Ferguson v. Ross

• Decision Date: 02 June 1891
• Citation: 126 N.Y. 459,27 N.E. 954
• Parties: FERGUSON v. ROSS et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

126 N.Y. 459

27 N.E. 954

FERGUSON

v.ROSS et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 2, 1891.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, second department.

R. D. Benedict, for appellants.

James C. Church, for respondent.

ANDREWS, J.

The statement of a few facts will be sufficient to present the questions on this appeal. In 1875 an act of the legislature was passed (chapter 604) entitled ‘An act to prevent the deposit of carrion offal, or dead animals in the North or East rivers, or in the Bay of New York, or Raritan bay, within the jurisdiction of the state of New York.’ The act, among other things, provided for the appointment by the governor of a shore inspector, to report and prevent violations of the act, who was to be paid a salary by the state comptroller, to be raised by taxation on the counties of New York, Kings, Queens, Westchester, and Richmond. The act was amended by chapter 414 of the Laws of 1885, by adding a new section, (section 8,) which extended the prohibitions in the original act, and made it unlawful to deposit or allow to be discharged into the waters mentioned in the first section of the act of 1875 any material dredged or excavated from any slip, basin, shoal, or other place, unless deposited above high-water mark, or behind a bulk-head for filling in; and provided a penalty for the violation of this section. In 1886 (chapter 630) the original act was further amended, as was also section 8 of the act of 1885, but in a particular not material to the present inquiry. This action was brought by the shore inspector, under the provision of the statute, against the defendant, to recover a penalty for depositing dredgings from a slip in the city of New York into the waters of the North river, contrary to the eighth section of the act of 1886. It is not controverted on this appeal that in December, 1887, the defendants discharged into the waters of the river, opposite the city of New York, on the New Jersey side, at a point about one-fourth of a mile from the New Jersey shore, a scow-load of material dredged from a slip in the city of New York, in violation of the act. It is insisted, however, in the first place, that, the deposit having been made within the territorial limits of New Jersey, the state of New York has no jurisdiction to enact a law subjecting persons to liability for any act done within the territory of that state. The case of People v. Railroad, 42 N. Y. 283, furnishes a satisfactory answer to this objection. By the compact entered into between New York and New Jersey, the particulars of which are set forth in the opinion in that case, the middle of the North river was declared to be the boundary between the two states, but by the third article exclusive jurisdiction of and over all the waters of the Bay of New York and of the Hudson river lying west of Manhattan island and to the south of Spuyten Duyvil creek, and of and over the lands covered by said waters to low-water mark on the New Jersey side thereof, was ceded to the state of New York, reserving to the state of New Jersey jurisdiction of wharves, docks, and piers on the Jersey shore. The purpose of vesting exclusive jurisdiction over these waters in the state of New York was to promote the interests of commerce and navigation, which would, as supposed, be best subserved by giving to this state the exclusive control and regulation of the waters of the bay and harbor of New York.

The only remaining question is as to the constitutionality of section 8 of the act of 1886, which is assailed as a violation of section 16, art. 3, of the constitution of this state. It is contended that the act of 1875 was a local bill, and that section 8 of the act of 1886 was an enactment of another other local provision, covering a different subject from that embraced in the original act; and also that the subject of the new section was not expressed in the title of the act of 1875, or of the amended act of 1886. The trial judge entertained some doubt whether the act of 1875, as originally enacted, was a local act. But, as we are of opinion that section 8 of the act of 1886 was a general, and not a local, law, the examination of the other question is unnecessary, for it is well settled that a general provision inserted in an act containing local provisions is valid, whether the subject is expressed in the title or not, as general acts require an enacting clause only. Const. art. 3, § 14; People v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58;Williams v. People, 24 N. Y. 405. The courts have, in some cases, found great difficulty in determining the application of section...