Fenton v. Quaboag Country Club, Inc.

Decision Date11 January 1968
Citation353 Mass. 534,233 N.E.2d 216
PartiesJohn F. FENTON et al. v. QUABOAG COUNTRY CLUB, INC.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Robert J. Moran, Springfield, for defendant.

Samuel L. Thompson, Springfield, for plaintiffs.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and WHITTEMORE, CUTTER, SPIEGEL, and REARDON, JJ.

REARDON, Justice.

This appeal has to do with the game of golf and in particular with the abilities of certain golfers in the county of Hampden whose alleged transgressions gave rise to a suit. The plaintiffs, husband and wife, state in their bill that they are the owners of a home in Monson adjoining a golf course operated by the defendant, and after the recitation of a series of grievances seek an injunction designed to terminate the operation of one of the holes in the defendant's nine-hole course, together with damages for injuries to person and property. The defendant's answer makes certain admissions and acknowledges the existence of a problem. It further states 'that cooperation in the problem the * * * (plaintiffs) have has been one way and although the * * * (plaintiffs) may have had no knowledge of the game of golf when they purchased this property they have certainly, over the years, become somewhat familiar with the game, but rather than be cooperative and understanding of the interest of the Quaboag Country Club, Inc. * * * have maintained an inexorable position of antagonism towards the Club and its members, and when suggestions were made to them which were anything less than the complete surrender of the use of the ninth fairway to all intentions and purposes, the * * * (plaintiffs) continued to be dissatisfied.'

A master to whom the case was referred filed a report which illuminates the deep antagonisms which spring to life when home and family are threatened by devotees of the great outdoors. We refer to his finding.

In 1952 the plaintiffs, John F. and Miriam E. Fenton, 'not familiar with the details of the game of golf,' bought their house, garage and land from one Lussier and his wife. The east side of the premises fronted on the Monson-Palmer Road. Otherwise the property was bounded on all sides by land owned by the defendant. The Lussiers had purchased the land from the defendant in 1944 and had, as one may gather from the report, coexisted happily with the golf club, a state of affairs no doubt enhanced by the fact that during their tenure Lussier and his family had sold soft drinks and sandwiches to golfers on the course and thus found no fault when errant golf balls descended upon their property. The club itself had a lengthy history. It opened in 1900 as a six-hole course, and in 1922 expanded to nine holes. 'Adjoining the westerly boundary of the * * * (plaintiffs') land is the * * * (defendant's) ninth fairway. It has occupied this location since before 1927, and even prior to that,' as far back as 1900, 'the east side of the now ninth fairway * * * (was) the east side of a fairway.'

Into this posture, fraught with potential trouble which only a golfer could fully appreciate, came the plaintiffs 'not familiar with the details of the game of golf.' Any deficiency in their knowledge was soon remedied as they immediately came under the assault of balls 'hit onto and over their property.' 'Except for a few isolated occasions, these balls were not intentionally directed' at the Fenton estate. However, the master has provided us with some chilling statistics which cast grave doubt on the proficiency of the golfers of Hampden County, at least those who were playing the defendant's course. From 1952 an annual average number of 250 balls 'were left' on the land of the plaintiffs, save for the year 1960 when a grand total of 320 such deposits were made. Over the years sixteen panes of glass in the plaintiffs' house were broken, for six of which fractures the plaintiffs have received reimbursement. The cost of such replacements apparently defied inflation and remained constant throughout the years at $3.85 for each new pane. Affairs worsened in 1961 when the defendant added a sand trap 'to the northwest corner of the ninth green.' Since golfers intent on achieving the green drove from the tee in a southerly direction, they were faced with alternatives. They might aim somewhat to the west and face the sand trap, or they might veer more to the east and face the Fentons. The master inclined to the belief that they were prone to make the latter choice although, as he found, this was not without hazard, for the plaintiff John F. Fenton collected 'all the balls he found on his land and sold them periodically.' Continued unbridled hooking and slicing caused further aggravation. Some years back the Fentons were possessed of a German Shepherd dog which developed apprehension at the approach of golfers to the point that they were forced to dispense with his companionship. In his place they acquired a Doberman evidently made of sterner stuff. The dog is still with them notwithstanding that he has been struck by a flying golf ball. On one occasion the male plaintiff himself stopped an airborne ball supposedly directed to the ninth green but winging its way off course. At another time a Fenton family steak cookout was interrupted by a misdirected ball which came to rest 'just under the grill.' There were additional serious evidences...

To continue reading

Request your trial
19 cases
  • Harrison v. Textron, Inc.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • April 30, 1975
    ...v. Basbanes, 354 Mass. 559, 238 N.E.2d 531 (1968), where the principle was applied without discussion. In Fenton v. Quaboag Country Club, Inc., 353 Mass. 534, 233 N.E.2d 216 (1968), damages were allowed covering a period of thirteen years during which a nuisance continued, but the statute o......
  • Attorney General v. Dime Sav. Bank of New York, FSB
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • July 27, 1992
    ...trespass involves an owner or owners of real property in actual or constructive possession. See, e.g., Fenton v. Quaboag Country Club, Inc., 353 Mass. 534, 233 N.E.2d 216 (1968) (homeowners suffered injuries to person and property from golf balls which were hit from adjacent course); Anntco......
  • Bank of Am., N.A. v. Rosa
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • December 18, 2013
    ...in certain instances for harm incidental to the harm for which equitable relief was obtained. See, e.g., Fenton v. Quaboag Country Club, Inc., 353 Mass. 534, 539, 233 N.E.2d 216 (1968) (distress and discomfort, and loss in rental value); Tehan v. Security Nat'l Bank of Springfield, 340 Mass......
  • RDC Melanie Drive, LLC v. Eppard
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • July 15, 2021
    ...that operation of adjacent golf course may constitute nuisance despite enabling zoning ordinance); Fenton v. Quaboag Country Club, Inc. , 353 Mass. 534, 538–39, 233 N.E.2d 216, 219 (1968) ("The pertinent inquiry is whether the noise (the invasion of golf balls) materially interferes with th......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT