Ferguson v. Board of Trustees of Bonner County School Dist. No. 82
| Decision Date | 28 April 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 11967,11967 |
| Citation | 564 P.2d 971,98 Idaho 359 |
| Parties | Jacob C. FERGUSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF BONNER COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 82, a Municipal Corporation of the State of Idaho, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
James E. Hunt, Greene & Hunt, Sandpoint, Peter B. Wilson, Wilson & Walter, Bonners Ferry, for petitioner-appellant.
Jon K. Hammarberg and Lucinda Weiss, Bandelin & Weiss, Sandpoint, E. L. Miller, Miller & Knudsen, Coeur d'Alene, for respondents.
This case involves questions concerning the statutory and constitutional adequacy of the notice and hearing afforded a teacher who was discharged for cause by the board of trustees of a school district. It is complicated by the fact that the teacher walked out of the hearing as it commenced.
On May 15, 1973, the school district administrator appeared at a regular meeting of the board of trustees of the Bonner County School District and recommended to the board that Jacob Ferguson, a teacher in the Bonner County schools, be discharged for improper grading practices and insubordination. Based on the showing of grounds for discharge put forth by the administrator, the board unanimously resolved to issue the following 'Resolution For Discharge of Teacher' which was served upon Ferguson:
'It is Resolved by:
'The Board of Trustees of Bonner County School District No. 82 of Bonner County, Idaho, being fully advised in the premises, and being of the opinion that Jake Ferguson, a teacher in said district, should be discharged for the following reasons:
'Applying a grading system for an improper purpose and which does not relate to the level of difficulty of work to such an extent as to constitute gross neglect of duty in failing to report progress of students to parents accurately, and that said acts constitute insubordination in that the teacher has previously been instructed to correct this deficiency and neglected to do so.
'A hearing may be requested by Jake Ferguson within 30 days after receipt of a copy of this resolution for the purpose of showing reasons why said discharge should not be effected.
'It was moved, Seconded and carried that the above resolution be adopted.'
The text of this resolution follows the format recommended by the State Board of Education in its regulations prescribing procedures for the discharge of teachers.
Regular school board meeting are open and the minutes of proceedings mad public, but for personnel matters such as the discharge of a teacher the Bonner County board of trustees retired to executive session during which no minutes were taken. Consequently, there is no record of the information placed before the board of trustees by the school administrator concerning the grounds for Ferguson's discharge.
Jacob Ferguson timely requested a hearing which was held on June 26, 1973. Present at this hearing were Ferguson (appearing without counsel), the attorney for the school district, the school administrator and other school officials, several students and parents who were to appear as witnesses against Ferguson, and the five trustees. The attorney for the school district stated initially that the resolution was merely an accusation and not a final determination of cause for discharge by the board. Ferguson made it clear from the outset that he did not care to hear any testimony and that he would not present any witnesses, because he believed the board had already made up its mind. He stated that the resolution sounded conclusive to him and that he had assumed that the board had already heard all the evidence against him. It was again stated by a trustee that the board had not yet made a final decision-that that was the purpose of the hearing. The board members and school attorney asked Ferguson if he would like a continuance and urged him to consult an attorney. However, Ferguson walked out of the hearing before the school district presented any evidence relating to the cause of discharge. After he left, the board members debated whether they should proceed with the hearing but concluded that they should not put on any evidence against Ferguson since he was not present. The board then unanimously voted to discharge him.
Ferguson subsequently petitioned the district court for an altenative writ of mandamus, seeking to compel the school trustees to reinstate him as a teacher in the Bonner County schools. In a memorandum opinion, the district court concluded that the school board had substantially complied with I.C. § 33-513(4) 1 and the procedures adopted by the State Board of Education, and also that the board of trustees would have proceeded with the hearing if Ferguson had not left. The court also concluded that Ferguson had knowingly waived his right to a meaningful hearing and that the board had done all that was constitutionally required regarding notice and opportunity to be heard concerning Ferguson's discharge.
Ferguson alleges that the board of trustees deprived him of his statutory and constitutional rights by the manner in which it discharged him. We will first discuss the statutory issues, then the constitutional issues, and finally the legal effect of Ferguson's departure from the hearing.
In I.C. § 33-513(4), the board of trustees of each school district is given authority to discharge certificated professional personnel for the following reasons:
'(F)or continued violation of any lawful rules or regulations of the board of trustees or of the state board of education, or for any conduct which could constitute grounds for revocation of a teaching certificate.'
While it is apparent from a reading of the statute that school boards are given broad authority to define what constitutes grounds for discharge by promulgation of rules and regulations governing professional conduct of school teachers, this provision also establishes that discharge of a teacher must be based upon rules and regulations which are 'lawful,' or for conduct which could constitute 'grounds for revocation of a teaching certificate.' This subsection also requires that the State Board of Education establish discharge procedures and that local school boards comply with these procedures.
'No certificated professional employee shall be discharged during a contract term except under procedures prescribed by the state board of education.' I.C. § 33-513(4).
Pursuant to this statute, the following procedure has been prescribed by the State Board of Education:
(Adopted by State Board of Education, September 11-12, 1964, reprinted Clk.Tr., p. 65).
The recommended form for a resolution for discharge (referred to in subparagraph 'A' above) was used by the school board in this case and is quoted supra, page 973. The trial court concluded, and we agree, that the school board substantially complied with the discharge procedures established by the State Board of Education pursuant to I.C. § 33-513(4), at least until Ferguson left the hearing, the effect of which will be discussed below.
Ferguson contends that he had a statutory right to have cause for his discharge established at the hearing, even in his absence. However, neither the statute nor the State Board of Education procedures require such a result. While we agree that the board of trustees could not discharge him except upon its finding of cause as required by I.C. § 33-513(4), there is no requirement that such cause be established at a hearing unless one is requested by the teacher. A hearing as referred to in the statute denotes the right to confront witnesses, cross examine them, and present evidence on the teacher's behalf. Adams v. Marshall, 212 Kan. 595, 512 P.2d 365 (1973); and cf. Application of Citizens Utilities Co., 82 Idaho 208, 351 P.2d 487 (1960). Ferguson knowingly and wilfully chose not to participate and avail himself of the benefits which the statute intended. We agree with the trial court that he waived his right to the hearing contemplated by the statute and the procedures established by the State Board of Education.
Ferguson does not contest the fact that there had been widespread dissatisfaction with his grading methods for some time among school officials, parents and students. 2 Nor does he contend that he was unaware that this was the reason that the school administrator had recommended his discharge. The resolution and the minutes of the board of trustees indicate that he was discharged for this reason (which it concluded constitutes 'gross neglect of duty' under I.C. § 33-1208 setting forth grounds for revocation of a teaching...
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