Feliciano v. AutoZone, Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 19200.,19200.
• Citation: 111 A.3d 453,316 Conn. 65
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Doris FELICIANO v. AUTOZONE, INC.

316 Conn. 65

111 A.3d 453

Doris FELICIANO

v.AUTOZONE, INC.

No. 19200.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 1, 2014.

Decided March 31, 2015.

Josephine Smalls Miller, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Emery K. Harlan, pro hac vice, with whom were Proloy K. Das and, on the brief, Andrew L. Houlding, Hartford, for the appellee (defendant).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js.

Opinion

ROGERS, C.J.

The issue in this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly affirmed the trial court's summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, Autozone, Inc., on the claims of unlawful discrimination on the basis of national origin, religion, sex, disability and race filed by the plaintiff, Doris Feliciano. The plaintiff brought this action pursuant to the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a–51 et seq., alleging that the defendant, her employer, had engaged in disability discrimination and sexual harassment, and had unlawfully terminated her employment on the basis of her national origin, religion and race. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that the plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination on any of her claims. The trial court granted the motion and rendered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Feliciano v. Autozone, Inc., 142 Conn.App. 756, 774, 66 A.3d 911 (2013). We then granted the plaintiff's application for certification to appeal on the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment on all counts of the plaintiff's complaint?” Feliciano v. Autozone, Inc., 310 Conn. 908, 76 A.3d 625 (2013). We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the trial court only with respect to the plaintiff's claim of sexual harassment in the workplace, and affirm the judgment in all other respects.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following undisputed facts and procedural history. “The plaintiff is a black female who was born in the U.S. Virgin Islands and practices the Rastafarian religion. As part of her religion, she wears her hair in dreadlocks. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant, first as a sales clerk and later as a supervisor, for a few years before being transferred to the defendant's Bloomfield location (store). Michael Balboni became the manager of the store in 2005, while the plaintiff was a supervisor there. The defendant had a company wide customer loyalty reward card program in place for purchases made by customers. In May, 2007, the defendant's automatic loss prevention computer program flagged twenty transactions between April 28 and May 9, 2007, involving the same customer loyalty card number. Nineteen of the twenty transactions were listed as being processed under the plaintiff's customer service representative number.

“On May 16, 2007, the plaintiff was accused by the defendant of improperly using a customer loyalty reward card for her own use. Patricia Vasquez, a loss prevention specialist, was sent by the defendant to investigate the situation. Vasquez questioned the plaintiff in the presence of Erwin Ballou, a district manager of the defendant. At the interview, the plaintiff admitted that she signed into the cash register and left it signed in under her customer service representative number for other employees to use. The plaintiff further admitted that she was ‘wrong’ for letting other employees work under her customer service representative number. Vasquez forwarded her report, including the plaintiff's statements, to the defendant's staff attorney, Timothy P. Harrison, in Tennessee. He was not acquainted with the plaintiff. Harrison recommended that the plaintiff's employment be terminated, and Azeem Sikandar, regional manager for the defendant, followed the recommendation by calling for the termination of the plaintiff's employment on the ground that she had violated the defendant's loss prevention policy. The plaintiff's employment was terminated on May 22, 2007....

“Following her termination, the plaintiff filed a timely complaint with the Connecticut [C]ommission on [H]uman [R]ights and [O]pportunities on July 27, 2007, within 180 days of the actions attributed to the defendant, and with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued a notice of right to sue on April 7, 2009, and the Connecticut [C]ommission on [H]uman [R]ights and [O]pportunities released jurisdiction on April 14, 2009. On April 30, 2009, the plaintiff commenced this action in the trial court pursuant to the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act.¹

“The defendant moved for summary judgment on all five counts of the plaintiff's complaint and, following oral argument by counsel, the court issued its memorandum of decision and entered its corresponding judgment on February 10, 2012, rendering summary judgment on all counts in favor of the defendant.” (Footnotes altered.) Feliciano v. Autozone, Inc., supra, 142 Conn.App. at 758–60, 66 A.3d 911.

The plaintiff then appealed to the Appellate Court claiming that the trial court improperly had rendered summary judgment on all five counts of her complaint because there were genuine issues of material fact as to all of her claims. Id., at 760, 66 A.3d 911. The Appellate Court, as did the trial court, construed the plaintiff's complaint as raising claims that the defendant had failed to reasonably accommodate her claimed disability; id., at 762, 66 A.3d 911 ; had engaged in sexual harassment in the workplace; id., at 764–65, 66 A.3d 911 ; and had unlawfully terminated her employment on the basis of her national origin, religion and race.²

Id., at 769, 66 A.3d 911. With respect to the disability discrimination claim, the Appellate Court determined that the trial court properly had determined that the plaintiff had failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was disabled within the meaning of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act. Id., at 764, 66 A.3d 911. With respect to the plaintiff's claim of sexual harassment, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court improperly had assumed that the plaintiff had intended to bring a hostile work environment claim pursuant to General Statutes § 46a–60 (a)(8)(C) ;³ id., at 766–67, 66 A.3d 911 ; see footnote 1 of this opinion; and affirmed the judgment on the alternative ground that “[t]he defendant was not on notice of the statutory basis for the plaintiff's claim”; Feliciano v. Autozone, Inc., supra, 142 Conn.App. at 767, 66 A.3d 911 ; because the plaintiff had not brought the claim pursuant to a specific provision of § 46a–60. Id., at 767–68, 66 A.3d 911. With respect to the plaintiff's unlawful termination claims, the Appellate Court upheld the judgment of the trial court that the plaintiff had failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff's termination occurred under “circumstances ... that give rise to an inference of discrimination” on the basis of her national origin, religion or race. Id., at 774, 66 A.3d 911.

The plaintiff claims on appeal to this court that the Appellate Court improperly determined that: (1) she had failed to make out a prima facie case that her employment was unlawfully terminated on the basis of her national origin, religion or race; and (2) she could not prevail on her sexual harassment claim because the defendant was not on notice of the statutory basis of the claim.⁴ We reject the plaintiff's first claim but agree with her second claim. We further conclude that the plaintiff has established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was subjected to a hostile work environment on the basis of her sex.

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review. “The standards governing our review of a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment are well established. Practice Book [§ 17–49 ] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.... The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ... and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.... A material fact ... [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case.... Finally, the scope of our review of the trial court's decision to grant the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is plenary.” (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) H.O.R.S.E. of Connecticut, Inc. v. Washington, 258 Conn. 553, 558–60, 783 A.2d 993 (2001).

With these principles in mind, we first address the plaintiff's claim that the defendant unlawfully terminated her employment on the basis of her national origin, religion or race. The legal standards governing discrimination claims involving adverse employment actions are well established. “The framework this court employs in assessing disparate treatment discrimination claims under Connecticut law was adapted from the United States Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and its progeny. Lyon v. Jones, 291 Conn. 384, 406–407, 968 A.2d 416 (2009). We look to federal law for guidance on interpreting state employment discrimination law, and the analysis is the same...