Felton v. State

Decision Date24 September 2018
Docket NumberS18A0627
Citation304 Ga. 565,819 S.E.2d 461
Parties FELTON v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Matthew K. Winchester, Law Offices of Matthew K. Winchester, Atlanta, Attorney for the Appellant

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Matthew Min-soo Youn, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Law, Joshua Bradley Smith, A.D.A., Natalie Spires Paine, Henry Wayne Syms, Jr., District Attorneys, Augusta Judicial Circuit, District Attorney's Office, Attorneys for the Appellee

BENHAM, Justice.

Appellant Johnathan Felton appeals his convictions related to the shooting death of Eric Wright.1 As error, appellant alleges the trial court improperly commented on the evidence in violation of former OCGA § 17-8-57. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm his convictions.

The evidence viewed in a light most favorable to supporting the jury’s verdicts shows as follows. On the night of October 25, 2010, police responded to a report of shots fired at a car wash located at 2583 Tobacco Road in Richmond County. Given the late hour of that Sunday night, the car wash was empty and the surrounding businesses were closed. The first officer to the scene testified that the victim was unresponsive and lying on his back, bleeding from gunshot wounds

.

The victim’s girlfriend, who was the only eyewitness to the crime, testified she and the victim had driven to that location in order for the victim to meet someone to purchase an audio component for his car. She testified that a man was already at the car wash when she and the victim arrived. A small, four-door red vehicle that had a black woman in the driver’s seat was parked nearby. The girlfriend testified she waited in the car while the victim got out and spoke with the man. She stated she could not hear their conversation because the car engine was running, but she could see the two men and the man was faced towards her in front of the victim’s vehicle. The girlfriend testified she saw the man pull out a gun and shoot the victim several times. She testified the victim raised his arms and tried to back away from the man before collapsing. Once the victim fell, the man fled from the scene in the red car. The victim’s girlfriend called 911 and described the shooter as a black male wearing a black t-shirt and dark pants with short twists in his hair. The police put out a bulletin alert for the red car and its occupants and ran database searches based on a partial license plate number, but were not able to make any progress in the case with those leads.

The lead investigator testified that police retrieved the victim’s cell phone from the scene and went through the telephone numbers in that phone to cultivate leads, homing in on the phone numbers that appeared close in time to the shooting. The lead investigator testified that whenever police identified a person of interest from the phone numbers, one of the investigators working the case presented a photographic lineup including that individual’s photograph to the victim’s girlfriend. For example, the photograph of C.J., who was a friend of the victim, was placed in a lineup because he had called the victim, but the victim’s girlfriend did not identify him as the shooter. In addition, the police received an anonymous tip that K.H. and L.C. were seen with a .380 caliber weapon in the area a week prior to the shooting. They also received an anonymous tip concerning H.P. Police placed the photograph of each of these men in a photographic lineup and presented the lineups to the victim’s girlfriend, but she did not identify any of them as the shooter. Police presented approximately six photographic lineups to the victim’s girlfriend.

One of the phone numbers that appeared in the victim’s cell phone close in time to the shooting belonged to D.J.2 Police put D.J.’s picture in a photographic lineup, but the victim’s girlfriend did not identify him as the shooter. However, when police spoke to D.J., he told them his phone had been stolen; therefore, police subpoenaed the records associated with D.J.’s phone. When police looked at D.J.’s phone records, they found a phone number belonging to appellant. Appellant’s phone number appeared in D.J.’s phone records at approximately the same time D.J. told police his phone had been stolen. On November 3, 2010, approximately a week after the shooting took place, investigators placed appellant’s photograph in a photographic lineup and presented the lineup to the victim’s girlfriend. She identified appellant as the shooter, telling investigators she was 100% sure he was the perpetrator.

A ballistics expert testified that a projectile and three shell casings recovered from the scene were all fired from the same .380 caliber weapon. The medical examiner testified the victim had five gunshot wounds

, one of which was to the chest and the others to his hands and to one of his arms. The medical examiner stated that the gunshot wounds

to the victim’s hands and arm were consistent with being defensive wounds. The gunshot that entered the victim’s chest pierced his left lung, the left ventricle of his heart, and his liver. The medical examiner concluded the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds and the manner of death was homicide.

1. The evidence adduced at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. Appellant contends the trial court erred when it made comments allegedly in violation of former OCGA § 17-8-57. The commentary at issue occurred during the defense’s cross-examinations of the victim’s girlfriend and the lead detective in the case. The relevant colloquies and summations of appellant’s allegations are set forth below.

a. Comments made during cross-examination of the victim’s girlfriend.

Appellant alleges the trial court’s commentary during the cross-examination of the victim’s girlfriend violated former OCGA § 17-8-57 and improperly bolstered her credibility. Appellant contends this was particularly harmful to his defense since the victim’s girlfriend was the only eyewitness to the crime. The relevant portion of the cross-examination is as follows:

Q. Did anybody call you to tell you something about the incident?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you remember who that was?
A. No, sir.
Q. Was it a friend?
A. I don't remember who told a friend.
Q. So a friend told a friend to call you?
A. No, sir. Can you say that again so I can understand?
Q. Who called you to tell you something about the incident?
[PROSECUTOR]: Objection. Hearsay.
THE COURT: How about that, [DEFENSE COUNSEL]?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: She can tell me about it. If she’s the one that received a call, she can say—
THE COURT: I know, but what she says, what the other person says, might be hearsay. You did receive a call?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, but I don't remember who the phone call came from.
Q. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I thought you said you did. So you did receive a phone call and somebody told you something about the incident, correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you talked to them for a period of time?
A. It wasn't a period of time. It was short.
Q. And you don't have any recollection of that conversation?
A. No, they just told me that—
[PROSECUTOR]: Objection, Your Honor. She can't say what someone else said.
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, when someone tells you what someone else says and they're not a party to the case and they're not under oath, that’s considered hearsay.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: But there’s also an exception to the hearsay rule that, if it’s a present sense impression of what she heard, she can say what she heard. It might not be accurate, and that’s—
THE COURT: I'm going to rule it out, [DEFENSE COUNSEL].
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay.
Q. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: But you did, ma'am, just for the record, you did say you received a call?
THE COURT: She probably received calls of grief, she probably recalls people just commenting, but I mean, you know, what are you going to?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s exactly my point, Your Honor.
THE COURT: But this is not a fishing expedition. Ask a question and maybe she can answer it, okay.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, the original question was, "Did you receive a call to talk to you about the incident?" I wasn't saying about somebody giving their sympathy.
THE COURT: Okay.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I asked her specifically, that was the question, did she
THE COURT: She said somebody did and she doesn't remember the name.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. But she did say, and I just want to be clear that that’s what I heard, that she said she did receive a call about somebody calling her about the incident.
THE COURT: That’s right, and she said she doesn't remember the name. She did make that comment. I think the jury heard that.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Appellant takes specific issue with the trial court’s comments highlighted in bold text, including the trial court’s supposition as to the content of the phone call at issue and the trial court’s characterization of defense counsel’s line of questioning as a "fishing expedition." Appellant further opines that this exchange should have occurred outside the presence of the jury.

b. Comments made during cross-examination of the lead detective.

There were several times during the cross-examination of the lead investigator that appellant contends the trial court made comments in violation of former OCGA § 17-8-57. The first comment occurred immediately after a bench conference concerning the State’s objection that defense counsel’s cross-examination was going into irrelevant matters, including a report that was not in evidence. The relevant exchange appears below:

Q. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So there was—we already covered [K.H.] and then there was another [photographic lineup] after that. I just want the names of the
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5 cases
  • Jenkins v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 13 Febrero 2020
    ...generally apply to colloquies between the trial court and counsel that concern the admissibility of evidence." Felton v. State , 304 Ga. 565, 572 (2) (c), 819 S.E.2d 461 (2018). Most of the comments that Lee challengesarose during colloquies with counsel and within the context of the trial ......
  • Davidson v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 24 Septiembre 2018
  • Thompson v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 28 Febrero 2019
    ...therefore review Thompson’s claim for plain error. Willis , 304 Ga. at 129 (2) (b), 816 S.E.2d 656 ; see also Felton v. State , 304 Ga. 565, 572 (2) (c), 819 S.E.2d 461 (2018).To establish plain error, Thompson must show the following:First, there must be an error or defect—some sort of dev......
  • Jones v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 22 Octubre 2018
    ...17-8-57 but appealed after the effective date of the statute’s 2015 amendment. See also Felton v. State , Case No. S18A0627, 2018 WL 4554464, at *4-5, ––– Ga. ––––, –––– – ––––, 819 S.E.2d 461, 465–67 (decided Sept. 24, 2018).In light of Willis , and given that Jones’s counsel did not objec......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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