Ferguson v. Alexander

• Citation: 122 S.W.2d 1079
• Decision Date: 03 December 1938
• Docket Number: No. 12798.,12798.
• Parties: FERGUSON v. ALEXANDER et al.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas

122 S.W.2d 1079

FERGUSON v. ALEXANDER et al.

No. 12798.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Dallas.

December 3, 1938.

Rehearing Denied January 7, 1939.

Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; W. L. Thornton, Judge.

Suit by H. W. Ferguson against W. M. Alexander and others to enjoin the defendants, who were attorneys, from representing certain defendants in libel and slander suit against them by plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the defendants, the plaintiff appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

John W. Pope, Sr., of Dallas, for appellant.

Renfro & Kilgore, of Dallas, for appellees.

LOONEY, Justice.

H. W. Ferguson appealed from an adverse judgment rendered in a proceeding wherein he sought to enjoin C. C. Renfro, James A. Kilgore and Robert B. Burgess, attorneys, from representing two of the defendants —to wit, W. L. Roots and D. C. Reed— in a suit, filed by appellant against Roots, Reed and others for damages based upon certain alleged libels and slanders, pending in the court below. The substance of appellant's allegations being that, said attorneys were disqualified to appear in opposition to appellant's suit—in that, the relation of attorney and client had existed between appellant and the attorneys (particularly C. C. Renfro) from the year 1919 to February 1937; and that, during said period, appellant, as president of the Dallas Joint-Stock Land Bank and responsible for the management of its affairs, employed C. C. Renfro as attorney for the Bank, and that, during the entire period of time mentioned, he and the law firm, of which he was a member, represented the Bank in all legal matters in regard to its litigation and business; in short, appellant sought to disqualify and enjoin said attorneys, on the theory that, having thus served him personally and the Bank, of which he was president, in regard to their legal matters, they were disqualified to represent Roots and Reed, stockholders and directors of the Bank—in that, their interests involved in the libel and slander suit conflicted with the interest of the former clients of said attorneys.

Appellant's suit, out of which the injunction proceeding grew, is against seven persons including Roots and Reed, in which appellant is seeking to recover damages for certain alleged libelous publications and slanderous utterances, by the defendants named in said suit or by their authority, of and concerning appellant personally and in regard to his management of the affairs of the Bank, in furtherance of a conspiracy to remove appellant from the presidency of the Bank and from its Board of Directors.

The proof at the hearing was, to the effect that, in 1919, C. C. Renfro was employed by Ferguson, president of the Bank, as its attorney, to examine titles to property upon which loans were sought, to draft documents, advise generally as to the conduct of the affairs of the Bank, and the policy to be pursued—in other words, during the period of time mentioned, Mr. Renfro and the different firms of which he was a member, represented the Bank fully and completely, were consulted by its officers and agents, particularly by appellant, its president, and thus acquired an extensive knowledge in regard to the affairs of the Bank; that during the same period, Mr. Renfro, and the different firms of which he was a member also represented appellant personally in several suits, examined titles to properties upon which appellant made personal loans, also examined titles where loans were sought from another corporation, in which appellant was interested, also attended to litigation on behalf of other corporations, in which appellant was interested.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the court declined to issue the injunction sought, finding and decreeing, as follows, that "* * * after hearing all of the evidence and the argument of counsel the court finds that the plaintiff has wholly failed to meet the burden of proof and to establish the facts necessary to support his application, and the court is of the opinion that the relief prayed for...