Fernandes v. Mockridge
| Decision Date | 01 August 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 32029-7-I,32029-7-I |
| Citation | 877 P.2d 719,75 Wn.App. 207 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Beryl FERNANDES, Appellant, v. Carol MOCKRIDGE and Christian Richards, Respondents. |
Michael J. Trickey, Appelwick Trickey & Lukevich, Seattle, for appellant.
Howard Roy Bartlett, Taylor Kiefer Therriault & Bartlett, Julie M. Schisel, Law Offices of Brian J. Linn, Seattle, for respondents.
Beryl Fernandes sued Christian Richards (her former husband) and Carol Mockridge for an allegedly fraudulent transfer of property. The trial court sent her suit to mandatory arbitration, a decision to which she assigns error. Disappointed in the arbitration award of $5,600, Fernandes sued de novo in superior court. She now appeals the trial court's orders dismissing her claims against the defendants and awarding them attorney's fees.
Because Fernandes did not demonstrate a tenable claim for damages exceeding the threshold at the time the trial court made the determination of arbitrability, we affirm the court's exercise of discretion in making that determination, as well as the order of attorney's fees attributable to Fernandes's failure to improve her position at the trial de novo.
Fernandes also assigns error to the trial court's limitation of her pro se direct testimony; issuance of its own findings of fact and conclusions of law; its assessment of the reasonableness of attorney fees pursuant to the dissolution decree and those incurred post-arbitration; and dismissal of her claims for lack of proof at the close of her case. Seeing no merit in these contentions and no point in taking additional evidence on appeal, we affirm the judgments.
Richards and Fernandes separated in February of 1988 after 19 years of marriage. Richards began dating Carol Mockridge in the spring of 1990.
As part of the property distribution plan entered in its decree of dissolution, the court awarded the couple's vacation home in Quilcene, Washington to Richards, subject to a lien in favor of Fernandes in the amount of 3/8th of the net sale proceeds. The decree authorized a number of disbursements from the proceeds towards community debts. For the purposes of property distribution, the decree assigned to the Quilcene property a fair market value of $115,000, with a net value of $80,000 after deducting sales costs and capital gains taxes.
Prior to the dissolution hearing, Richards and Fernandes had tried to sell the property by listing it with a real estate broker for $149,500. In August, 1990, Mockridge made an offer to buy Fernandes's one-half interest for $61,500. Fernandes rejected this offer. The broker later recommended they lower the price to between $112,000 and $115,000. Richards, who was managing the property until the time of trial, lowered it to $139,500 on November 7, 1990. The property remained for sale at this price for 3 months, despite being shown to numerous people. In March, 1991, Richards sold the Quilcene property to Mockridge for $102,500. After deduction of capital gains tax, sales costs, and certain repair costs, the net proceeds were $71,560. Fernandes's share amounted to just under $27,000. The court-ordered disbursements from her share of the proceeds left Fernandes with no cash distribution from the sale. In fact, she still had outstanding debts.
Fernandes filed suit against the defendants in June, 1991, alleging fraud, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty and conspiracy to defraud and seeking equitable damages and damages for emotional distress. The defendants filed for mandatory arbitration. Fernandes objected, asserting that her claim exceeded the maximum arbitrable amount of $35,000. The court allowed arbitration after reviewing memoranda from the parties and holding a status conference.
The arbitrator dismissed Mockridge and awarded Fernandes $5,600 against Richards. Under MAR 7.1, as the aggrieved party, Fernandes requested a trial de novo. Prior to trial, she successfully resisted a motion for summary judgment. At the bench trial Fernandes represented herself. At the conclusion of Fernandes's case, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss all of her claims. The court awarded pre-arbitration attorney's fees to Richards under the dissolution decree and awarded attorney's fees to the defendants for the post-arbitration period.
Fernandes assigns error to the court's decision to transfer her case to mandatory arbitration over her objection. Her argument that the transfer violated her right to a jury trial has already been rejected in Christie-Lambert Van and Storage Co. Inc. v. McLeod, 39 Wash.App. 298, 306, 693 P.2d 161 (1984). Similarly without merit is her contention that the transfer was a violation of due process. She had ample opportunity to be heard.
She also contends King County's local rule (LMAR 2.1) required the court to accept at face value her claim that the case exceeded $35,000 in value. LMAR 2.1(b) reads in relevant part that "if a party asserts that its claim exceeds the maximum amount authorized by statute or seeks relief other than a money judgment, the case is not subject to arbitration except by stipulation."
Local courts may not pass rules inconsistent with the general civil rules. CR 83. The test for inconsistency is whether the two rules can be reconciled and both given effect. King County v. Williamson, 66 Wash.App. 10, 13, 830 P.2d 392 (1992).
MAR 2.2, a general rule, provides the trial court with discretion to determine whether a case is actually subject to arbitration under RCW 7.06.020. The judicial council has said that MAR 2.2 "gives the judge authority to deal with maneuvers designed to keep a case out of the arbitration system." 4A Wash.Prac., Rules Practice § 5821 at 11 (4th ed. 1990). RCW 7.06, authorizing mandatory arbitration in certain civil cases, is intended primarily to alleviate court congestion and reduce delay in hearing cases. Christie-Lambert Van, 39 Wash.App. at 302, 693 P.2d 161. To give to LMAR 2.1(b) the effect suggested by Fernandes would defeat this intent by forcing the unnecessary and premature commitment of court resources. LMAR 2.1 must function within the larger purpose of MAR 2.2, which is meant to prevent parties from sidestepping mandatory arbitration by exaggerating the value of their claims.
To the extent that LMAR 2.1 allows the claimant to frustrate a transfer to arbitration by an unsupported assertion of value, it cannot be reconciled with MAR 2.2(a) which allows the court to "determine whether a case is actually subject to arbitration." Notwithstanding any inconsistency presented by King County's local rule, MAR 2.2 vests discretion in the trial court judge to look behind the face value of the claim and to order a...
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