Ferguson v. Trovaten
| Decision Date | 10 February 1905 |
| Docket Number | 14,043 - (45) |
| Citation | 102 N.W. 373,94 Minn. 209 |
| Parties | MOSES FERGUSON v. BETSEY TROVATEN and Another |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Wilkin county to recover possession of land and $1,000 for the detention thereof. The case was tried before Flaherty, J., and a jury, which rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for possession and $540 damages. From a judgment entered pursuant to the verdict defendants appealed. Reversed and new trial granted.
Vendor and Purchaser -- Statute of Frauds -- Printed Signature.
Action to recover the possession of land. Each party based his right of possession upon a contract of sale and purchase from the same party. Held:
1. To constitute a contract for the sale of real estate valid within the statute of frauds, a written offer to buy or sell it must be accepted in writing, but the offer and acceptance need not be in the same writing.
2. The printed signature of the authorized agent of the vendor appearing in the writing in this case, which is claimed by the defendants to be a valid contract for the sale of the land, does not constitute a subscribing or a signing of the contract within the meaning of the statute of frauds.
3. It was error for the trial court to exclude an offer on behalf of the defendants to show an oral acceptance of their application to purchase the land, with proof of such performance on their part as would take the contract out of the statute.
Lyman B. Everdell and Chas. E. Wolfe, for appellants.
W. V Kane and Thomas Kneeland, for respondent.
This is an action to recover from the defendants the possession of the land described in the complaint, with damages for withholding it from the plaintiff. Both parties claim title through a common source, the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, hereafter referred to as the company. The plaintiff's claim to the land was based upon an executory agreement to convey the land to him for the sum of $3,000, made July 2, 1901, by the company, and a further contract made by it on December 23, 1902. In this last contract it was recited that it was the intention of the parties by the original to confer upon the plaintiff the right of possession to the land, and such right was thereby expressly given and confirmed to him, subject to any right in the land existing in any other person theretofore acquired from the company. The defendants' claim to the land and their right to retain the possession thereof was based upon an alleged contract with the company for the purchase of the land by the defendant Betsy Trovaten, the wife of her codefendant, the payment of the purchase price therefor, and the entry into the possession thereof under the contract, and the making of permanent improvements thereon.
At the close of the evidence the trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff for the recovery of the possession of the land, and submitted only the question of damages to the jury. The jury returned a verdict accordingly, and awarded the plaintiff damages in the sum of $540. The defendants then made a motion for judgment in their favor notwithstanding the verdict, or for a new trial. The motion was denied, and judgment entered on the verdict, from which the defendants appealed.
The assignments of error relied upon by the defendants are to the effect that the trial court erred in its rulings as to the admission of evidence and in directing a verdict for the plaintiff. This necessitates an examination of the evidence received on the trial and that offered by the defendants and excluded by the court. The plaintiff offered in evidence his contracts with the company, to which reference has been made. The contracts established a prima facie right in the plaintiff to the possession of the land. The evidence, however, was undisputed that the defendants have been in the actual possession of the land and cultivating it since April, 1900; hence the plaintiff, who did not obtain either of his contracts until July, 1901, is charged with notice of the rights of the defendants in the land, if any they have.
It is practically admitted that at all times hereinafter stated Wilsey, the land agent of the company, and Phipps, its land commissioner, were each authorized to sell its land in this state and execute contracts therefor, but all applications for the purchase thereof were subject to the acceptance and approval of the land commissioner. The defendants offered evidence tending to show: That A. A. Trovaten, hereafter referred to as the "defendant," went, on July 22, 1899, to the office of the land commissioner, and made application to him to purchase the land in question for his wife. That at this time the company had not then perfected its title to the land, as it was indemnity land, and the defendant then had a contest as to it pending in the proper land office of the United States. That the defendant then had a talk with the land commissioner as to the terms upon which an application for the purchase of the land would be accepted, and the terms of the sale were talked over. That the land commissioner dictated to one of his clerks the terms of the application, which was partly printed and partly written, and when completed it described the land, stated the purchase price therefor ($1,200), the time and manner of the payment, and the names of the parties, and in the margin thereof these words:
A. A. Trovaten, contestant, is to relinquish contest, and if we perfect title, sale is to be entered and deed made; otherwise relinquishment and money to be returned.
That the defendant then signed the application, but there was no written acceptance by the company at this time other than the writing in the margin thereof and the printed signatures of its land agent and land commissioner at the end of certain printed instructions and conditions. Then followed, in the same instrument, the application proper for the sale of the land. That seven days thereafter the defendant paid to the company $400 on the purchase price of the land, and on December 29, 1899, he paid the balance thereof, $800. That the company acknowledged in writing, signed by its land agent, the receipt of these payments. That the receipt for the first payment was in these words:
Your favor of the 26th instant remitting $400 on account of application for the S.E. I / 4 of section 1, in township 134, of range 48, is received. I note your statement that the balance of amount can be forwarded when we are prepared to enter sale. It was the understanding at the time this matter was talked over in the office that you would remit the full amount required, and that same would be held with your application until the company can perfect title and transfer the property to you by deed. Kindly forward balance of the amount together with your formal relinquishment as soon as possible and oblige.
That the defendant relinquished his contest, and paid the balance of the purchase price as requested; and that on February 23, 1900, the company wrote the defendant that it was holding his application until such time as the question of title could be adjudged.
On the trial the defendants also offered to show by the defendant substantially these facts: That the land commissioner orally offered to sell the land for $1,200; that the defendant accepted the offer; that his application for the purchase of the land was then prepared, and signed by him, as before stated; that the land commissioner accepted and approved of the application, and agreed that as soon as a patent for the land was secured a deed therefor would be made to the defendant's wife; and that the defendants paid the purchase price, entered upon the land, and made...
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