Prevedini v. Mobil Oil Corp.

• Decision Date: 24 January 1973
• Citation: 164 Conn. 287,320 A.2d 797
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Val PREVEDINI v. MOBIL OIL CORPORATION.

Page 797

320 A.2d 797

164 Conn. 287

Val PREVEDINI v. MOBIL OIL CORPORATION.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Jan. 24, 1973.

I. Milton Widem, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was John J. Kenny, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Elliott B. Pollack, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and SHAPIRO, LOISELLE, MacDONALD and BOGDANSKI, JJ.

SHAPIRO, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff Val Prevendini, hereinafter called Prevedini, instituted an action of summary process against the defendant Mobil Oil Corporation, hereinafter called Mobil, in the Circuit Court where a stay of the proceedings was ordered. After the filing of a motion by Prevedini to vacate the stay, Mobil filed a motion to dismiss the motion to vacate the stay. The Appellate Division denied the motion to dismiss and vacated the order staying the proceedings. Mobil filed a notice of and then a petition for certification which this court granted.

On April 24, 1964, Mobil leased from Prevedini, commencing May 1, 1964, and terminating on March 1, 1971, certain premises in the town of Wethersfield used as a gasoline service station. The lease contained an option clause, the pertinent portion of which appears in the footnote. ¹ The defendant claims that on October 6, 1969, Prevedini executed a quitclaim deed to Robert L. Spinetta of the pemises involved in the lease. It further claims that the deed was subsequently recorded in the Wethersfield land records which disclosed receipt of a conveyance tax in the sum of $46.20. A real estate conveyance tax form filed with the town clerk disclosed the full purchase price of the property to be $41,940. The claim is made that this conveyance was made without noice to Mobil. On January 11, 1971, Mobil's real estate representative wrote to Prevedini stating that he would like to meet 'and discuss our present lease which expires March 1, 1971.' Prevedini replied by letter of January 14, 1971, stating that he was 'not interested in discussing any renewal of a lease on (the) property.'

On February 24, 1971, Mobil brought an action in the Superior Court against Prevedini and Spinetta seeking, inter alia, to enforce its claimed preemptive rights under paragraph six of the lease ² and seeking a judgment requiring Prevedini to sell the gasoline station premises to Mobil for the same price for which Prevedini sold them to Spinetta. It is also claimed that at the same time a lis pendens was recorded in the Whethersfield land records and an attachment was placed on the property. Thereafter, Prevedini brought an action in the Superior Court against Mobil seeking an interpretation of the terms of the lease as well as damages. Both actions are awaiting assignment as privileged matters. On April 1, 1971, Prevedini instituted in the Circuit Court an action of summary process against Mobil seeking possession of the premises on the claim that the lease had expired. In its answer, Mobil pleaded as a special defense that since an action was pending in the Superior Court seeking a determination of its preemptive rights under the lease, Prevedini's title to the premises was in controversy and, therefore, summary process at this time was not available. On August 12, 1971, the Circuit Court entered a stay of the summary process proceedings until final adjudication of the action pending in the Superior Court. On August 17, 1971, Prevedini filed a motion with the Appellate Division ³ to vacate the Circuit Court's order. On September 27, 1971, Mobil filed a 'Motion to Dismiss the Appeal,' claiming that the stay was an interlocutory order from which no appeal could be taken and, therefore, the Appellate Division lacked jurisdiction to hear Prevedini's motion since there was no final judgment. Nevertheless, on December 9, 1971, the Appellate Division denied Mobil's motion to dismiss and vacated the order staying the summary process proceedings. On December 9, 1971, pursuant to Practice Book § 743, Mobil filed notice and then a petition for certification for appeal which this court granted on January 19, 1972. No claim is made that Mobil has failed to keep current the payments of the contract rent as provided in the lease.

The basic question we deal with here is whether the order of the Circuit Court staying the summary process proceedings was reviewable by the Appellate Division. If the Circuit Court stay was not reviewable, the action of the Appellate Division in vacating the stay cannot stand. Section 51-265, which confers appellate jurisdiction over the Circuit Court, provides for review of 'any final judgment or action of the circuit court.' This court has developed a number of standards delineating the requirement of finality. One test is whether the order or action terminates a separate and distinct proceeding. Dewart v. Northeastern Gas Transmission Co., 139 Conn. 512, 514, 95 A.2d 381. Another test lies in the effect of an order 'as concluding the rights of some or all of the parties'; Banca Commerciale Italiana Trust Co. v. Westchester Artistic Works, Inc., 108 Conn. 304, 307, 142 A. 838, 839; Gores v. Rosenthal, 148 Conn. 218, 221, 169 A.2d 639; and finally, if the rights of the parties are concluded so that further proceedings cannot affect them, then the judgment is final. State v. Fahey, 146 Conn. 55, 57, 147 A.2d 476; Watson v. Howard, 138 Conn. 464, 467, 86 A.2d 67; Northeastern Gas Transmission Co. v. Brush, 138 Conn. 370, 373, 84 A.2d 681. Furthermore, an order staying proceedings does not ordinarily terminate an action but merely postpones it and is normally considered interlocutory. Gores v. Rosenthal, supra.

Here we have a stay of summary process proceedings. The purpose of summary process proceedings as authorized by § 52-532 of the General Statutes is to permit the landlord to recover possession on termination of a lease; Feneck v. Nowakowski, 146 Conn. 434, 436, 151 A.2d 891; without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which he may be subjected under a common-law action. Housing Authority v. Alprovis, 19 Conn.Sup. 37, 39, 109 A.2d 884. The process is intended to be summary and is designed to provide an expeditious remedy to the landlord seeking possession. Mayron's Bake Shops, Inc. v. Arrow Stores, Inc., 149 Conn. 149, 154, 176 A.2d 574; Atlantic Refining Co. v. O'Keefe, 131 Conn. 528, 530, 41 A.2d 109. The issue of possession under summary process in this case, as claimed by Mobil, can be adjudicated in the future depending on the outcome of the proceedings in the Superior Court. Prevedini, however, contends that, in light of the express purpose of the summary process procedure, the action of the Circuit Court operated to deprive him of his statutory right under § 52-532 to a prompt decision on the issue of the right to possession of the premises. We are concerned only with the effect of the order issued by the Circuit Court in staying the summary process proceedings and whether that stay constituted a final judgment which the Appellate Division could properly review on appeal.

In dealing with the right of appeal, we have held that '(t)he right of appeal is purely statutory and is accorded only if the conditions fixed by statute and the rules of court for taking and prosecuting the appeal are met. Kennedy v. Walker, 135 Conn. 262, 266, 63 A.2d 589. The appeal lies only from a final judgment. General Statutes . . . (§ 51-265); Levay v. Levay, 137 Conn. 92, 95, 75 A.2d 400. The test of a final judgment lies, not in the nature of...