Ferencz v. Hairston, 96-3563

Decision Date05 September 1997
Docket NumberNo. 96-3563,96-3563
Citation119 F.3d 1244
PartiesRobert George FERENCZ, doing business as Blue Line Remodeling; Gary W. Kerekes, doing business as Sunnyside Construction Company, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Dianna HAIRSTON, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Harland M. Britz (argued and briefed), Britz & Zemmelman, Toledo, OH, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Robert G. Young (argued and briefed), Office of the City of Toledo Law Department, Toledo, OH, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: LIVELY, MERRITT, and SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

LIVELY, Circuit Judge.

This case involves claims of due process violations brought by individuals whose names were removed from a list of eligible contractors for city work. The defendants are officials of the City of Toledo, Ohio. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs' claims for deprivation of property interests and judgment as a matter of law on the claims for deprivation of liberty interests. After a de novo review of the record on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

The plaintiffs Robert Ferencz, d/b/a/ Blue Line Remodeling, and Gary Kerekes, d/b/a/ Sunnyside Construction Company, are remodeling contractors. Both were among sixteen contractors on a list compiled by the City of Toledo's Department of Community Development, a list from which bids were solicited for rehabilitation projects funded by federal Community Development Block Grants. Whenever a federally funded rehabilitation project became available within the City of Toledo, the city allowed three of the contractors on the list the opportunity to submit bids on the project. The city would select the "best" and lowest bid, but the property owner was not bound by the city's choice; in fact, the property owner could choose to have the work performed by any contractor by simply paying the difference between the price of that contractor's bid and the bid selected by the city. The successful bidder would then enter into a contractual relationship with the eligible homeowner, and payment would be made with federal block funds. Unsuccessful bidders from the list would await rotation to bid on future projects. In the past Ferencz and Kerekes had bid on and completed numerous federally funded projects within the city.

In the late 1980s, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) performed a random inspection of federally funded rehabilitation projects in Toledo. The investigation turned up a number of deficiencies, and the city was ordered to resolve the deficiencies and reimburse the federal government for payments made on deficient work. The defendants Anthony Reams and Dianna Hairston each served as Interim Director of the Department of Community Development during the period of the investigation and compliance efforts. Ms. Hairston sent both plaintiffs letters on October 11, 1989, informing them that they had been removed from the list because of allegedly substandard work. The plaintiffs were not notified of the specific deficiencies alleged against their work until December 15, 1989, when the defendant James Guenther, the Housing Rehabilitation Administrator for the City of Toledo, notified them by letter. The letters contained allegations of failing to pull permits properly and of shoddy workmanship on projects for which pre-payment had been made. Local news media, including the Toledo Blade, published the names of the suspended contractors as well as the city's allegations of poor workmanship and permit violations.

In an effort to clear up the allegations against him, Mr. Ferencz met with James Guenther on numerous occasions. Ferencz was ultimately found to be in substantial compliance after correcting all of the alleged deficiencies in workmanship. He was, however, not restored to the contractor list. Mr. Kerekes claims to have encountered similar difficulties in his efforts to be restored to the list. He claims to have been aware of no specific deficiencies and to have written to Ms. Hairston, requesting that she identify the jobs that he was being accused of having deficiently performed. Mr. Kerekes testified that he asked Guenther to meet him at the job sites to "clear up" the situation, but Guenther never accompanied Kerekes to any of the job sites. Kerekes did ultimately speak with Guenther, confronting him about the accusations published in the Toledo Blade.

II.

In this consolidated civil action, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs sought restoration to the list of eligible bidders for city rehabilitation work and damages both for lost business income and for injury to their reputations. Upon concluding that the plaintiffs had no property interest that was protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment resulting from their relationship with the city, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on November 24, 1993. On December 14, 1993, the court entered an order holding in abeyance further proceedings on the claim of infringement of a liberty interest pending completion of a "name-clearing" hearing. This hearing was held in February 1994. The plaintiffs claimed that the hearing was untimely; that they had demanded such a hearing much earlier and had suffered damages because of the city's delay in holding it. The district judge empaneled a jury for trial of the plaintiffs' claims of deprivation of liberty interests. After the plaintiffs had presented all their evidence, the court granted the defendants' motion pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 50(a) for judgment as a matter of law. The court based its ruling upon a finding that neither plaintiff had requested a name-clearing hearing.

III.

In considering procedural due process claims, we first determine whether the interest at stake is within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property. Only after we have concluded that the interest claimed is within that protection do we consider the form and nature of the process that is due. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705-06, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Thus, in a § 1983 due process claim for deprivation of a property interest, a plaintiff must first show a protected property interest. Only after meeting this requirement can the plaintiff prevail by showing " that such interest was abridged without appropriate process." LRL Properties v. Portage Metro Housing Authority, 55 F.3d 1097, 1108 (6th Cir.1995).

A.

To establish a property interest in a particular benefit, a plaintiff must have a "legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709. Property interests are not created by the Fourteenth Amendment; instead, they are "created and defined by independent sources, such as state law." McLaurin v. Fischer, 768 F.2d 98, 102 (6th Cir.1985) (citing Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1491, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-73, 95 S.Ct. 729, 735-36, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975)). Ohio courts recognize property interests created by "mutually explicit understandings" or by "unwritten common law practice in the workplace." See, e.g., Yashon v. Gregory, 737 F.2d 547, 553-54 (6th Cir.1984) (discussing Ohio law).

B.

The property interest claimed by the plaintiffs in this case is an entitlement to remaining on the bid list. They assert that the list gives rise to an expectation that they will receive valuable business opportunities. They also claim to have had mutually explicit understandings with the defendants that they would remain on the bid list so long as they wished and their work remained satisfactory. Because the plaintiffs wished to remain on the list and had performed numerous satisfactorily inspected and paid projects for the city, they maintain that their interest in remaining on the list was one deserving of Fourteenth Amendment protection. Yet, being on the list entitled the plaintiffs to nothing more than the opportunity to make the lowest and "best" bid, a bid that could be rejected by the homeowner even if selected by the city. More significant is that fact that the city's discretion in determining the "best" bid forecloses any claim that being listed guarantees any contracts coming to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs' asserted property right is similar to a claimed interest rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Koerpel v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 858 (10th Cir.1986). In that case, the court determined that a physician's expectation of Medicare reimbursement was not sufficient to create a property right since merely being on the list of eligible physicians did not guarantee any actual employment or payments. The court also pointed out that the physician was not the intended beneficiary of the Medicare program; it is intended to benefit elderly patients. Id. at 864. The plaintiffs in the present case are in a similar position--being on the list may result in a benefit (contractual relationship with homeowners for rehabilitation projects), but whether such benefit actually comes to fruition is beyond the plaintiffs' control. And, the rehabilitation program is intended to benefit low-income persons by providing housing at a reasonable cost; it is not for the benefit of contractors. One other similarity between the two cases is that neither the plaintiffs in the present case nor the physician in Koerpel suffered the loss of a license to continue in their occupations as a result of being delisted.

In United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Solomon, 960 F.2d 31 (6th Cir.1992), this court held that "[a] 'disappointed bidder' to a government contract may establish a legitimate claim of entitlement protected by due process by showing either that it was actually awarded the contract at any procedural...

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