Fenno v. Chapin

Decision Date28 April 1881
Citation8 N.W. 762,27 Minn. 519
PartiesE. Ray Fenno v. R. H. Chapin
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the district court for Steele county, Buckham, J., presiding, refusing a new trial.

Order affirmed.

J. M Burlingame and A. C. Hickman, for appellant.

Lewis L. Wheelock and Amos Coggswell, for respondent.

OPINION

Mitchell, J. [1]

This was an action to recover the possession of a "Rowell seeder," of which plaintiff claimed to be the owner. Defendant denied plaintiff's ownership, and alleged property in himself. A verdict was rendered for the defendant, and plaintiff moved for a new trial on the grounds of -- First, errors in law occurring at the trial second, newly-discovered evidence. The motion having been denied, the plaintiff appealed to this court.

Upon the trial it appeared from the evidence that the seeder in question originally belonged to plaintiff, and that he delivered the actual possession of it to one Jepson, under a contract of sale, and accepted from him his promissory notes for the purchase-money thereof, which contained the following condition: "The express conditions of the above contract for said seeder are such that the right or title of possession" (probably meaning title and right of possession) "does not pass from the said E. Ray Fenno until the same, with interest, is paid in full." That subsequently defendant, for a valuable consideration by him paid purchased the said seeder from Jepson. Jepson never paid plaintiff the purchase-money. Plaintiff claimed the seeder under the conditions contained in the notes referred to. Defendant claimed it as an innocent purchaser from Jepson for a valuable consideration. Defendant introduced evidence tending to prove that he had no notice of plaintiff's claim when he purchased from Jepson. Plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show that defendant purchased with notice of his claim. After showing that he had the exclusive right to sell these "Rowell seeders" in Steele county, plaintiff offered to prove that this fact was known to defendant, and that his (plaintiff's) name was upon the seeder in question. This evidence, being objected to as immaterial, was excluded by the court, to which ruling plaintiff excepted. This is the only exception taken by plaintiff on the trial. We think the ruling of the court excluding this evidence was correct. There was nothing in either of these facts, if proved,...

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