Fernandez v. DaimlerChrysler, A.G.

• Decision Date: 12 October 2016
• Citation: 143 A.D.3d 765,40 N.Y.S.3d 128,2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 06679
• Parties: David Anthony FERNANDEZ, etc., appellant, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER, A.G., respondent, et al., defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

143 A.D.3d 765

40 N.Y.S.3d 128

2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 06679

David Anthony FERNANDEZ, etc., appellant,

v.DAIMLERCHRYSLER, A.G., respondent, et al., defendants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Oct. 12, 2016.

O'Connell & Riley, Pearl River, NY (James K. Riley and Anthony J. Bragaglia of counsel), for appellant.

Goldberg Segalla, LLP, White Plains, NY (William T. O'Connell of counsel), and Squire Patton Boggs, San Francisco, CA (Matthew J. Kemner, pro hac vice, of counsel), respondent (one brief filed).

MARK C. DILLON, J.P., JEFFREY A. COHEN, ROBERT J. MILLER, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for wrongful death, the plaintiff appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Kelly, J.), dated July 21, 2014, which granted the motion of the defendant DaimlerChrysler, A.G., pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it and, in effect, denied his application to compel further discovery on the issue of jurisdiction and to sanction DaimlerChrysler, A.G., for its alleged failure to comply with certain discovery demands, and (2), as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the same court dated February 19, 2015, as, in effect, upon renewal, adhered to the original determination.

ORDERED that the appeal from the order dated July 21, 2014, is dismissed, as that order was superseded by the order dated February 19, 2015, made upon renewal; and it is further,

ORDERED that the order dated February 19, 2015, is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,

ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant DaimlerChrysler, A.G.

On August 8, 2004, Janis Anne Fernandez (hereinafter the decedent) sustained serious injuries when she lost control of her 2003 Jeep Liberty while driving in Pennsylvania. On June 18, 2006, she died of her injuries. In June 2007, the plaintiff, individually and as executor of the decedent's estate, commenced this wrongful death action sounding in, inter alia, strict products liability and negligence against, among others, DaimlerChrysler, A.G. (hereinafter Daimler), a German corporation that manufactures Mercedes–Benz vehicles in Germany. The plaintiff alleged that the decedent lost control of the subject vehicle due to allegedly defective ball joints and front lower control arms.

Daimler moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that the Supreme Court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. The court held the motion in abeyance while the parties conducted discovery on the issue of liability. Following the exchange of discovery, the plaintiff opposed Daimler's motion, and requested that the court compel further discovery on the issue of jurisdiction, or in the alternative, sanction Daimler for its alleged failure to properly respond to his discovery requests. The court granted Daimler's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it and, in effect, denied the plaintiff's application to compel further discovery or, in the alternative, for sanctions. The plaintiff moved, inter alia, for leave to renew his opposition to Daimler's motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it. The court, in effect, granted renewal and, upon renewal, adhered to its prior determination. The plaintiff appeals.

“ ‘A foreign corporation is amenable to suit in New York courts under CPLR 301 if it has engaged in such a continuous and systematic course of doing business here that a finding of its presence in this jurisdiction is warranted’ ” (Goel v. Ramachandran, 111 A.D.3d 783, 786, 975 N.Y.S.2d 428, quoting Landoil Resources Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., 77 N.Y.2d 28, 33, 563 N.Y.S.2d 739, 565 N.E.2d 488 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Any exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on the basis of state law must comport with the due process requirement that “the corporation's affiliations with the State in which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive ‘as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State’ ” (Daimler AG v. Bauman, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 746, 751, 187 L.Ed.2d 624, quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 ). Here, in opposition to Daimler's motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it, the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that the activities of Daimler in New York subjected it to the personal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court pursuant to CPLR 301 (see Magdalena v. Lins, 123 A.D.3d 600, 601, 999 N.Y.S.2d 44 ; Rachel's Children Reclamation Found., Inc. v. Elon, 49 Misc.3d 1208[A], 2015 N.Y. Slip Op 51516[U], 2015 WL 6080392 [Sup.Ct., Kings County] ). Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, exercising general jurisdiction over Daimler does not comport with due process (see Daimler AG v. Bauman, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. at 759–760, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 ; Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. at 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846 ). Accordingly, the court properly determined that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Daimler pursuant to CPLR 301.

The Supreme Court also properly determined that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Daimler pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1). CPLR 302(a)(1) grants New York courts jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries when the action arises out of the nondomiciliaries' “transact [ion of] any business within the state” (CPLR 302[a][1] ). In order to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists under CPLR 302(a)(1), a court must determine (1) whether the defendant transacted business in New York and, if so, (2) whether the cause of action asserted arose from that transaction (see Licci v. Lebanese Can. Bank, SAL, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 334, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 984 N.E.2d 893 ; Fischbarg v. Doucet, 9 N.Y.3d 375, 380, 849 N.Y.S.2d 501, 880 N.E.2d 22 ; Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v. Montana Bd. of Invs., 7 N.Y.3d 65, 71, 818 N.Y.S.2d 164, 850 N.E.2d 1140 ). In order to satisfy the second prong of the jurisdictional inquiry, there must be an “articulable nexus” (McGowan v. Smith, 52 N.Y.2d 268, 272, 437 N.Y.S.2d 643, 419 N.E.2d 321 ), or a “substantial relationship” (Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460, 467, 527 N.Y.S.2d 195, 522 N.E.2d 40 ), between a defendant's in-state activity and the cause of action asserted (see Licci v. Lebanese Can. Bank, SAL, 20...