Felt v. Felt

• Citation: 59 N.J.E. 606,45 A. 105
• Parties: FELT v. FELT.
• Decision Date: 22 December 1899
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)

45 A. 105

59 N.J.E. 606

FELT

v. FELT.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Dec. 22, 1899.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from court of chancery.

Bill by Betsy E. Felt against Joseph F. Felt for divorce. Decree for defendant (40 Atl. 436), and complainant appeals. Affirmed.

Frank L. Holt, for appellant .

Williams & Edwords, for respondent.

GUMMERE, J. The appellant, by her bill in this case, seeks a decree of divorce from her husband for adultery, and also for desertion. The respondent has pleaded, in bar of the relief sought, a decree of absolute divorce obtained by him against the appellant in a district court of the territory of Utah. A full recital of the averments of the plea is not necessary. It is sufficient for present purposes to say that the truth of those averments is conceded by the appellant; that from them it appears that the court which rendered the decree pleaded had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suit, and of the respondent here, who was the complainant therein, and who at the time of the institution of the suit was a bona fide resident of the territory of Utah; that the domicile of his wife was in this state, and that she was neither served with process within the territory of Utah, nor did she personally submit herself to the jurisdiction of the court, but that jurisdiction was obtained by publication of the process and complaint made in accordance with the statutes of Utah; that, in addition, personal service thereof was made upon her, at her residence in New Jersey, a sufficiently long time before the period within which to make answer had expired to afford her an opportunity to defend the suit, if she had desired to do so; and that the decree was granted upon two grounds, viz. cruelty and desertion. What force and effect will be attributed to a decree of divorce, rendered in a court of a sister state, where the jurisdiction of the court rests solely upon the domicile of the complainant, and where the defendant, being a nonresident, is brought into court by publication and the service of notice outside the jurisdiction, is a question of first impression in this court, it will not be denied that the preservation of good morals, and a proper regard for social relations, make it desirable that such a decree should be considered valid, not only in the state where it is pronounced, but in every other jurisdiction, provided the grounds upon which it is based are recognized in such jurisdiction as justifying the decree. By it the matrimonial relation of the husband and wife is terminated in the state in which it is rendered. Within the boundaries of that state a marriage afterwards contracted by either of the parties with a third person is entirely valid. So, too, sexual relations between the former husband and wife, within that jurisdiction, subsequent to the entry of the decree, are illicit, unless sanctioned by a new marriage. But, if the decree is without extraterritorial force, the entire status of both parties is reversed as soon as they pass beyond the limits of that state. A subsequent marriage to a third person within that state then becomes void, and the relations of the parties to it become adulterous; while sexual relations between the parties to the decree, which are meretricious if indulged in within that state, become matrimonial again when indulged in without its borders. A condition of the law which makes the intercourse of a man and woman either legitimate or adulterous, as they happen to be within the limits of one state or another, is not to be...