Ferguson v. Rex Spinning Co.

Decision Date13 February 1929
Docket Number453.
Citation146 S.E. 597,196 N.C. 614
PartiesFERGUSON v. REX SPINNING CO.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Appeal from Superior Court, Gaston County; N. A. Townsend, Special Judge.

Action by Earl Ferguson, by his next friend, J. F. Ferguson, against the Rex Spinning Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

Employee was not acting within scope of employment as regarded injury to fellow employee by use of hose pipe with compressed air.

This is an action for actionable negligence, brought by J. F Ferguson, next friend of Earl Ferguson, his son, against defendant.

Earl Ferguson was a "doffer boy," 14 years of age working in the twister room of defendant's cotton mill under Whitey Barnes, a second hand who was over him. He was performing his duties in a place he had a right to be. The company furnished a hose with compressed air to Barnes, the force of which was 110 pounds, and sufficient to blow grease and lint off of frames in the cotton mill.

Earl Ferguson testified: "Barnes slipped up behind me and grabbed my arm and raised me clean off the floor with the hose pipe. He grabbed my left arm, put the hose pipe to me with his other arm and raised me off the floor. I felt the air going in me and I grabbed his arm and I commenced sinking to the floor, and that was all I knew until I woke up on the spare floor."

The issues submitted to the jury and their answers thereto, were as follows:

"1. Was the minor plaintiff injured by reason of the negligence of the defendant, as alleged in the complaint? Answer: Yes.
"2. Was the second hand, Whitey Barnes, at the time of the injuries inflicted on the plaintiff, acting within the scope of his employment? Answer: Yes.
"3. What damage, if any, is plaintiff entitled to recover of the defendant? Answer: $1,700.00."

Defendant introduced no evidence, and at the close of plaintiff's evidence made motion for judgment as in case of nonsuit. C. S. § 567. The motion was refused; defendant excepted and assigned error. Defendant also submitted the following prayer for instructions: "If you believe the evidence as testified to by the witnesses, you will answer the second issue No." This was refused; defendant excepted and assigned error, and appealed to the Supreme Court.

J. Laurence Jones, of Charlotte, and Geo. B. Mason, of Gastonia, for appellant.

Carpenter & Carpenter, of Gastonia, for appellee.

CLARKSON J.

The material question for our determination was whether Whitey Barnes, under the facts and circumstances of this case, was acting within the "scope of his employment"? We cannot so hold.

The law, as stated in 18 R. C. L. pp. 795, 796, is as follows: "Acts impliedly authorized or such as are within the scope of the employment--that is, wrongs for which the employer may be held accountable--are not susceptible of precise or even very helpful definition by any phrase or short form of expression. Each case must be determined with a view to the surrounding facts and circumstances-- the character of the employment and the nature of the wrongful act. Whether the act was or was not such as to be within the employment's scope is ordinarily one of fact for the jury's determination. But if the departure from the employer's business is of a marked and decided character the decision of the question may be within the province of the court. 'Where a servant steps aside from the master's business and does an act not connected with the business, which is hurtful to another, manifestly the master is not liable for such act, for the reason that having left his employer's business, the relation of master and servant did not exist as to the wrongful act. (Italics ours.) But if the servant continues about the business of the employer, adopts methods which he deems necessary, expedient or convenient, and the methods adopted prove hurtful to others, the employer is liable. *** (Page 800.) The rule, however, established by the later authorities does not make the responsibility of the employer depend on the question whether an injury inflicted by the employee was wilful and intentional or unintentional, but upon the question whether the employee when he did the wrong acted in the prosecution of the employer's business, and within the scope of his authority, or had stepped aside from that business, and done an individual wrong. These decisions assert that the employer should be held responsible for the acts of his employee, when done in the course of his employment with a view to the furtherance of his employer's business, and not for a purpose personal to himself, whether the same be done wilfully and intentionally, or merely carelessly and heedlessly."

The injury...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT