Feneck v. Nowakowski
| Decision Date | 26 May 1959 |
| Citation | 151 A.2d 891,146 Conn. 434 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Lucy FENECK et al. v. Paul A. NOWAKOWSKI. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
Carlos B. Ellis, Middletown, for appellant (defendant).
Israel Poliner, Middletown, with whom, on the brief, was Myron J. Poliner, Middletown, for appellees (plaintiffs).
Before BALDWIN, KING, MURPHY, MELLITZ and SHEA, * JJ.
The plaintiffs leased to the defendant a store at 202 Main Street, Middletown, for five years from August 1, 1951, at an annual rental of $3000, payable in advance in monthly instalments of $250 each. Under the written lease executed by the parties, it was provided that the lease would terminate if the rent remained unpaid for ten days after it became payable and that the lessor could, without re-entry, recover possession of the premises in the manner prescribed by the statute relating to summary process, notice to quit possession being expressly waived by the lessee. In October, 1955, the plaintiffs instituted an action of summary process against the defendant for nonpayment of rent and recovered a judgment under which the defendant was evicted from the premises. Thereafter, the plaintiffs commenced the present action for recovery of the rent due and owing under the lease. From a judgment for the plaintiffs to recover $4500, the full amount of the rent payable, under the terms of the lease, to the expiration date on July 31, 1956, the defendant has appealed.
The sole question determinative of this appeal is the effect upon the lease of the action of the plaintiffs in evicting the defendant under the summary process judgment. The defendant is only entitled to a correction in the finding as to the date of the eviction. He paid the rent as provided in the lease through April 30, 1954, but thereafter was always in arrears. In June, he paid the rent for May. From that time until the summary process action was started, a total of $1500 additional rent was paid. The defendant was also credited with a payment of $500 which had been deposited with the plaintiff when the lease was executed as security for the payment of rent and for application to the payment of rent at the termination of the lease.
By virtue of the precise wording of the statute relating to summary process, § 52-532 of the 1958 Revision, that remedy is available only when there is a lease and it has been terminated. The purpose of the action is to enable the landlord upon such termination to recover possession from the tenant. Jo-Mark Sand & Gravel Co. v. Pantanella, 139 Conn. 598, 600, 96 A.2d 217. The judgment in the summary process action effectively terminated the lease. Hamre v. Michael Etzel & Sons, Inc., 120 Conn. 129, 137, 179 A. 647; Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248 N.Y. 333, 336, 162 N.E. 97, 59 A.L.R. 1015; Hinsman v. Marble Savings Bank, 104 Vt. 40, 42, 156 A. 874. The election of the...
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City of Bridgeport v. Barbour-Daniel Electronics, Inc.
...process proceeding is that the lease has terminated." Webb v. Ambler, 125 Conn. 543, 550, 7 A.2d 228 (1939); Feneck v. Nowakowski, 146 Conn. 434, 436, 151 A.2d 891 (1959). If that is so, and given the necessity of a notice to quit to the commencement of a summary process action, it is illog......
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Young v. Young
...112 S. Ct. 69, 116 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1991); Prevedini v. Mobil Oil Corp., 164 Conn. 287, 292, 320 A.2d 797 (1973); Feneck v. Nowakowski, 146 Conn. 434, 436, 151 A. 2d 891 (1959); Jo-Mark Sand & Gravel Co. v. Pantanella, 139 Conn. 598, 600, 96 A.2d 217 (1953). Summary process statues "secure a p......
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Prevedini v. Mobil Oil Corp.
...by § 52-532 of the General Statutes is to permit the landlord to recover possession on termination of a lease; Feneck v. Nowakowski, 146 Conn. 434, 436, 151 A.2d 891; without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which he may be subjected under a common-law action. Housing Authority v. A......
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