Ferguson v. Martineau

• Decision Date: 20 November 1914
• Docket Number: 244
• Citation: 171 S.W. 472,115 Ark. 317
• Parties: FERGUSON v. MARTINEAU, CHANCELLOR
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

171 S.W. 472

115 Ark. 317

FERGUSON v. MARTINEAU, CHANCELLOR

No. 244

Supreme Court of Arkansas

November 20, 1914

Prohibition to Pulaski Chancery Court; John E. Martineau Chancellor; petition sustained as against the chancellor denied as to the county judge.

STATEMENT BY THE COURT.

One Arthur Hodges was convicted of murder in the first degree in the Clark Circuit Court. He appealed to this court and the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. After the judgment of the Clark Circuit Court, Hodges made application to that court for a writ of coram nobis to inquire into the issue of his sanity at the time of the alleged offense for which he was convicted. The writ was issued, and upon a trial of that issue before a jury it was determined that Hodges was sane. Hodges was then conveyed to the State penitentiary and delivered to the superintendent thereof to await his execution under the provisions of the act approved February 15, 1913, Act 55, of the Acts of 1913.

On the 6th day of November, 1914, upon the petition of W. M. Rankin with accompanying affidavits, setting forth that Arthur Hodges is now insane, and asking that inquiry be made into the question of his sanity at the present time, the county and probate judge of Pulaski County, upon consideration of the petition, granted the same and ordered a warrant to issue for the arrest of Arthur Hodges, and directed the sheriff to have him before the probate court on the 23d day of November, 1914, to have the question of his sanity determined.

On the 7th of November, 1914, application was made to the chancery court of Pulaski County for an injunction against the Commissioners of the Arkansas Penitentiary, restraining them from executing Hodges on the day set for his execution. The chancery court granted the petition and issued an order enjoining the commissioners from executing Hodges on the 14th day of November, 1914, or on any other date until the further orders of the chancery court.

The petitioners apply to this court for writs of prohibition, directed to the judge of the chancery court of Pulaski County and to the judge of the county and probate court of said county, prohibiting them from interfering with the execution of Arthur Hodges on the day set for his execution under the sentence and judgment of the Clark Circuit Court.

The judge of the probate court of Pulaski County set up, in response to the petition, that the writ of prohibition should not issue for the reason that this court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ prohibiting the probate court of Pulaski County from exercising its jurisdiction to inquire into the question of the sanity of Hodges, and further set up that he had such jurisdiction and that he had exercised it for good cause shown. The chancellor of the Pulaski Chancery Court responded that he issued the injunction restraining the commissioners from executing Hodges until his sanity could be determined by the probate court on the 23d day of November, 1914, the day set by that court for the inquisition; that he had issued all the orders that he could issue or would issue and that the petitioners, if aggrieved by his action, had their remedy by way of appeal, and not by writ of prohibition.

For the convenience of hearing, the cases are consolidated here and disposed of in one opinion.

Writ of prohibition granted and injunctive order quashed.

Wm. L. Moose, Attorney General, and Jno. P. Streepey, Assistant, for petitioners.

Section 4003 of Kirby's Digest, under which the probate court is proceeding, is manifestly not intended to apply to the case of a person in the custody of the law, who has been convicted of a criminal offense, and is awaiting the punishment provided by law.

The law has thrown ample safeguards around insane persons charged with violations of the criminal laws, whereby they are protected, if insane at the time of the commission of the crime, or afterwards become insane. Kirby's Dig §§ 2227, 2418, 2440, 2454. If these safeguards are not sufficient, it is not the province of the court to add to them.

Jones & Owens and Bradshaw, Rhoton & Helm, for respondents.

1. As to the probate court, this court is without jurisdiction to issue the writ. 75 Ark. 510.

2. Since the act requiring that the death penalty be inflicted upon persons convicted of capital crimes by electrocution at the State penitentiary makes no provision for inquiring into the sanity of a condemned person by the commissioners thereof, there is no one who has authority to determine that question except the probate court of the county where such person is, and we therefore contend that the probate court of Pulaski County has such authority under section 4003 of the digest.

3. The chancellor has done all that he proposes to do or can do in issuing the restraining order. The purpose of the writ of prohibition is not to correct error, but wholly to prevent a court from doing that which it has no power to do.

Until this court has determined that the probate court erred in assuming jurisdiction to inquire into the sanity of Hodges, which can only be done after the question is presented through the proper forum, the circuit court, it must be assumed that the probate court acted within its jurisdiction. Such being the case, the plaintiffs were threatening to do, and were about to do, that which was unlawful and wrong, and the chancery court had the right, and it was within his power and jurisdiction, to issue the restraining order. Martin's Chancery Decisions, 566, and notes; 143 Ind. 98, 52 Am. St. Rep. 407; 66 Ark. 211-214; 56 Mo. 332; 88 Wis. 255; 96 Ark. 332-359.

OPINION

WOOD, J. (after stating the facts).

In Featherstone v. Folbre, 75 Ark. 510, 88 S.W. 554, we said: "This court has no original jurisdiction to control or supervise any proceedings of the probate court. That all belongs to the circuit courts, as matters of original jurisdiction, and to this court by appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over the circuit courts. This court supervises and controls all courts inferior to the circuit courts only through the latter courts. In no other way can the harmony of our judicial system, as at present constituted, be preserved."

In the same case we held that the supervisory jurisdiction of this court over the probate court "comes, not originally, but by way of appeal and supervision through the circuit courts."

It follows that this court has no jurisdiction to issue the writ of prohibition in this case, directed to the probate court. If the application for a writ of prohibition directed to the probate court had been first made in the circuit court and refused, then this court would have jurisdiction by reason of its superintending control over the circuit court, but this was not done.

The petition for the writ of prohibition directed to the probate court must be denied.

Courts of equity have to do with civil and property rights, and they have no jurisdiction to interfere by injunction with criminal proceedings. They can not stay processes of courts having the exclusive jurisdiction of criminal matters, where no civil or property rights are involved. Portis v. Fall, et al. 34 Ark. 375; Medical and Surgical Institute v. Hot Springs, 34 Ark. 559; Taylor Cleveland & Co. v. Pine Bluff, 34 Ark. 603; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. City of Little Rock, 39 Ark. 412; High on Injunctions, § 68; Kerr on Injunctions in Equity, p. 2, star; 1 Wharton Cr. Law, § 403.

This court in State v. Vaughan, 81 Ark. 117, 98 S.W. 685, quoting from the Illinois Supreme Court, said: "It is elementary law that the subject-matter of the jurisdiction of the court of chancery is civil property. * * * The court has no jurisdiction in matters merely criminal or merely immoral, which do not affect any right to property. It is no part of the mission of equity to administer the criminal law of the State. A court of equity has no jurisdiction over matters merely criminal or merely immoral."

The Supreme Court of the United States, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 31 L.Ed. 402, 8 S.Ct. 482, says: "The office and jurisdiction of a court of equity, unless enlarged by express statute, are limited to the protection of rights of property. It has no jurisdiction over the prosecution punishment or pardon of crimes and misdemeanors, or over the appointment or removal of public officers. To assume such a jurisdiction or to sustain a bill in equity to restrain or relieve against proceedings for the punishment of offenses, or for the removal of public officials, is to invade the domain of the courts of common law, or of the executive and administrative departments of the government." See also Fitts...