Ferman v. Jenlis, Inc.
| Decision Date | 18 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:16–cv–00074–JEG,4:16–cv–00074–JEG |
| Citation | 224 F.Supp.3d 791 |
| Parties | Randall S. FERMAN and Extreme Hunting Solutions, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. JENLIS, INC. and Daniel S. Amundson, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa |
Brett J. Trout, Brett J. Trout, P.C., Desmoines, IA, for Plaintiffs.
Edward Peter Sheu, Best & Flanagan LLP, Minneapolis, MN, Matthew M. Craft, Dutton Braun Staack & Hellman PLC, Waterloo, IA, for Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on Motion by Defendants Jenlis, Inc. (Jenlis) and Daniel S. Amundson (Amundson) (jointly, Defendants) to dismiss the Complaint by Plaintiffs Randall S. Ferman (Ferman) and Extreme Hunting Solutions, LLC (Extreme Hunting) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) or 12(b)(3). The parties have not requested a hearing, and the Court finds a hearing is unnecessary. The Motion is fully submitted and ready for ruling.
Courts consider motions to dismiss "accepting the allegations contained in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Cockram v. Genesco, Inc. , 680 F.3d 1046, 1056 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
Ferman owns a copyrighted work entitled "No Trespassing signs with pictures of wireless surveillance cameras with no antenna mounted on the side, and antenna mounted on the top of the camera" (the Ferman Sign). Ferman owns Extreme Hunting and has assigned ownership of the Ferman Sign to the entity. Ferman created the Ferman Sign in 2014 and has distributed it nationally since 2014. Ferman registered his copyright in the Ferman Sign around January 16, 2015. A copy of the certificate of registration is attached as an exhibit to the Complaint.
Like Plaintiffs, Jenlis also develops and sells "no trespassing" signs. Amundson is the chief executive officer of Jenlis. Around January 14, 2016, Plaintiffs allegedly discovered that Defendants were selling a "no trespassing" sign (the Jenlis Sign) similar to the Ferman Sign. An image of the Jenlis Sign is attached as an exhibit to the Complaint, though an image of the Ferman sign is not. The Jenlis Sign includes wording, a two-toned colored background, and a depiction of a camera, all allegedly similar to the Ferman Sign. Defendants allegedly had access to the Ferman Sign prior to their creation of the Jenlis Sign.
On March 18, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a one-count Complaint alleging infringement of Plaintiffs' copyright in the Ferman Sign in violation of 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 501 (the Copyright Act). Plaintiffs request monetary and equitable relief. On April 19, 2016, Defendants filed the present Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs resist.
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising under the Copyright Act pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 () and 28 U.S.C. § 1338 ().
Jenlis is a Minnesota corporation with its principal place of business in Minnesota. Amundson is a resident of Winona, Minnesota. Plaintiffs allege this Court has jurisdiction because Defendants are doing business in the State of Iowa and in this judicial district, because the allegedly infringing acts occurred in this judicial district, and because Defendants have injured Plaintiffs in this judicial district. Defendants argue these general allegations are insufficient to support a finding of personal jurisdiction and therefore move to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). Defendants contend they are Minnesota residents with no property, place of business, or employees in Iowa, and no other substantial contacts sufficient to find general personal jurisdiction. Furthermore, Defendants argue Plaintiffs have not alleged any specific Jenlis sign was marketed or sold in Iowa, and that Plaintiffs have not alleged any other specific conduct connecting Defendants to Iowa. Defendants contend that the only proffered evidence of their contact with Iowa was an affidavit by Ferman that included only hearsay. Specifically Ferman's affidavit included a hearsay account that the Jenlis Sign was offered for sale at a trade show in Des Moines, Iowa, called the 2016 Iowa Deer Classic, and that a business card of a Jenlis salesperson was observed at the trade show. On surreply, Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit of a Justin Houseal, which includes non-hearsay evidence of Jenlis's presence at the trade show.
"To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists, which is accomplished by pleading sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that the defendant can be subjected to jurisdiction within the state." K–V Pharm. Co. v. J. Uriach & CIA, S.A. , 648 F.3d 588, 591–92 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The evidentiary showing is minimal and can be shown not only from the pleadings but also from affidavits and exhibits filed in support of or opposition to the motion. Id. at 592. The Court "must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve factual conflicts in the plaintiff's favor; however, the party seeking to establish the court's personal jurisdiction carries the burden of proof and that burden does not shift to the party challenging jurisdiction." Fastpath, Inc. v. Arbela Techs. Corp. , 760 F.3d 816, 820 (8th Cir. 2014).
A federal court may assume jurisdiction over nonresident defendants only to the extent permitted by the long-arm statute of the forum state and in conformance with due process. Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc. , 946 F.2d 1384, 1389 n.2 (8th Cir. 1991) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). "Because Iowa's long-arm statute ‘expands Iowa's jurisdictional reach to the widest due process parameters allowed by the United States Constitution,’ [the Court's] inquiry is limited to whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process." Wells Dairy, Inc. v. Food Movers Int'l, Inc. , 607 F.3d 515, 518 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hammond v. Fla. Asset Fin. Corp. , 695 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2005) ).
Due process requires the non-resident defendant to have sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum state such that "maintenance of the suit ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ " World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 291–92, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) ). Personal jurisdiction requires "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla , 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). "If a court determines that a defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, it may then consider ‘whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice.’ " Dever v. Hentzen Coatings , Inc. , 380 F.3d 1070, 1073 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) ).
"Personal jurisdiction can be specific or general." Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM—Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG , 646 F.3d 589, 593 (8th Cir.2011). "Specific jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction over causes of action arising from or related to a defendant's actions within the forum state." Fastpath , 760 F.3d at 820 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Eighth Circuit evaluates five factors in determining whether specific jurisdiction exists: "1) the nature and quality of the defendant's contacts with the forum state; 2) the quantity of such contacts; 3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; 4) the interests of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and 5) the convenience of the parties." Downing v. Goldman Phipps, PLLC , 764 F.3d 906, 913 (8th Cir.2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Factors one through three are primary, while factors four and five are secondary. Dever , 380 F.3d at 1074. The third factor, the relation of the cause of action to the contacts, is a key inquiry for specific jurisdiction, which inheres when a suit "aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant's contacts with the forum." Daimler AG v. Bauman , ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 746, 754, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014) (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall , 466 U.S. 408, 414, n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984) ) (alterations in original).
"For a State to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the defendant's suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State." Walden v. Fiore , –––U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1121, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014). This means that "the relationship must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum State." Id. at 1122 (quoting Burger King , 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174 ). "Jurisdiction is proper ... where the contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a substantial connection with the forum state." Stanton v. St. Jude Med., Inc. , 340 F.3d 690, 694 (8th Cir.2003) (quoting Burger King , 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174 ). While Plaintiffs ultimately bear the burden of proof to establish personal jurisdiction, "[a]t the motion stage, the action should not be dismissed for lack of...
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