prudent motorist cannot claim surprise when such a stop is made. We quote at length from Miller v. Cody, supra, 41 Wash.2d at 778, 252 P.2d at 305:

Where two cars are traveling in the same direction, the primary duty of avoiding a collision rests with the following driver. In the absence of an emergency or unusual conditions, he is negligent if he runs into the car ahead. (Citing case.) The following driver is not necessarily excused even in the event of an emergency, for it is his duty to keep such distance from the car ahead and maintain such observation of that car that an emergency stop may be safely made. (Citing cases.)

In the instant case, Cody (appellant) was not confronted with any situation approaching an emergency. As the driver of the following car he was chargeable with knowing that the car ahead, which was edging out into the cross traffic of an intersecting street, might come to an abrupt stop. He nevertheless failed to observe this event when it did occur, or at least did not maintain such distance or have such control of his car that he could avoid the collision. Accepting at face value appellant's account of how the accident occurred, we are therefore of the view that The trial court did not err in holding appellant negligent as a matter of law. (Italics ours).

Defendant Bridges, the bus driver, testified that plaintiffs stopped abruptly and without warning. From this evidence, defendants contend that, in accordance with the rule set forth in James v. Niebuhr, 63 Wash.2d 800, 802, 389 P.2d 287 (1964), the trial court properly submitted the issue of defendant's negligence to the jury. The plaintiff in that case was driving down an arterial highway and had stopped to allow cars to enter the arterial from an access road. The defendant, who contended that the plaintiff did not signal her intention to stop, struck plaintiff's vehicle from the rear. Reversing the trial court's ruling that the following driver was negligent as a matter of law, we said:

(I)t was error to hold the defendant guilty of negligence as a matter of law, since, if the plaintiff stopped suddenly and without warning At a place where a sudden stop was not to be anticipated, the jury was entitled to find that the defendant was not traveling closer to the plaintiff or at a speed greater than reasonable care required under the circumstances. While the following driver has the primary duty of avoiding an accident, he is not guilty of negligence as a matter of law, simply because he collides with a vehicle in front of him. (Citing cases.) (Italics ours.)

In the case at bar, however, from the following driver's point of view, plaintiffs' stop--sudden or otherwise--was to be anticipated. It is not only lead drivers who must heed traffic control signals; the followers, too, are charged with their luminous messages. Whatever message a flashing yellow light imports, it must include a warning that a sudden stop might there be made by a leading driver. 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 323 (1949) states:

When approaching a street intersection a driver is bound to anticipate that a car ahead of him may be stopped by traffic signals or conditions, and may therefore be guilty of negligence in running into it when it does stop.

See, also, Gleason v. Rhodes Center Pharmacy, Inc., 94 Ga.App. 439, 95 S.E.2d 293 (1956); Greenberg v. Robertson-Stelling Corp., 127 Misc. 427, 216 N.Y.S. 340 (1926).

We hold that, under the facts of this case, defendant bus driver acted negligently as a matter of law. The trial court erred in submitting the issue to the jury.

The trial court also submitted to the jury the issue of plaintiffs' contributory negligence. Error is assigned to this action. Plaintiffs contend that they had a 'right' to stop at the flashing yellow light; that such stop was 'justified.' From this premise they argue that, as a matter of law, they could not have been guilty of contributory negligence. Mr. Felder's admitted reason for stopping at the intersection was his misreading of the traffic signal. He testified, however, that After he had stopped, he noticed approaching traffic from either side upon the intersecting roadway. When asked how long he had been stopped before being struck from behind, he answered:

I can not say definitely. * * * I know that I did have enough time to look to the right and look to the left * * *. I noticed that cars were coming from east and west on 25th into Pacific, so I would estimate that it must have been from 10 to 20 seconds that I was stopped before I was struck * * *.

Mr. Felder testified that he came to a gradual stop; and that he had been stopped for some 10 to 20 seconds before being struck by the bus. Defendant bus driver testified that plaintiffs' car came to an abrupt stop, without warning, and...