Simmons v. Board of Trustees of Independent School Dist. No. 1

• Decision Date: 03 September 1980
• Docket Number: No. 13120,13120
• Citation: 633 P.2d 1130,102 Idaho 552
• Parties: Laurie SIMMONS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 1130

633 P.2d 1130

102 Idaho 552

Laurie SIMMONS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 13120.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Sept. 3, 1980.

On Rehearing Sept. 2, 1981.

Byron J. Johnson, Boise, for plaintiff-appellant.

Reed Clements of Clements, Clements & Brown, Lewiston, for defendant-respondent.

DONALDSON, Chief Justice.

This is an action by plaintiff-appellant Laurie Simmons (hereinafter referred to as "employee") for reinstatement in her employment as a teacher's aide following her discharge by the Board of Trustees of Independent School District No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as "school district"). Employee alleges she was discharged in violation of her right to due process of law because she was dismissed without a hearing or the opportunity to be heard. In addition to seeking reinstatement, employee also seeks back pay with interest and other fringe benefits which she claims she was entitled to as an employee of the school district following her discharge.

Laurie Simmons was employed as a teacher's aide at Camelot Elementary School in Independent School District No. 1, Nez Perce County, for the 1977-78 school year, and had been employed in that capacity On October 31, 1977, the principal of Camelot Elementary assigned employee to monitor a kindergarten class for three days while the regular teacher was engaged in parent-teacher conferences. Upon receiving this assignment, employee notified the principal that she would not perform it. The record indicates that employee refused to perform because she felt that she was not supposed to accept that kind of assignment, that a teacher's aide was not qualified to do such work and that it would be unprofessional for her to do so. The principal then notified her that continued refusal to accept the assignment would probably result in termination of her job.

for two school years prior to the year in question. She was a "classified employee," an uncertified employee under contract with the school district, as opposed to being a "certified employee," one holding a certificate from the Idaho State Department of Education, and her employment with the school district was on the basis of an oral contract, subject to renewal and confirmation annually at the option of the school district. Employee's duties were specifically set forth in a written job description which she acknowledged she had received. Included in the job description was an obligation on her part as a teacher's aide to "perform such other duties as may be assigned" in addition to those specifically set forth.

The following day the principal again advised her of the assignment to monitor the kindergarten class. The employee again refused to accept the assignment and the principal informed her that her job as teacher's aide had been terminated. Upon being notified of the employee's discharge, the superintendent of the school district contacted employee and reviewed with her the reasons for her termination as well as the reasons why employee felt the job should be refused. Employee was advised that she could avoid termination by accepting the assignment. Employee again refused and the superintendent confirmed her termination as of November 1, 1977.

Employee then initiated this action and a trial was held on the matter. The trial court specifically found that employee's job was terminated for cause as a result of employee's "willful voluntary rejection of an assignment of duties," which assignment was found by the trial court to be reasonable and within the scope of her employment, and that "employee was afforded adequate notice and due process of law as required." The trial court found for the school district and entered a judgment to that effect, dismissing employee's action with prejudice. Employee now appeals from dismissal of her action. For reasons stated herein we affirm the dismissal.

As her first argument on appeal, employee raises the issue of whether she was discharged in violation of her right to due process of law. To respond to this question adequately, it is necessary to undertake a two-prong inquiry: (1) whether employee had a property right which required notice and a due process hearing and, (2) if employee had such a right, whether the notice and hearing afforded her was sufficient under the circumstances to meet the due process requirements established by Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).

In Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, the United States Supreme Court declared:

"To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709.

Thus, where the claimant can show that a decision not to rehire somehow deprived him of an interest in "liberty," or that he had a "property" interest in continued employment, then an opportunity for a hearing is required. Perry v. Sindermann, supra at 599, 92 S.Ct. at 2698.

We need not decide the existence of a property interest in the present case, since the school district acknowledges, and the Procedural due process has been described as a malleable concept. Wagner v. Little Rock School District, 373 F.Supp. 876, 881 (E.D.Ark.1973). Its essential elements vary according to

trial court found, that employee had a property interest in the job, entitling her to notice and due process before her position was terminated. Having satisfied the first prong of the two-step inquiry, we need only concern ourselves with whether the notice and the hearing afforded employee were sufficient to meet the minimum requirements of procedural due process.

"(t)he precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives to the procedure that was followed, the protection implicit in the office of the functionary whose conduct is challenged, the balance of the hurt complained of and the good accomplished. . . ." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163, 71 S.Ct. 624, 644, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

Despite its malleable characteristics, a fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard, at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965); Ahern v. Board of Education, 456 F.2d 399, 403 (8th Cir. 1972); Cooley v. Board of Education, 453 F.2d 282, 286-87 (8th Cir. 1972).

In the past, this Court has declared that where a teacher has established a property right in his teaching contract, he cannot be deprived of that interest without notice and an opportunity to be heard. Ferguson v. Board of Trustees, 98 Idaho 359, 363-64, 564 P.2d 971, 975-76 (1977). Thus, at a minimum, due process requires that there be at least notice and the opportunity to be meaningfully heard (emphasis added).

In the present case the trial court concluded

"(t)hat plaintiff had full and ample notice of her prospective termination, was fully aware of the reasons for termination of her employment and that such constituted, as a matter of law, due notice as required for termination of her employment; that the plaintiff had, on two separate occasions, the opportunity to have and was afforded a hearing, both by her principal and by her superintendent, at which time the position of the plaintiff and that of her employer were fully understood each by the other, constituting compliance with constitutional provisions of due process of law for the termination of plaintiff's employment with defendant."

The findings of the trial court which are based on competent, substantial and largely uncontroverted evidence will not be overturned on appeal. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Heckman Ranches, Inc. v. State, 99 Idaho 793, 589 P.2d 540 (1979); Lewis-Clark Memorial Gardens, Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 99 Idaho 680, 587 P.2d 821 (1978). Only where the findings of fact made by the trial court are clearly erroneous will they be set aside. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Marshall Bros., Inc. v. Geisler, 99 Idaho 734, 588 P.2d 933 (1978); Lester v. Lester, 99 Idaho 250, 580 P.2d 853 (1978).

The record indicates that employee knew that if she failed to accept the assignment, she would be terminated. She was so told not only twice by her principal, but also by her superintendent. Employee was aware of the reason for her dismissal. She had ample and adequate opportunity to evaluate her position and change her opinion. Any other procedure or a formal hearing besides that provided by the superintendent would have been "a meaningless gesture." Biklen v. Board of Education, 333 F.Supp. 902, 909-910 (N.D.N.Y.1971).

Likewise, the record indicates that employee met with her principal on two separate occasions, discussed with him her reasons for refusing to accept the position, and then had a telephone conference with her superintendent, reviewing in detail her personnel file and her reasons for refusing the assignment. At no time during these proceedings did she request a more complete We agree with employee's argument that the principal issue on appeal is whether or not there was compliance with procedural due process in her discharge from employment. Our holding that there was compliance therefore makes it unnecessary to consider any subordinate issues.

hearing. Employee also testified that she did not feel her superintendent was abrupt or arbitrary with her during their discussion. In light of these discussions with her supervisors, we cannot conclude that employee did not have a meaningful opportunity to be heard. We therefore affirm the decision of the trial court to dismiss the case with prejudice, holding that the...