Feng v. Sheena Komenda & Rockwell Collins, Inc.
| Decision Date | 14 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-CV-139-LRR,15-CV-139-LRR |
| Parties | JINGYUAN FENG, Plaintiff, v. SHEENA KOMENDA and ROCKWELL COLLINS, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................... 1
II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND .................... 1
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ................................ 2
IV. ANALYSIS ........................................... 4
A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies Under ICRA ........ 6
B. The Title VII Claims ................................ 8
C. The Common Law Claim ............................. 10
V. CONCLUSION ....................................... 12
I. INTRODUCTION
The matter before the court is Defendant Sheena Komenda's "Motion to Dismiss" ("Motion") (docket no. 4).
II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 12, 2015, Plaintiff Jingyuan Feng filed a pro se Petition (docket no. 2) in the Iowa District Court for Linn County. In the Petition, Feng asserts the following five claims against Komenda and Rockwell Collins, Inc. ("Rockwell") (collectively, "Defendants"): Count I asserts that Defendants committed fraud by falsifying certain statements made in Feng's performance reviews; Count II asserts that Komenda discriminated against Feng based on her race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, and the Iowa Civil Rights Act ("ICRA"), Iowa Code § 216.6; Count III asserts that Komenda retaliated against Feng after Feng complained that she felt she was being treated unfairly in the form of negative performance reviews; Count IV asserts that Rockwell "factually supported" Komenda's retaliation "by knowingly and intentionally using . . . false statements"; and Count V asserts that Defendants wrongfully terminated Feng. Feng requests compensatory damages.
On December 14, 2015, Komenda filed the Motion. On the same date, Rockwell filed an Answer (docket no. 5) in which it generally denies liability and sets forth affirmative defenses. On April 4, 2016, Feng filed an untimely Resistance (docket no. 11). Komenda requests oral argument on the Motion, but the court finds that oral argument is unnecessary. The Motion is fully submitted and ready for decision.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
Viewed in the light most favorable to Feng, the facts are as follows: Feng is an Asian foreign national living in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Rockwell employed Feng from on or about June 2008 until she was terminated on April 21, 2014. From 2008 to 2012, Feng received generally positive performance reviews from her two supervisors. Beginning in September 2012, Komenda became Feng's third supervisor. On April 30, 2013, Komenda gave Feng a performance rating of "minimally meeting expectations" and criticized Feng'swork performance. Feng disagreed with Komenda's evaluation and voiced her opposition to the performance rating. After a friend told Feng that she would be fired for "talk[ing] back" to Komenda, Feng sent an email to Komenda "to clarify some cases [they] discussed during the meeting, and [Feng] expressed [her] intention and action plans to follow [Komenda's] lead in the future." Petition ¶ 9.
On May 10, 2013, Komenda and a human resources representative asked Feng to sign a sixty-day "Performance Recovery Plan" ("PRP"), stating that she was not meeting performance expectations. The PRP stated that a possible outcome was termination. Feng requested the company's discipline policy, which she received. According to the discipline policy, a PRP is "mandatory" when the employee receives a work performance rating of "not meeting performance expectations." Id. ¶¶ 11-12. Feng states that Komenda changed her April 30, 2013 rating of "minimally meeting expectations" to "not meeting performance expectations" some time between April 30, 2013 and May 10, 2013. This alleged downgrade in performance rating occurred within ten days of Feng opposing Komenda's evaluation.
As a result, Feng requested that Komenda and Rockwell's human resources department "correct the false statement in the . . . PRP." Id. ¶ 14. They declined to do so. Feng refused to sign the PRP and refused to participate in the PRP discipline process. Feng subsequently contacted Rockwell's Ombudsman to complain of Komenda's actions. Feng stated that she believed they were motivated by race-based discrimination. From August 2, 2013 to September 4, 2013, Feng worked under the PRP. She maintains that Komenda "manipulated the performance statements in an obviously discriminatory and retaliatory manner." Id. ¶ 17. For example, Feng states that her performance during this time exceeded Komenda's "own predefined 'measurement criteria'" but that Komenda still rated Feng's performance as unsatisfactory. Id. On September 27, 2013, Feng complained to the Ombudsman again.
From September 10, 2013 to March 17, 2014, Feng was on a leave of absence and was not working. Upon her return to work in March 2014, she again worked under the PRP. During this period, Komenda assigned Feng tasks above her job grade. Again, Feng states that her performance exceeded Komenda's measurement criteria, but again Komenda rated her performance as "unsatisfactory" because it was not completed in a timely manner. On April 24, 2014, Rockwell terminated Feng, citing the PRP.
On May 13, 2014, Feng filed a charge of discrimination with the ICRC and the Cedar Rapids Civil Rights Commission alleging race based discrimination and retaliation under ICRA. See Brief in Support of the Motion (docket no. 4-1) at 17-19. The charge names "Rockwell Collins, Inc." as the discriminating party. Id. On May 16, 2014, Feng filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC under Title VII alleging discrimination based on her race and national origin. Id. at 20-21. On April 16, 2015, the ICRC sent Feng a notice that her case was being administratively closed and that further investigation was not warranted. Id. at 22-33. The ICRC concluded that there was no reasonable possibility that further investigation would result in probable cause regarding Feng's discrimination or retaliation claims. Id. at 30, 32. The letter accompanying the notice from the ICRC stated that Feng had several "legal options" and provided instructions for requesting a right to sue letter. Id. at 22. On August 18, 2015, the EEOC sent Feng a notice of dismissal and apprised her of her right to sue. Id. at 34-35.
IV. ANALYSIS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint on the basis of "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).2 The question for a court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not whetherthe plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but rather "whether his complaint [is] sufficient to cross the federal court's threshold." Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 529-30 (2011) (citation omitted). In order to cross the federal court's threshold, the complaint need not be "a model of the careful drafter's art," nor need it "pin plaintiff's claim for relief to a precise legal theory." Id. at 530. This is especially true when the plaintiff is appearing pro se, which requires the court to liberally construe the pleadings. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)); Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). To be sufficient, a complaint must simply state a "plausible 'short and plain' statement of the plaintiff's claim, not an exposition of his legal argument." Skinner, 562 U.S. at 530 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1219 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2010)).
In order for the statement of the plaintiff's claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim satisfies the plausibility standard "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw thereasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although a plaintiff need not provide "detailed" facts in support of his or her allegations, the "short and plain statement" requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. at 677-78 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (). It is insufficient to "plead[] facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
"Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint [that] there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate." Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 546 (8th Cir. 1997)). Although the court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in the Complaint, the court need not accept legal conclusions disguised as facts. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies Under ICRA
Komenda argues that the court should dismiss the Petition because "Feng has not been issued a 'right to sue' release from the Iowa Civil...
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