Fenney v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP
| Decision Date | 03 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:18-cv-02019-MSN-cgc,2:18-cv-02019-MSN-cgc |
| Citation | 441 F.Supp.3d 635 |
| Parties | Cassandra FENNEY, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART STORES EAST, LP, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, Cassandra Fenney, brought this premises liability action against Defendant, Wal-Mart Stores East, LP ("Defendant"), alleging negligence and seeking damages for medical costs and pain and suffering. (ECF No. 26.) Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, submitted on September 16, 2019. (ECF No. 55.) Plaintiff responded to Defendant's Motion on October 15, 2019. (ECF No. 59.) Defendant filed its reply on October 29, 2019. (ECF No. 62.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED .
The following facts are undisputed unless noted otherwise. On November 15, 2016, Plaintiff went to Defendant's store to shop for Christmas decorations. (ECF No. 59 at PageID 264.) Plaintiff was looking at merchandise on steel shelving in the garden center and asked Wal-Mart sales associate, Eva Logan ("Ms. Logan"), for assistance. (Id. ) When Ms. Logan came to assist Plaintiff, she was pulling an empty, manual pallet jack that she was using to transport loads of charcoal—Plaintiff avers she did not see Ms. Logan using a pallet jack. (Id. ) Ms. Logan placed the pallet jack some distance behind Plaintiff and retrieved a ladder to assist Plaintiff with merchandise. (Id. at PageID 264–65.) When Ms. Logan was on the ladder with her back toward Plaintiff, Plaintiff walked backward away from the shelving unit without looking behind her first and fell over the legs of the pallet jack. (Id. at PageID 265.) As a result of her fall, Plaintiff suffered injuries to her right arm and shoulder. (ECF No. 26 at PageID 97.)
Before she fell, Plaintiff had been shopping in the garden center for approximately fifteen to twenty-five minutes and had walked through the specific area where she fell one or two times before and did not see a pallet jack in any area of the garden center. (ECF No. 62 at PageID 341.) After Plaintiff fell, Ms. Logan reported the incident to Defendant's store manager, Marie Hayslett ("Ms. Hayslett"), who conducted an investigation. (ECF No. 62 at PageID 342.)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court shall grant a party's motion for summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party asserting the presence or absence of genuine issues of material facts must support its position either by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record," including depositions, documents, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, or other materials, or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Asbury v. Teodosio , 412 F. App'x 786, 791 (6th Cir. 2011). Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts contained in the record and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis, Inc. , 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court cannot weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of any matter in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The moving party may discharge this burden either by producing evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact or simply "by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
When confronted with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "A genuine dispute exists when the plaintiff presents significant probative evidence on which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for her." EEOC v. Ford Motor Co. , 782 F.3d 753, 760 (6th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). The nonmoving party must do more than simply " ‘show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’ " Adcor Indus., Inc. v. Bevcorp, LLC , 252 F. App'x 55, 61 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348 ). A party may not oppose a properly supported summary judgment motion by mere reliance on the pleadings. See Beckett v. Ford , 384 F. App'x 435, 443 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). Instead, the nonmoving party must adduce concrete evidence on which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in her favor. Stalbosky v. Belew , 205 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2000) ; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
The Court's role is limited to determining whether there is a genuine dispute about a material fact, that is, if the evidence in the case "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To start, the Court does not have the duty to search the record for such evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) ; InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller , 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989). Additionally, the Court must "view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden" applicable to the case. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Thus, if the plaintiff's evidentiary standard of proof at trial is preponderance of the evidence, then on a motion for summary judgment the Court must determine whether a jury could reasonably find that the plaintiff's factual contentions are true by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at 252–53, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
"When the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of his case on which he bears the burden of proof, the moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law and summary judgment is proper." Martinez v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. , 703 F.3d 911, 914 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Chapman v. UAW Local 1005 , 670 F.3d 677, 680 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc)). Courts must analyze a motion for summary judgment with due regard not only for the rights of the party "asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury," but also for the rights of those "opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by [ Rule 56 ], prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis." Celotex , 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate because it owed no duty to Plaintiff. In the alternative, Defendant argues that no reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff is not at least equally at fault for her own injury, and she is thus disqualified from recovery on comparative fault grounds. Plaintiff disputes both grounds. The Court will first address Defendant's duty of care arguments before moving on to the issue of comparative fault.
Tennessee tort law govern this case. See Hataway v. McKinley , 830 S.W.2d 53, 60 (Tenn. 1992) (). To succeed on a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant (1) owed her a duty of care and (2) breached that duty (3) causing (4) harm. Williams v. Linkscorp Tenn. Six, L.L.C. , 212 S.W.3d 293, 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (). Whether a duty exists is a question of law. Coln v. City of Savannah , 966 S.W.2d 34, 39 (Tenn. 1998). Generally speaking, the operator of a place of business has a duty to maintain the premises "in a reasonably safe condition either by removing or repairing potentially dangerous conditions or by helping customers and guests avoid injury by warning them of the existence of dangerous conditions that cannot, as a practical matter, be removed or repaired." Piana v. Old Town of Jackson, Inc. , 316 S.W.3d 622, 629–30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Psillas v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc. , 66 S.W.3d 860, 864 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) ). However, the property owner is not responsible for removing or warning against "conditions from which no unreasonable risk was to be anticipated." Parker v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc. , 446 S.W.3d 341, 350 (Tenn. 2014). Rather than adopting the position that so-called "open and obvious" hazards relieve a defendant of a duty, Tennessee courts weigh the gravity of the potential harm against the burden of taking action to prevent it: "[I]n short, if the foreseeability and gravity of harm posed from a defendant's conduct, even if ‘open and obvious,’ outweighed the burden on the defendant to engage in alternative conduct to avoid the harm, there is a duty to act with reasonable care." Coln , 966 S.W.2d at 43.
First, Defendant argues that it owes no duty to Plaintiff because Plaintiff's injury was not reasonably foreseeable. Defendant avers Plaintiff, without looking behind her, "took up to ten (10) steps backwards—travelling approximately ten (10) to fourteen (14) feet—and tripped over the pallet jack," and "[t]here were no objects between the area...
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