Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction

• Decision Date: 16 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. 23972.,23972.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Rafael FERNANDEZ v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

859 A.2d 948

86 Conn.App. 42

Rafael FERNANDEZ v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

No. 23972.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 13, 2004.

Decided November 16, 2004.

Martin Zeldis, public defender, for the appellant (petitioner).

James A. Killen, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Christopher L. Morano, chief state's attorney, and Angela R. Macchiarulo, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

FOTI, WEST and McLACHLAN, Js.

WEST, J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether, on the basis of the doctrine of res judicata, the habeas court correctly prevented the petitioner, Rafael Fernandez, from relitigating claims in a habeas proceeding that were raised, litigated and decided on direct appeal from his judgment of conviction. We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

In May, 1998, the petitioner was convicted, by a three judge panel, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) and arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53-111(a)(1). He appealed from his judgment of conviction, claiming that (1) the trial court, Espinosa, J., denied him his constitutional right to counsel when it granted defense counsel's oral motion to withdraw and (2) the trial court, Barry, J., deprived him of his constitutional right to represent himself when it vacated its previous order granting his pro se motion to be transferred to another correctional facility to have access to a law library. Our Supreme Court disagreed and thus affirmed the trial court's judgment. See State v. Fernandez, 254 Conn. 637, 639-40, 758 A.2d 842 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 913, 121 S.Ct. 1247, 149 L.Ed.2d 153 (2001). Approximately eighteen months later, the petitioner filed a two count amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The habeas court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the two claims raised by the petitioner in his amended petition were identical to those discussed and ruled on by our Supreme Court in the petitioner's direct appeal from his judgment of conviction. The petitioner thereafter filed a petition for certification to appeal, which the habeas court granted. This appeal followed.

The petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly dismissed his amended petition on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Before addressing that claim, we set forth our standard of review for a challenge to the dismissal of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. "[T]he conclusions reached by the trial court in its decision to dismiss the habeas petition are matters of law, subject to plenary review .... Thus, [w]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct... and whether they find support in the facts that appear in the record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) King v. Commissioner of Correction, 80 Conn.App. 580, 584, 836 A.2d 466 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 919, 841 A.2d 1191 (2004).

With that standard in mind, we assess the court's legal conclusion that the petitioner's claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. "[T]he doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, [provides that] a former judgment on a claim, if rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action [between the same parties] on the same claim.... To determine whether two claims are the same for purposes of res judicata, we compare the pleadings and judgment in the first action with the complaint in the subsequent action.... The judicial [doctrine] of res judicata... [is] based on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate.... [W]here a party has fully and fairly litigated his claims, he may be barred from future actions on matters not raised in the prior proceeding." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thorpe v. Commissioner of Correction, 73 Conn.App. 773, 777, 809 A.2d 1126 (2002).

"The doctrine [of res judicata] applies to criminal as well as civil proceedings and to state habeas corpus proceedings...." Brown v. Commissioner of Correction, 44 Conn.App. 746, 750, 692 A.2d 1285 (1997), citing McCarthy v. Warden, 213 Conn. 289, 294-98, 567 A.2d 1187 (1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 939, 110 S.Ct. 3220, 110 L.Ed.2d 667 (1990); see also Thorpe v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 73 Conn.App. at 778, 809 A.2d 1126 (holding that habeas court correctly determined that petitioner was barred by res judicata from relitigating first federal due process claim in habeas petition); Smith v. Liburdi, 22 Conn.App. 562, 563-64, 578 A.2d 160 (holding that trial court properly quashed petitioner's habeas corpus petition on ground that petitioner fully litigated claim on direct appeal from judgment of conviction), cert. denied, 216 Conn. 816, 580 A.2d 60 (1990). "Although the doctrine of res judicata in its fullest sense bars claims that could have been raised in a prior proceeding, such an application in the habeas corpus context would be unduly harsh.... Unique policy considerations must be taken into account in applying the doctrine of res judicata to a constitutional claim raised by a habeas petitioner.... Foremost among those considerations is the interest in making certain that no one is deprived of liberty in violation of his or her constitutional rights.... With that in mind, we limit the application of the doctrine of res judicata in circumstances such as these to claims that actually have been raised and litigated in an earlier proceeding." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thorpe v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, at 778-79 n. 7, 809 A.2d 1126.

Here, the petitioner sought habeas review of two claims that were unequivocally raised, litigated and decided on direct appeal from his judgment of conviction. In his first claim, the petitioner alleged the following: Before trial, the court permitted the petitioner's privately retained counsel to withdraw from the case. Rather than retain new counsel, the petitioner decided to represent himself. Realizing that the correctional facility at which he was being held lacked the resources necessary to prepare for trial, he asked to be transferred to another facility. The court granted his request, but later reversed its decision, per the request of the commissioner of correction, and had the petitioner transferred back to a facility with inadequate resources. Because of that decision, the petitioner alleged that he could not prepare adequately for trial and therefore was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial. He also alleged that he "appealed this issue and argued he was prevented from adequately preparing for his trial." Indeed, he did.

On direct appeal from his judgment of conviction, the petitioner "challenge[d] the order of the trial court, Barry, J., vacating its previous order, which had granted the [petitioner's] pro se motion to be transferred to another correctional facility in order to gain access to a law library." State v. Fernandez, supra, 254 Conn. at 639, 758 A.2d 842. That order, he claimed, "resulted in the failure of the state to fulfill its constitutional obligation to provide pro se criminal defendants with access to the courts." Id. Our Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the petitioner "was not constitutionally entitled to access to a law library in order to have meaningful access to the courts." Id., at 640, 758 A.2d 842. Because there is no difference (apart from slight variations in wording) between the claim raised, litigated and decided on direct appeal and that alleged in the habeas proceeding, the habeas court properly concluded that the first claim in the petitioner's amended petition was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

The petitioner premised his second claim on the trial court's decision to allow defense counsel to withdraw his appearance. He alleged that, in doing so, the court failed to comply with the rules of practice, failed to give him adequate notice, and failed to articulate its decision properly. According to the petitioner, "this decision effectively denied [him] the right to be represented by counsel, when it allowed [his] privately retained counsel to withdraw from the case in violation of the sixth amendment [to the United States constitution] and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution." As in his first claim, the petitioner alleged that "this issue was appealed." Again, he is correct.

On direct appeal from his judgment of conviction, the petitioner claimed that "the trial court, Espinosa, J., abused its discretion in granting [defense counsel's] motion to withdraw." State v. Fernandez, supra, 254 Conn. at 646, 758 A.2d 842. The petitioner further claimed that "the trial court, Espinosa, J., failed to comply with Practice Book (1978-1997) § 632 by: (1) allowing [the petitioner's defense counsel] to withdraw notwithstanding the fact that he had not filed a written motion requesting permission to withdraw; and (2) failing to assert with any degree of specificity good cause in support of its decision to grant [counsel's] oral motion to withdraw." Id. The petitioner argued that, "as a result of the court's alleged failure to comply with Practice Book (1978-1997) § 632, he was deprived of his right to counsel under article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut and under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution." Id., at 646-47, 758 A.2d 842. In rejecting the petitioner's claim, our Supreme Court concluded that: "(1) the trial court, Espinosa, J., did not abuse its discretion in granting [defense counsel's] motion to withdraw; and (2) although the trial court, Espinosa, J., violated Practice Book (1978-1997) § 632 in...