Ferrel v. Superior Court
| Decision Date | 28 March 1978 |
| Citation | 576 P.2d 93,144 Cal.Rptr. 610,20 Cal.3d 888 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 576 P.2d 93 Alejandro Ramirez FERREL, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. L.A. 30812. |
Wilbur F. Littlefield, Public Defender, Harold E. Shabo, Ezekiel Perlo and John L. Ryan, Deputy Public Defenders, for petitioner.
John H. Larson, County Counsel, and John P. Farrell, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for respondent.
No appearance for real party in interest.
Alejandro Ramirez Ferrel is presently incarcerated in the Los Angeles County jail awaiting trial on various felony charges. 1 By this petition for writ of mandate, he seeks to compel the Los Angeles County Superior Court to set aside its order revoking his right to represent himself and to enter a new order permitting him to represent himself on these charges.
Petitioner has, since the initiation of the criminal proceedings against him, sought to proceed in propria persona (hereinafter referred to as pro. per.). His motion to this effect was granted by the municipal court, and he represented himself at the preliminary hearing. In respondent superior court petitioner renewed his motion to proceed in pro. per. Respondent granted this motion and ordered that petitioner be allowed pro. per. privileges at the county jail. 2 Six months later, in November 1976, after peti tioner's repeated violation of jail rules involving abuse of his pro. per. privileges, 3 these privileges were ordered suspended. Thereafter, at a hearing before respondent, over objection of the public defender who had been appointed to represent petitioner solely for the purposes of the hearing, respondent terminated petitioner's pro. per. status and appointed the public defender to represent him at trial.
A defendant in a criminal proceeding has a federal constitutional right to represent himself without counsel if, upon timely motion (People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187), the trial court determines that he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562). If these conditions are satisfied, the trial court must permit an accused to represent himself without regard to the apparent lack of wisdom of such a choice and even though the accused may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment. (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at 834, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525.)
Petitioner contends that a violation of jail rules does not warrant termination of the constitutional right of self-representation; such termination, he argues, is permissible only if an accused deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct intended to disrupt the trial or abuse the dignity of the courtroom.
A basis for this contention can be found in the nature of the Sixth Amendment right of self-representation itself which guarantees that an accused can personally present his own defense. Since it is manifest that the right to present a defense must necessarily be exercised in court, we conclude that an accused should only be deprived of that right when he engages in disruptive in-court conduct which is inconsistent with its proper exercise.
The decision in Faretta lends support to this conclusion. The United States Supreme Court, by citing its decision in Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, mentions only disruptive in-court behavior in its discussion of when the right of self-representation can be terminated.
The respondent, however, contends that termination of a defendant's pro. per. status would also be justified when, by the defendant's own misconduct in jail, he loses his pro. per. privileges, thereby making it practically impossible for him to prepare a defense. In that event, it is argued that the right to proceed in pro. per. should be terminated and counsel appointed in order to guarantee a fair and speedy trial.
Limitations on or suspension of a defendant's pro. per. privileges, whether or not such privileges may initially be required, 4 may be necessary in certain circumstances as a result of a defendant's misconduct in jail. The existence of such limitations on pro. per. privileges would not, however, preclude a defendant from making an intelligent and voluntary decision to continue to represent himself provided that he has been warned of the dangers and difficulties that such a choice might entail. 5 We therefore conclude that respondent committed error when after petitioner's pro. per. privileges were suspended as a result of...
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People v. McKenzie
...waiver had been accepted. Further, the trial court was not obligated to accept it. By strong dictum in Ferrell v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 888, 891, 144 Cal.Rptr. 610, 576 P.2d 93, we indicated that an accused may be deprived of the right to represent himself, if he engages in disrup......
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People v. Boyce
...inconsistent with a proper Faretta demand. The right to present a defense must be exercised in court ( Ferrel v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 888, 891, 144 Cal.Rptr. 610, 576 P.2d 93 ),20 and the right to self-representation contemplates a defendant's active participation. As the United ......
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...defendant competent to waive counsel has an affirmative right to represent himself. As we explained in Ferrel v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 888, 891, 144 Cal.Rptr. 610, 576 P.2d 93: "A defendant in a criminal proceeding has a federal constitutional right to represent himself without co......
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...it is also irrelevant to the question whether the waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent. (See Ferrel v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 888, 891, 144 Cal.Rptr. 610, 576 P.2d 93.) As defendant himself stated to the court during the Faretta hearing, "Your honor, my knowledge of the la......