Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction
Decision Date | 02 June 2009 |
Docket Number | No. 18247.,18247. |
Parties | Rafael FERNANDEZ v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION. |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
The petitioner, Rafael Fernandez, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In this appeal,1 the petitioner asks us to determine whether the habeas court properly found that the actions of the petitioner's trial counsel, William T. Gerace, in obtaining the trial court's permission to withdraw from representing the petitioner at his criminal trial, did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.
The following relevant facts and procedural history are set forth in our decision on the petitioner's direct appeal from his convictions. See State v. Fernandez, 254 Conn. 637, 758 A.2d 842 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 913, 121 S.Ct. 1247, 149 L.Ed.2d 153 (2001). On May 29, 1998, a three judge panel found the petitioner guilty of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111 (a)(1) and murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a). Id., at 646, 758 A.2d 842. The petitioner thereafter was sentenced to a total effective term of fifty-five years imprisonment. Id.
On direct appeal from his conviction, the petitioner claimed that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Gerace's pretrial oral motion to withdraw and that, as a result, he was deprived of his rights to the assistance of counsel and to counsel of choice under article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut2 and under the sixth3 and fourteenth4 amendments to the United States constitution. Id., at 646-47, 758 A.2d 842. This court rejected the petitioner's claims.5 Id., at 649-53, 758 A.2d 842.
Approximately eighteen months after this court affirmed his conviction, the petitioner filed a habeas petition. See Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction, 86 Conn.App. 42, 43, 859 A.2d 948 (2004). The habeas court dismissed that petition on the ground that the petitioner's claims were identical to those discussed and ruled on by this court in the petitioner's direct appeal, and the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the habeas court.6 Id., at 44, 859 A.2d 948.
On April 1, 2005, the petitioner initiated the habeas action that underlies the present appeal. In his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner claims that Gerace rendered ineffective assistance by virtue of the manner in which he withdrew as the petitioner's trial counsel. Specifically, the petitioner alleges that Gerace never discussed with the petitioner his intent to withdraw or his reasons for doing so and failed to return the petitioner's retainer. The petitioner further claims that Gerace's conduct deprived him of his constitutional rights to counsel and to counsel of choice during critical stages of the criminal proceedings. Finally, the petitioner claims that his attorney during the first habeas trial, Timothy Aspinwall, rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the first habeas petition.
After a hearing on the habeas petition that is the subject of this appeal, the habeas court denied the petition. In its memorandum of decision, the habeas court found no concrete evidence that Gerace's performance had been deficient, notwithstanding his failure to file a written motion to withdraw. The habeas court further found that Gerace's actions, even if they had been deficient, had not deprived the petitioner of his sixth amendment right to counsel or rendered the result of the criminal trial unreliable in any other way. The habeas court also found that, in light of its conclusions with respect to Gerace's representation, Aspinwall had not been deficient in failing to raise the present claims in the first habeas action.
On appeal from the judgment of the habeas court, the petitioner challenges the habeas court's finding that Gerace did not render ineffective assistance. Citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006), the petitioner argues that Gerace's withdrawal constituted structural error that is per se prejudicial, and that "once it is determined that ... Gerace was ineffective in the manner in which he withdrew and was allowed to withdraw as counsel of choice ... the petition should be granted without further consideration of harm or whether the outcome would have been different had Gerace remained as counsel." We reject the petitioner's claim. Consequently, we also reject his claim that the habeas court improperly failed to find that Aspinwall's performance was constitutionally defective by virtue of his failure to raise the claims included in the present habeas petition.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bryant v. Commissioner of Correction, 290 Conn. 502, 509-10, 964 A.2d 1186 (2009). "[A] reviewing court can find against a petitioner on either ground, whichever is easier." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Washington v. Commissioner of Correction, 287 Conn. 792, 832-33, 950 A.2d 1220 (2008).
In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, supra, 548 U.S. at 146-48, 126 S.Ct. 2557, the United States Supreme Court distinguished the right to counsel of choice from the right to effective assistance of counsel. "The earliest case generally cited for the proposition that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, [771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763] (1970), was based on the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause rather than on the [s]ixth [a]mendment.... And even our recognition of the right to effective counsel within the [s]ixth [a]mendment was a consequence of our perception that representation by counsel is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results. Strickland [v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at 685, 104 S.Ct. 2052]. Having derived the right to effective representation from the purpose of ensuring a fair trial, we have, logically enough, also derived the limits of that right from that same purpose.... The requirement that a defendant show prejudice in effective representation cases arises from the very nature of the specific element of the right to counsel at issue there—effective (not mistake-free) representation. Counsel cannot be ineffective unless his mistakes have harmed the defense (or, at least, unless it is reasonably likely that they have). Thus, a violation of the [s]ixth [a]mendment right to effective representation is not complete until the defendant is prejudiced. [Id.]
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