Fenner v. Mayor of Balt.

• Decision Date: 21 June 2022
• Docket Number: DLB-21-2646
• Parties: CHARLES FENNER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MAYOR & CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

CHARLES FENNER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MAYOR & CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE, et al., Defendants.

No. DLB-21-2646

United States District Court, D. Maryland

June 21, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DEBORAH L. BOARDMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiffs Charles Fenner, Beverly Stevenson, Tijuana McKoy, and Sheena Scott, proceeding pro se and seeking to represent a class of similarly situated plaintiffs, filed suit against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (the “City”), the Baltimore Police Department (“BPD”), the Baltimore City Department of Finance, (collectively, the “City defendants”), Workday, Inc. (“Workday”), and the City Union of Baltimore Local 800, AFT, AFL-CIO (the “Union”).^[1] ECF 1 (complaint). This case arises out of the city's transition to Workday, a payroll management service, and the problems that resulted. Plaintiffs claim violations of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C § 201 et seq., as well as common law negligence and violations of unspecified state and local laws. They allege the Workday system has resulted in erroneous, late, and missed payroll payments. They also allege that the defendants refused to bargain in good faith; failed to comply with overtime, record keeping, and other provisions of the FLSA and were negligent towards them.

The City defendants, Workday, and the Union have separately moved to dismiss. ECF 12 (Workday motion), 15 (City defendants motion), & 18 (Union motion). The motions are fully briefed. ECF 24 (opposition), 25 (City defendants reply), 27 (Union reply), & 29 (Workday reply). No hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6. For the following reasons, the motions to dismiss are granted.

I. Background

The complaint is light on details and background information. Rather than attempt to restructure plaintiffs' allegations into a narrative, the Court quotes them in their entirety for the sake of accuracy. The complaint states:

Plaintiffs are entitled to relief and damages sought by defendants based on defendants' violating the Fair Labor Standards Act and the National Labor Relations Act.

Defendants did cause harm and violate employees' rights with respect to overtime pay, record keeping and other terms that cover employees in Federal, Local, and State governments for non-exempt employees. Defendants did and continue to violate not only the (FLSA) the (NLRA) but also other federal, state and local labor laws.

Defendants did cause harm and violate the (NLRA) by refusing to bargain collectively and in good faith concerning representation in bringing and enforcing a bargaining agreement.

Defendant Workday is a payroll management system that since its inception has performed erroneous calculations resulting in plaintiffs not receiving proper pay, and continues to not calculate payroll properly causing plaintiff to be under paid, receive no pay, be overpaid or not properly compensated according to the department and specific pay guidelines according to contract. Many plaintiffs are still awaiting pay from 9 months ago, in some form or fashion.

Defendant Dept of Finance oversees the Workday systems and is responsible for maintenance and corrective action if the system is not performing correctly.

Defendants, its agents, or representatives were negligent in their duty of care. Defendants did cause harm to plaintiff by violation of (NLRA) and the (FLSA). Defendants also caused emotional stress, and mental stress by refusing to properly compensate, bargain in good faith and otherwise correct issues that plaintiffs brought to managers and those in positions of authority who could have solved the issues that plaintiff alleges were in violation of their rights.

Defendants refused to participate in Dept of Labor investigation concerning violations of acts. Defendants primary place of business is Baltimore City.

ECF 1, at 14-15 (cleaned up). Plaintiffs do not make any allegations regarding their relationships with any of the defendants.

Plaintiffs filed suit on October 15, 2021. ECF 1. After the defendants moved to dismiss on January 20 and 24, 2022, plaintiffs filed an opposition on March 2. ECF 24. The Court will consider the opposition even though only Fenner signed it, ECF 24, at 9, and even though it was filed approximately two weeks after the date it was due, ECF 16, 17, & 19 (notice letters dated January 20 and 25 indicating any opposition should be filed within 28 days of the date of the letters). However, the Court will not consider the additional factual allegations in the opposition because the plaintiffs may not amend their complaint in an opposition brief.^[2] See Whitten v. Apria Healthcare Grp., Inc., No. PWG-14-3193, 2015 WL 2227928, at *7 (D. Md. May 11, 2015) (“An opposition is not a proper vehicle for amending a complaint.”) (citing Saunders v. Putnam Am. Gov't Income Fund, No. JFM-04-560, 2006 WL 1888906, at *2 n.2 (D. Md. July 7, 2006)). The Court uses the additional factual proffers in the opposition only to interpret and clarify the allegations in the complaint, not to supplement them.

II. Standard of Review

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint” and “should be granted unless the complaint ‘states a plausible claim for relief.'” In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017), as amended (Jan. 20, 2017) (quoting Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012)); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive the motion, the “complaint need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379, 387 (4th Cir. 2013)). Stated differently, the complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion “does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.'” Butler v. United States, 702 F.3d 749, 752 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept all the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d at 92 (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011)). Generally, the Court may consider only the allegations in the amended complaint and any documents attached to or incorporated into it. Zak v. Chelsea TherapeuticsInt'l., Ltd., 780 F.3d 597, 606-07 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 637 F.3d at 448).

The Court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). “[C]ourts are not required,” however, “‘to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.'” Deabreu v. Novastar Home Mortg., Inc., 536 Fed.Appx. 373, 375 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished) (quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)). “The ‘special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.” Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. for City of Balt., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. Discussion

Workday, the Union, and the City defendants each separately move to dismiss the claims against them. Where the parties' arguments overlap, the Court addresses them together.

As an initial matter, it is worth clarifying which of the defendants employed the plaintiffs. The complaint does not expressly state this information, but context and liberal interpretation provide an answer. Plaintiffs allege “Workday is a payroll management system.” ECF 1, at 14. Thus, Workday did not employ any of the plaintiffs itself; rather, it provided a service to plaintiffs' employers. The complaint further alleges “[d]efendant Dept of Finance oversees the Workday systems.” Id. From this, the Court infers that the Baltimore City Department of Finance also did not employ plaintiffs. Finally, though the complaint does not devote any special attention to the Union, plaintiffs' opposition indicates they are “union members of the City Union of Baltimore and are not employees.” ECF 24, at 3. Thus, the City and BPD appear to be plaintiffs' employers. Nothing in plaintiffs' opposition indicates otherwise. See ECF 24.

A. The Baltimore City Department of Finance

The Baltimore City Department of Finance is not a legal entity that can sue or be sued. The Baltimore City Charter creates a municipal corporation known as the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Balt. City Charter, Art. 1, § 1 (2022), as well as the Department of Finance, id. Art VII, § 5. The former “may sue or be sued.” Id. Art 1, § 1. The latter is given no such capacity by the charter. “[A]bsent a statutory or constitutional provision creating a government agency, an ‘office' or ‘department' bears no unique legal identity, and thus, it cannot be sued under Maryland law.” Owens v. Balt. City State's Att'ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 393 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Boyer v. State, 594 A.2d 121, 128 n.9 (Md. 1991)); see also Upman v. Howard Cnty. Police Dep't, No. RDB-09-1547, 2010 WL 1007844, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 2010) (“Maryland law is not unique as federal courts have traditionally recognized that individual government departments lack the capacity to be sued.”). Accordingly, all claims against the Baltimore City Department of Finance are dismissed.

B. The NLRA Claims

Plaintiffs allege defendants violated the NLRA “by refusing to bargain collectively and in good faith concerning...