Ferguson v. Pa. Dep't of Corr.
| Docket Number | 310 M.D. 2022 |
| Decision Date | 30 November 2023 |
| Parties | Antonio D. Ferguson, Petitioner v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances & Appeals, Respondents |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Antonio D. Ferguson (Petitioner) has filed a petition for review in this Court's original jurisdiction. Petitioner requests that an adverse disciplinary decision reached by the Department of Corrections (Department) be rescinded. In response, the Department has filed preliminary objections asserting this Court's lack of jurisdiction. To the extent the Department asserts this Court's lack of appellate jurisdiction, we sustain the Department's preliminary objection. Nevertheless, after careful review, we sua sponte conclude that Petitioner has failed to invoke this Court's original jurisdiction. Accordingly we dismiss the petition for review with prejudice.[1]
Petitioner is an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Phoenix (SCI-Phoenix), where he was assigned to a work program. At some point during his incarceration, Petitioner was reassigned from one housing block to another. When he attempted to enter the new housing block, he received a Class I misconduct. Petitioner filed a grievance, and a hearing occurred at which a correctional officer testified that Petitioner did in fact have permission to enter that housing block. Thereafter, Petitioner was exonerated of the misconduct.[3]
At some point during this process, Petitioner was removed from his work assignment and filed a grievance regarding that removal. He claims that on April 29, 2022, he received a final appeal determination, informing him that his employment in the work program was not in the best interest of the security of the facility.
Subsequently, Petitioner timely filed the instant petition for review, addressed to this Court's original jurisdiction, contending that the Department denied him due process by removing him from his work program. See Pet. for Rev. at 1-5. According to Petitioner, he has a liberty interest in continued employment at his work assignment.[4] See id. Additionally, Petitioner claims that he has a liberty interest in "gaining his freedom from incarceration," and that his removal from the work detail could potentially affect a pending application for commutation. See id. at 3. Petitioner seeks reinstatement to his work program as well as awarded back pay and bonuses. See id. at 5.
In response, the Department filed preliminary objections, arguing that Petitioner's claims should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because he is attempting to appeal a grievance outcome, which this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider. See Prelim. Objs., 8/5/22, ¶¶ 6-7.
When reviewing preliminary objections to petitions for review in our original jurisdiction, we "must treat as true all well-pleaded, material and relevant facts together with any reasonable inference[s] that can be drawn from those facts." Cnty. of Berks v. Pa. Off. of Open Recs., 204 A.3d 534, 539 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (citations omitted). We are not required to accept as true "conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences from facts, expressions of opinion or argumentative allegations." See id. "[W]here any doubt exists as to whether the preliminary objections should be sustained, the doubt must be resolved in favor of overruling the preliminary objections." Pa. State Lodge, Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Dep't of Conservation & Nat. Res., 909 A.2d 413, 416 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).
The Department asserts that Petitioner's claims should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Prelim. Objs., ¶¶ 6-7. According to the Department, to the extent Petitioner seeks appellate review of a grievance outcome, those claims should be dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction. See id. We agree. The resolution of inmate grievances is "purely internal to the [Department] and does not function on the level of a government agency" such that appellate review is appropriate.[5] See Bronson v. Cent. Off. Rev. Comm., 721 A.2d 357, 358 (Pa. 1998).
In its brief, while maintaining its position that Petitioner seeks to appeal a grievance outcome, the Department asserts further that Petitioner's claim does not sound in this Court's original jurisdiction, observing that inmates lack a property right in keeping a prison job. See Dep't's Br. at 7.[6] In response, Petitioner continues to assert a violation of his constitutional rights but fails to develop a cohesive due process argument directed to this Court's original jurisdiction, instead stating "appellate review is necessary to remedy unreasonable wrongs." Pet'r's Br. at 5.
In our view, the Department's preliminary objections do not address adequately the substance of Petitioner's petition, which purports to allege a violation of his right to procedural due process. See Pet. for Rev. at 1-5; Dep't's Br. at 6-7. Although the Department addresses this claim in a cursory manner, the brief does not address our jurisdiction in any detailed analysis. As the Rules of Civil Procedure require, preliminary objections must state specifically the grounds upon which relief is sought. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(b); see also Peoples Benefit Servs., Inc., 895 A.2d at 690 n.13.
However, this does not end our inquiry. The original jurisdiction of this Court is unique. It is wholly statutory and narrowly circumscribed. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 761; see also id. §§ 762-764.[7] "The conferral of original and exclusive jurisdiction creates subject-matter jurisdiction in the Commonwealth Court for the specified classes of claims." Scott v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 284 A.3d 178, 186 (Pa. 2022). "[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative even at the highest level." Id. (cleaned up).[8] Accordingly, we may consider whether a litigant has invoked this Court's original jurisdiction sua sponte.[9] See, e.g., Reese v. Adamson, 146 A. 262, 263 (Pa. 1929) ().[10]
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, that no "State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. "Procedural due process rights are triggered by deprivation of a legally cognizable liberty interest." Brown v. Blaine, 833 A.2d 1166, 1172 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). "If, and only if, the party establishes the deprivation of a protected interest, will the Court consider what type of procedural mechanism is required to fulfill due process." See Shore v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 168 A.3d 374, 383 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).
In the context of prison litigation, "the Department's decisions regarding inmate misconduct convictions generally fall outside the scope of our original jurisdiction, even where a prisoner's constitutional rights have allegedly been violated." Feliciano v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 250 A.3d 1269, 1270 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021), aff'd, 283 A.3d 196 (Pa. 2022). However, a prisoner may invoke our original jurisdiction by identifying an interest not limited by Department regulations and affected by a final Department decision. See Feliciano, 250 A.3d at 1275. A procedural due process violation occurs when the prison "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life."[11] See id. at 1275-76 (citing Brown, 833 A.2d at 1172). If a petitioner cannot show such a violation, then the disciplinary decision is "not an adjudication subject to this Court's review and therefore falls outside the scope of our original jurisdiction." See id. at 1275 (citing Bronson, 721 A.2d at 359).
Instantly, Petitioner argues that he has a protected interest in his continued employment at his work assignment. See generally Pet. for Rev. He contends that his removal from his work assignment, after the original misconduct was resolved in his favor, was a violation of due process. See id. at 3-4. Petitioner contends that the Department failed to follow its own procedures in removing him from the work program. See id.
We are not prepared to recognize a procedural due process claim herein. It is well settled that a prisoner has no property right in "keeping a prison job." See Bush v. Veach, 1 A.3d 981, 984 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citing Bryan v. Werner, 516 F.2d 233, 240 (3d Cir. 1975) ( that an inmate's expectation of keeping a particular prison job does not amount to either a "property" or "liberty" interest entitled to protection under the due process clause)).[12] [13] Therefore, the loss of a prison work assignment, without more, does not constitute an atypical and significant hardship such as would invoke our original jurisdiction.[14] See Feliciano, 250 A.3d at 1275-76; see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995) ().
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Department's preliminary objection to this Court's appellate jurisdiction. Nevertheless, we sua sponte conclude that Petitioner has failed to invoke this Court's original jurisdiction. Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for review with prejudice.[15] [16]
AND NOW, this 30th day of November, 2023, the Department of Corrections' preliminary objection to this...
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