Felton v. Leake Cnty. Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 07 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14CV411 DPJ-FKB |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
| Parties | VERNA FELTON PLAINTIFF v. LEAKE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, and PATRICK POSEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AS SUPERINTENDENT OF THE LEAKE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT DEFENDANTS |
This employment dispute is before the Court on Defendants' amended motion for partial dismissal or, in the alternative, for partial summary judgment [38]. Plaintiff Verna Felton has responded in opposition [59]. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion is granted.
Verna Felton, the former principal of the Leake Central Junior High School, filed this suit against the Leake County School District ("LCSD") and its Superintendent, Patrick Posey, asserting various claims stemming from her suspension and termination. Her allegations include discrimination based on "her race and sex in violation of Title VII and Section 1981," intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel, slander, defamation, tortious interference with contract, invasion of privacy, and unlawful discharge. First Am. Compl. ("FAC") [33] ¶ 50.
Beginning in 2012, Felton became principal at Leake Central Junior High. In February 2013, the LCSD and Superintendent Posey recommended renewal of her contract for the 2013-2014 school year. But on February 18, 2013, Defendants suspended Felton's employment based on complaints of bullying, intimidation, and threatening behavior resulting in a "hostile workenvironment in violation of the Mississippi Educator Code of Ethics." First Am. Compl. ("FAC") [33] ¶ 29. Defendants later terminated Felton's employment on March 6, 2013.
Felton requested and received a hearing in accordance with Mississippi Code Section 37-9-59. The hearing lasted four days, during which Felton, with the assistance of two attorneys, put forth evidence challenging the employment decision through witness testimony and exhibits. Defs.' Mem. [39] at 2-4; Defs.' Reply [61] at 7; Pl.'s Mem. [60] at 27. The Board of Education for the LCSD, after reviewing the hearing record and allowing Felton and her attorney to address the Board, voted to uphold the termination. Chancery Ct. Rec. [38-1] at 13. The Board explained that Felton was being terminated "due to her insubordination, neglect of duty and deficiency in meeting professional responsibilities; failure to follow the policies of the Leake County Board of Education; her refusal to comply with reasonable directives of the Superintendent; incompetence and failure to implement the instructional needs of Leake Central Junior High School." Id. Felton filed a notice of appeal with the Chancery Court of Leake County, but neglected to post an appeal bond, so the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 32.
After exhausting her administrative remedies under Title VII, Felton filed the present suit. The matter is now before the Court on Defendants' motion to dismiss, or alternatively, for summary judgment, in which Defendants generally contend that all claims, other than those under Title VII, are preempted by the school board's decision. The motion is fully briefed, personal and subject-matter jurisdiction exist, and the Court is prepared to rule.
In their motion, Defendants invoke both Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 while offering record evidence. Plaintiff likewise relies heavily on materials outside the record. See, e.g., Pl.'s Resp. [59] ¶ 11. Under Rule 12(d), the Court must convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion if it considers "matters outside the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). "Rule 12(d) gives a district court 'complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.'" Isquith ex rel. Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 194 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1366 (1969); Ware v. Assoc. Milk Producers, Inc., 614 F.2d 413, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1980)). Here, the Court has considered the parties' exhibits, so Rule 56 applies.
Summary judgment is warranted under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The rule "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323. The nonmoving party must then "go beyond the pleadings" and "designate 'specific facts showingthat there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324 (citation omitted). In reviewing the evidence, factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, "but only when . . . both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). When such contradictory facts exist, the court may "not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). Conclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic arguments have never constituted an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075; SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993).
Finally, it should be mentioned that both parties failed to fully comply with Rule 56(c)(1), which states that "[a] party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." (emphasis added). Rule 56(c)(3) adds that "[t]he court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record." And under Rule 56(e), "[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact . . . , the court may: . . . (2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion." Though the Court made every effort to consider the record as a whole, to the extent something was missed there was no "duty to sift through the record in search of evidence." Jackson v. Cal-W. Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 379-80 (5th Cir. 2010).
Defendants make the following three arguments in their motion: (1) all of Plaintiff's claims—except for her Title VII claims—are barred by res judicata and/or collateral estopptel; (2) Plaintiff's remaining claims against Defendant Posey in his individual capacity are inappropriate; and (3) Plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages against a government agency. Each will be addressed in turn.
Defendants argue that the LCSD Board of Education's decision is an adjudication entitled to preclusive weight. Therefore, they contend that all of Plaintiff's claims, except her Title VII claim, are due to be dismissed based on the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Because res judicata applies, the Court will not address collateral estoppel.
Generally speaking, res judicata precludes a party "from relitigating claims that were or could have been raised in a prior action." Cook v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Lowndes Cnty., 806 F. Supp. 610, 615 (N.D. Miss. 1992). Here, the "prior suit" is actually an administrative determination from the LCSD Board of Education. But there can be no serious dispute that an administrative ruling from a state agency can carry preclusive effect.
According to the United States Supreme Court, when a state agency resolves disputed issues of fact, "federal courts must give the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State's courts." Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986) (). And the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that a termination hearing conducted by a school board qualifies as a decision by a state administrative agency for res judicata purposes. See Miller v. Pascagoula Mun. Sep. Sch.Sys., 263 F.3d 162, at *1 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citing Levitt v. UTEP, 847 F.2d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 1988)). Such a hearing occurred in this case pursuant to the procedures provided in Mississippi Code Section 37-9-111.
Even assuming a school-board decision can carry preclusive effect, Felton raises three threshold arguments. First, she contends that res judicata cannot apply because she did not appeal the school-board decision pursuant to section 37-9-113. But this argument runs counter to Elliott, in which the Supreme Court held that the agency determination had preclusive effect, despite the employee's failure to "seek review of [the] administrative proceedings in the [state] courts." 478 U.S. at 792; see also Ellis v. Tupelo Pub. Sch. Dist., Civil Action No. 1:12-CV-234-SA-DAS, 2014 WL 1285947, at *4 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 31, 2014) ().
Second, Felton generally states that she "has not had an adequate opportunity to litigate her claims against the Defendants LCSD and Posey." Pl.'s Mem. [60] at 18 (emphasis in original). But Felton neither elaborates on that point nor cites any record evidence to support it. See Jackson, 602 F.3d at 379-80 ...
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