Rodriguez–Reyes v. Molina–Rodriguez
| Decision Date | 29 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 11–1504 (FAB). |
| Citation | 851 F.Supp.2d 375 |
| Parties | Karen RODRIGUEZ–REYES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Carlos MOLINA–RODRIGUEZ, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Johanna M. Emmanuelli–Huertas, Pedro E. Ortiz Alvarez, Law Office, Ponce, PR, for Plaintiffs.
Christian E. Pagan–Cordoliani, Puerto Rico Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
Before the Court are the motions to dismiss filed by defendants Carlos Molina–Rodriguez (“Molina”) and Sonia Rios (“Rios”), (collectively, “defendants”) (Docket Nos. 6 & 9), and the plaintiffs' opposition (Docket No. 10). For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED.
Karen Rodriguez–Reyes (“Rodriguez”), Carmen Rivera–Rosado (“Rivera”), Maria Torres–Plaza (“Torres”), Pilar Vega (“Vega”), and Liz Fuentes–Rodriguez (“Fuentes”) (collectively, “plaintiffs”) are former employees of the Administration of Juvenile Institutions (“AIJ”). (Docket No. 1, pp. 2–3, 4–8.) Rodriguez, Rivera, Torres, and Fuentes claim to be well-known affiliates of the Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”). Id. at 4–6, 8. Plaintiff Vega claims to be a well known affiliate of the Puerto Rico Independence Party (“PIP”). Id. at p. 2, 7. The New Progressive Party (“NPP”) administration entered office in 2009. Id. at p. 4, 14. The plaintiffs allege that after taking office, the NPP administration “began to dismiss employees and replace them with those affiliated with the NPP or maintained those identified with the party.” Id. The plaintiffs state that the defendants were aware of the plaintiffs' political affiliations because “they engaged in a witch-hunt scheme to obtain information as to the affiliation of each employee.” Id. at p. 6, 44. Specifically, they claim that the “officers began to talk about politics, to ask about everybody's affiliation and even made expressions as to the fact that there would be NPP's [sic] very upset if their [the plaintiffs'] contracts would be renewed.” Id. at p. 7, 45.
Plaintiff Rodriguez worked for the AIJ from July 2003 until May 30, 2010. Id. at p. 4, 13, 15. She had most recently served as a science teacher at the Villalba institution. Id. at 16. Rodriguez alleges that she never received a negative evaluation during her tenure with the AIJ. Id. at 17. Rodriguez claims she was replaced by Jose Colon, a member of the NPP and friend of the President of the NPP. Id. at 19.
Plaintiff Rivera worked for the AIJ from July 2003 until May 30, 2010. Id. at 19, 21. She most recently served as an elementary “school” teacher at the Villalba institution. Id. at 22. Like plaintiff Rodriguez, Rivera also alleges that she never received a negative evaluation during her tenure with the AIJ. Id. at 23. Rivera claims she was replaced by Marexis Arroyo, who was younger and a member of the NPP. Id. at p. 5, 24. The complaint asserts that Rivera was terminated due to her political affiliation and age. Id. at 25.
Plaintiff Torres worked for the AIJ from 1998 until May 30, 2010. Id. at 26, 29. She most recently served as a science teacher at the Ponce institution. Id. at 31. Like plaintiffs Rodriguez and Rivera, Torres also alleges that she never received a negative evaluation during her tenure with the AIJ. Id. at 30. Torres claims she was replaced by Rousmarie Borrero, a member of the NPP who joined the AIJ in 2010. Id. at 32. The complaint states that of the two AIJ employees not retained at the Ponce location in 2010, neither was a member of NPP. Id. at 33.
Plaintiff Vega worked for the AIJ from 2000 until an unspecified date after 2009. Id. at p. 6, 34, 36. She most recently served as a school director. Id. at 34. Vega alleges that she always received “excellent monitorings [sic]” during her tenure with the AIJ. Id. at 38. Vega claims that in 2009 she was informed that all director positions were to be eliminated and that she would be appointed to a regional director position. Id. at 36. She alleges that, instead, an NPP member was appointed as regional director. Id. at 37. The complaint asserts that Vega was terminated due to her political affiliation and age. Id. at 39.
Plaintiff Fuentes began working for the AIJ in 2006. Id. at 41. She worked as a physical education teacher at the Humacao location from 2006 to 2008, and from 2009 to 2010. Id. at 41. Like other plaintiffs, Fuentes alleges that she never received a negative evaluation during her tenure with the AIJ. Id. at 42. Fuentes claims that she was not offered a position for the 2011–2012 school year. Id.
On May 31, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant Molina, in both his personal and official capacity, defendant Rios, John Doe 1, and John Doe 2. (Docket No. 1.) The plaintiffs claim that their employment was terminated based upon their political affiliation. Id. at p. 1, 1. Plaintiffs Rivera and Vega also allege that they were terminated because of age, in addition to political affiliation. Id. at pp. 5, 6, 25, 39. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations to their freedom of speech and freedom of association. Id. at p. 7, 49. Additionally, plaintiffs allege violations of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 31, § 51412 (“Article 1802”) and article 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 31, § 51423 (“Article 1803”). Id. at pp. 7, 8, 49, 51. Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. Id. at pp. 7–8, 50, 53.
On August 12, 2011, defendant Molina filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”). (Docket No. 6.) On October 24, 2011, defendant Rios also filed a motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 9.) The defendants argue (1) that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination, (2) that article 1803 is not applicable to the defendants, and (3) that the article 1802 and Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico claims have no “cognizable basis for federal jurisdiction.” (Docket Nos. 6 pp. 12–13 & 9 pp. 12–13.) On October 26, 2011, plaintiffs filed an opposition to defendants' motions to dismiss.4 (Docket No. 10.) Plaintiffs argue that they have sufficiently provided facts, and not conclusory statements, which establish a plausible prima facie case of political discrimination. Id. The Court will consider each argument in turn.
Rule 12(b)(6) allows the Court to dismiss a complaint when it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a Court must accept the “well-pleaded facts as they appear in the complaint, extending [the] plaintiff every reasonable inference in his [or her] favor.” Medina–Claudio v. Rodriguez–Mateo, 292 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir.2002). “[A]n adequate complaint must provide fair notice to the defendants and state a facially plausible legal claim.” Ocasio–Hernandez v. Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2011). When faced with a motion to dismiss, “[a] plaintiff is not entitled to ‘proceed perforce’ by virtue of allegations that merely parrot the elements of the cause of action.” Id. at 12 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). Any “[n]on-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint [, however,] must ... be treated as true, even if seemingly incredible.” Id. (citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951). Where those factual allegations “ ‘allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,’ the claim has facial plausibility.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949). Furthermore, a court may not “attempt to forecast a plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits; ‘a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if ... a recovery is very remote and unlikely’.” Id. at 13 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). The relevant inquiry, therefore, “focuses on the reasonableness of the inference of liability that the plaintiff is asking the court to draw from the facts alleged in the complaint.” Id.
According to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must base its determination solely on the material submitted as part of the complaint or central to it. Fudge v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1015 (1st Cir.1988). Generally, “a court may not consider documentsthat are outside of the complaint, or not expressly incorporated therein, unless the motion is converted into one for summary judgment.” Alt. Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir.2001). “When ... a complaint's factual allegations are expressly linked to—and admittedly dependent upon—a document (the authenticity of which is not challenged), [however,] that document effectively merges into the pleadings and the trial court can review it in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Beddall v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir.1998) (internal citation omitted). This is especially true where the plaintiff has “actual notice ... and has relied upon these documents in framing the complaint.” Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1993).
The Court will first determine if the plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of political discrimination against the defendants. Then the Court will evaluate the plaintiffs' claims brought under Puerto Rico law.
III. Legal AnalysisA. Section 1983
“Government officials are forbidden by the First Amendment from taking adverse action against public employees on the basis of political affiliation, unless political loyalty is an appropriate requirement of the employment.” Ocasio–H...
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Rodríguez–Reyes v. Molina–Rodríguez
...but the court granted them, dismissing with prejudice all federal claims against all defendants. See Rodríguez–Reyes v. Molina–Rodríguez, 851 F.Supp.2d 375, 383 (D.P.R.2012). The court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent claims and dismissed them without pre......