HORSE of Connecticut, Inc. v. Washington

• Decision Date: 20 November 2001
• Docket Number: (SC 16313)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: H.O.R.S.E. OF CONNECTICUT, INC. v. TOWN OF WASHINGTON

258 Conn. 553

783 A.2d 993

H.O.R.S.E. OF CONNECTICUT, INC. v. TOWN OF WASHINGTON

(SC 16313)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 18, 2001.

Officially released November 20, 2001.

Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Sullivan, JS.¹ William C. Franklin, with whom, on the brief, was Denise M. Cloutier, for the appellant (defendant).

Jeffrey J. Tinley, with whom was Robert Nastri, Jr., for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

PALMER, J.

The plaintiff, H.O.R.S.E.² of Connecticut, Inc., appealed to the trial court from the decision of the board of assessment appeals of the defendant town of Washington, claiming that it is a charitable organization, the real property of which is entitled to a tax exemption pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 12-81 (7).³ The trial court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. H.O.R.S.E. of Connecticut, Inc. v. Washington, 57 Conn. App. 41, 51, 746 A.2d 820 (2000). We granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal limited to the following two issues: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that: (1) there were no material facts in dispute regarding whether the plaintiffs property is used exclusively for charitable purposes under ... § 12-81 (7); and (2) even if there were no such facts in dispute, as a matter of law the plaintiff is a charitable organization under § 12-81 (7), and uses its property exclusively for charitable purposes?"

H.O.R.S.E. of Connecticut, Inc. v. Washington, 253 Conn. 911, 754 A.2d 161 (2000). We disagree with the Appellate Court's conclusion that the trial court properly determined that there are no material facts in dispute as to whether the plaintiff uses its property exclusively for charitable purposes and, consequently, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.⁴

The following undisputed facts are set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court. "The [defendant's] board of assessment appeals denied the plaintiffs claim for an exemption from local taxation as to a forty-six acre parcel of land that the plaintiff owns and operates as a farm for injured, distressed and mistreated horses. The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, claiming that [its property is exempt from taxation] under § 12-81 (7) because it is a corporation⁵ organized exclusively for charitable purposes, and it uses the property exclusively to carry out such purposes. The court noted that the plaintiffs corporate charter reveals that its objectives are to unite into one organization the care of all abused, neglected, unwanted and lost domestic hoofed animals; to provide education and training pertinent to the care of hoofed animals for employees, members and officers, and the community as a whole; and to safeguard, advance and promote the safety and well-being of domestic hoofed animals by political, educational and other community activity. The plaintiffs president, Patricia Wahlers, resides on the property ... and cares for the horses."⁶ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) H.O.R.S.E. of Connecticut, Inc. v. Washington, supra, 57 Conn. App. 42-43. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

The trial court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact and, on the basis of the undisputed facts, the plaintiffs property was tax exempt under § 12-81 (7) because the plaintiff is a charitable organization that uses its property exclusively for charitable purposes. On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly had determined that there were no material facts in dispute. Id., 44. The defendant further claimed that, even if, as the trial court had concluded, there were no material facts in dispute, the plaintiff is not entitled to a property tax exemption under § 12-81 (7). Id., 46. The defendant advanced two arguments in support of this claim: first, the plaintiff does not qualify as a charitable organization for purposes of § 12-81 (7) because its purpose is to serve the well-being of horses, not that of social man; id., 47; and second, even if it is assumed that the plaintiff is a charitable organization within the meaning of § 12-81 (7), it nevertheless is not entitled to a property tax exemption because it does not use its property exclusively for charitable purposes. See id., 48. The Appellate Court rejected the defendant's arguments and affirmed the trial court's judgment. Id., 51. Because we conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the plaintiff uses its property exclusively for charitable purposes, we conclude that summary judgment was inappropriate and, therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.⁷

Before addressing the merits of the defendant's claim, we set forth the applicable standard of review. "The standards governing our review of a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment are well established. Practice Book [§ 17-49]⁸ provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.... The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ... and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Practice Book [§ 17-46]."⁹ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 209, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000). "A material fact ... [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hammer v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co., 214 Conn. 573, 578, 573 A.2d 699 (1990). Finally, the scope of our review of the trial court's decision to grant the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is plenary. See, e.g., Doucette v. Pomes, 247 Conn. 442, 453, 724 A.2d 481 (1999).

Our review of the defendant's claim also is informed by the "settled rule of law that statutes which exempt from taxation are to be strictly construed against the party claiming an exemption.... Exemptions, no matter how meritorious, are of grace, and must be strictly construed. They embrace only what is strictly within their terms." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United Church of Christ v. West Hartford, 206 Conn. 711, 718, 539 A.2d 573 (1988). "It is also well settled that the burden of proving entitlement to a claimed tax exemption rests upon the party claiming the exemption." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 719.

With these principles in mind, we turn to the defendant's claim that the Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court's decision to grant the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. Certain additional facts, however, are necessary to our resolution of that claim.

In support of its opposition to the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, the defendant relied on the following testimony of Wahlers, which was taken at a deposition on January 23, 1997:

"[William C. Franklin, counsel for the defendant]:... During the time you have been on Wilbur Road [in Washington], have you permitted anyone to board healthy horses there?

"[Wahlers]: Yes.

"[Franklin]: How does that work?

"[Warders]: They pay board. They bring the horses in. They pay board. Their horses are taken care of just as well as the others that are injured and/or sick.

"[Franklin]: Can people board healthy horses there?

"[Wahlers]: Yes. There [are] no contagious diseases. Every horse is checked before it comes through the door.

* * *

"[Franklin]: What's the boarding deal? If I called you up and say, T have a perfectly healthy horse but I know you will take good care of it, can I board the horse there?' You say, `Sure.' How much?

"[Wahlers]: Three hundred dollars a month.

"[Franklin]: Three hundred a month. What do I get for that?

"[Wahlers]: Everything.

"[Franklin]: I know nothing about horses.

"[Wahlers]: Okay. You will get whatever they need as far as feed, their hay. They get vitamins, electrolytes, that type of stuff. They get hoof oil and shoe shine. We make them pretty [and] everything else. They get groomed every day. If you can't be there, they get hand walked or ridden if we have your permission ... to ride them. If people that are full-time working people... come up only on the weekends, it's much safer to have your horse hand walked or ridden during the week to make sure it's not a banana when you come up to ride on the weekend. They get blanketed, so on [and] so forth.

"[Franklin]: You have twenty current tenants? "[Wahlers]: Yes. "[Franklin]: Two are retired? "[Wahlers]: Yes.

"[Franklin]: And of the other eighteen, how many of them are—

"[Wahlers]: Twelve boarders.

"[Franklin]: Twelve boarders and eight rehabilitation projects?

"[Wahlers]: ([Wahlers] nods).

"[Franklin]: Js. that a pretty representative mix of what you have all the time? I know that the numbers change, but [have] about [one] half of your horses [been] boarders over the years?

"[Wahlers]: Yes.

"[Franklin]: How do your boarding rates compare with boarding rates around town, if you know?

"[Wahlers]: We're less expensive.

"[Franklin]: Why is that?

"[Wahlers]: I don't believe that boarding places should be getting as much money as they get. Besides, we don't have an outdoor ring, which is one of the big things."

In support of its motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted the affidavit...