Fenton v. Department of Public Welfare

• Decision Date: 09 May 1962
• Citation: 182 N.E.2d 528,344 Mass. 343
• Parties: Eleanor FENTON v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 528

182 N.E.2d 528

344 Mass. 343

Eleanor FENTON v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued April 3, 1962.

Decided May 9, 1962.

Albert G. Tierney, Jr., Boston, for petitioner.

William C. Ellis, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, CUTTER, KIRK, and SPIEGEL, JJ.

SPIEGEL, Justice.

The Medfield board of public welfare (hereinafter called the board) denied the application of the petitioner for disability assistance under G.L. c. 118D, inserted by St.1951, c. 741, § 2. On appeal to the Department of Public Welfare for the Commonwealth (hereinafter called the Department) the decision of the board was sustained. A petition for review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14, was filed and heard in the Superior Court. The case is here on appeal from a decree setting aside the decision of the Department.

The facts do not appear to be in dispute. On September 9, 1958, the petitioner, aged thirty-one, while a patient at the Massachusetts General Hospital made application to the board for aid. The board rejected the application on the ground that the board was unable to determine the need of the petitioner under G.L. c. 118D, § 1, because her father, Warren Fenton, failed to submit any information concerning his income. Section 1 provides in part as follows: 'The board of public welfare of every town shall give adequate assistance to every needy person resident therein, eighteen years of age or over, who is permanently and totally disabled and has resided in the commonwealth for one year immediately preceding the date of his application for such assistance.' ¹

The board conceded that 'all basic factors of eligibility as residence, age, personal and real assets are in order except that they were unable to determine the * * * [petitioner's] need for Disability Assistance.'

Upon the petitioner's appeal to the Department a hearing was held before a referee of the Department and by decision dated December 10, 1958, the Department sustained the decision of the board. A petition for review under G.L. c. 30A was then brought in the Superior Court. a judge of that court remanded the matter to the board with instructions to make full inquiry as to the eligibility of the petitioner for assistance.

The board again requested Warren Fenton to furnish information 'as to his income and other resources.' He failed to reply to this request and the board 'again denied the case on the basis that they were unable to determine the * * * [petitioner's] needs under G.L. c. 118D, since the * * * [petitioner's] father under departmental regulations at that time * * * had a legal liability toward the support of his daughter.' The petitioner appealed to the Department and another hearing was held before a referee. The Department, on July 18, 1960, affirmed its previous decision and again denied the petitioner's appeal.

The court upon consideration of the present petition ruled: '1. That the Medfield Board of Public Welfare, the State Department of Public Welfare and its Commissioner, in making a determination concerning the eligibility of the applicant and her need for assistance, were without authority to consider the resources, income and responsibility to support which her father might have. * * * 2. That the State Department of Public Welfare was without authority to promulgate rule #7 ² (as a condition for eligibility) * * *. 3. The Medfield Board of Public Welfare was without authority to deny the petitioner's application for assistance on the basis that they were unable to determine her needs because her father 'had a legal liability toward the support of his daughter.' 4. The State Department of Public Welfare was without authority to deny the petitioner's appeal for the reasons set forth in its decision. 5. The action of the Medfield Board of Public Welfare and the State Department of Public Welfare was based upon errors of law and made upon unlawful procedure.'

The Department contends that the obligation of support is first in the parents and therefore knowledge of the parents' ability to support a disabled child would be a condition precedent to the granting of aid. This contention is based primarily on § 8 of G.L. c. 118D, as amended through St.1957, c. 493, which provides that a mother or father of a disabled child, 'except a father or mother who has attained the age of sixty-five years * * *, if of sufficient ability, shall be bound to support such person and shall be obliged to reimburse any town which provides assistance for such person under this chapter in proportion to their respective abilities to pay * * *.'

Chapter 118D was enacted to enable the Commonwealth to qualify for Federal grants made available '[f]or the purpose of enabling each State to furnish financial assistance, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to needy individuals eighteen years of age and older who are permanently and totally disabled and of encouraging each State, as far as practicable under such conditions, to help such individuals attain self-support or self-care * * *.' 42 U.S.C. § 1351 (1958), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1351. The provisions of c. 118D are 'to be reasonably construed to accomplish * * * [their] beneficient purpose.' Leigh v. Commissioner of Pub. Health & Charities of Lawrence, 310 Mass. 343, 345, 37 N.E.2d 1017, 1018.

Section 2 of G.L. c. 118D provides that full...