Ferris v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 June 1919
• Docket Number: No. 21209.,21209.
• Citation: 173 N.W. 178,143 Minn. 90
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: FERRIS v. MINNEAPOLIS & ST. L. RY. CO.

143 Minn. 90

173 N.W. 178

FERRIS

v.MINNEAPOLIS & ST. L. RY. CO.

No. 21209.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 20, 1919.

Appeal from Municipal Court of Waseca; Arthur B. Childress, Judge.

Action by Annie Ferris against the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Company. Verdict for plaintiff, new trial granted, and plaintiff appeals. Order reversed, with direction to enter judgment upon the verdict.

Syllabus by the Court

‘Baggage’ means such articles of necessity and convenience as are usually carried by passengers for their personal use. It does not include merchandise held for sale, but if the carrier knowingly accepts such merchandise as baggage its liability is the same as in case of other baggage. In this case the evidence sustains the finding of the jury that certain articles of merchandise kept for sale were accepted as baggage with notice of their character and use.

The limitation of the amount of the carrier's liability for loss is a matter of contract. A limitation in a schedule of rates published and filed as required by statute is not effective for the purpose if not assented to by the shipper.

A limitation on the baggage check does not limit the carrier's liability unless assented to by the passenger and there is a contract fairly and honestly entered into establishing the limitation.

The burden of proof is upon the carrier to prove that such a contract was fairly and honestly made. Moonan & Moonan, of Waseca, for appellant.

M. M. Joyce, of Minneapolis, and W. C. Odell, of Chaska, for respondent.

HALLAM, J.

Plaintiff was a peddler traveling about selling various articles of merchandise. In November, 1917, plaintiff bought a ticket from Montgomery to Waterville on defendant's line and at the same time presented a grip, containing personal apparel and also certain articles which she had for sale to defendant's agent and asked that the grip be checked to Waterville. The agent checked the grip and it was lost in transit. Defendant admitted liability. The questions litigated were: First, was defendant liable for the value of the merchandise; and, second, was there an effective limitation of the amount of liability?

Plaintiff had a verdict for $420, the value of the contents of the grip. The court granted a new trial exclusively upon errors occurring at the trial.

[1] 1. By the term ‘baggage’ is meant such articles of necessity or personal convenience as are usually carried by passengers for their personal use. It does not include merchandise kept for sale. Story on Bailments, § 499; 10 C. J. 1087; Haines v. C., St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 29 Minn. 160, 12 N. W. 447,43 Am. Rep. 199. If, however, the carrier knowingly accepts as baggage a package containing ordinary merchandise it waives any objection to the character of the property and its liability is the same as in case of ordinary baggage. 10 C. J. 1195; McKibbin v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 78 Minn. 232, 80 N. W. 1052. Defendant's regulations permit the carriage of sample goods as beggage. Plaintiff, in the presence of defendant's agent and before the grip had been checked, opened the grip to take out certain articles. The agent plainly saw that part of the contents of the grip consisted, not of personal apparel, but of merchandise such as is usually kept for sale. Plaintiff had been in the same business for 10 years and had frequently checked this grip at Montgomery. With this evidence in the case, the court instructed the jury that if the nature of the contents of the grip and the use the plaintiff proposed to make of them were known to defendant's agent at the time he accepted the grip as baggage and issued a baggage check therefor defendant was liable for the full value of the contents of the grip. This instruction was correct. The jury by their verdict found that defendant's agent had such knowledge and the evidence sustains the findings.

2. Defendant contends that its liability is limited to $100. It contends that it has published and filed with the Railroad and Warehouse Commission a schedule of rates which contains this language:

‘Unless a greater sum is declared by the passenger and charges paid for increased valuation at time of delivery to carrier, the value of baggage up to and including 150 pounds * * * shall be deemed and agreed to be not in excess of $100.’

We will assume that the evidence establishes this fact.

Our statutes require every railroad company to publish and file with the Railroad and Warehouse Commission schedules of rates, fares and charges for transportation of persons and property, and, provide that such schedules shall state ‘any rules or regulations in any way affecting the aggregate of such rates, fares and charges' (G. S. 1913, §§ 4342, 4344), and they prohibit ‘any unequal or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person’ (section 4332). Defendant contends that the passenger is conclusively presumed to have knowledge of any limitation of liability in the schedules and regulations filed, and that such limitation fixes the amount of recovery in case of loss. This was substantially the rule applied by the United States Supreme Court in construing the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. 584, c. 3591), the provisions of which are, in the particulars mentioned, much the same as ours, except that they refer to interstate commerce whereas ours refer to intrastate commerce. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 33 Sup. Ct. 148, 57 L. Ed. 314,44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 257;Great Northern Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, 232 U. S. 508, 34 Sup. Ct. 380, 58 L. Ed. 703;Boston & Maine Ry. Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 34 Sup. Ct. 526, 58 L. Ed. 868, L. R. A. 1915B, 450, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 593.

The court held in those cases that under the Hepburn Act the limitation of liability stated in the schedules is part of the rate, that where a tariff rate is based on value it fixes the rights and liabilities of the parties, that if no value is stated, the tariff rates applicable to such a state of facts applies, that if there are alternative rates based on value and the shipper accepts the lower rate, the carrier, if sued for loss, is liable only for the lower value. As to baggage cases that court held that a provision in a tariff schedule that the passenger must declare the value of his baggage and pay stated excess charges for excess liability is a ‘regulation’ of which the shipper is bound to take notice and that the effect of the regulation and the delivery and acceptance of the baggage without declaration of value or notice to the carrier of such higher value is to charge the carrier with the maximum liability stated in the schedules.

Defendant urges us to follow the rule of these federal decisions. With all due respect to that high authority, we are not disposed now to do so. The sections of our statutes above cited were originally enacted in 1887. G. L. 1887,...