Fey v. King
Decision Date | 21 November 1922 |
Docket Number | 33621 |
Citation | 190 N.W. 519,194 Iowa 835 |
Parties | WILLIAM B. FEY, Appellant, v. HOWARD C. KING, Appellee |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Lyon District Court.--C. C. BRADLEY, Judge.
ACTION for damages for libel. Plaintiff proved the publication of the writing complained of, and rested. Upon motion, the court directed a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
E. C Roach, W. C. Garbeson, and E. E. Wagner, for appellant.
Simon Fisher and S.D. Riniker, for appellee.
I.
The defendant is a newspaper publisher, and was charged in the petition with the publication of a libelous writing concerning the plaintiff. Three published writings were put into the record, and may as well be set forth here. Each writing was published upon the date indicated. They were the following:
The first of the foregoing articles furnishes the basis of this action. The second was a purported retraction, made upon demand of the plaintiff. The third was offered in evidence for the plaintiff on the trial, and objection thereto was sustained. Error is assigned on such ruling. The contention for the plaintiff is that the publication charged in the petition was libelous per se, and that he was, therefore, entitled to a verdict for damages in some amount. This contention is based upon the assumed legal proposition that any publication concerning a person which tends to provoke him to wrath or expose him to public hatred or ridicule or to deprive him of public confidence and social intercourse is libelous per se. If such legal proposition be sound, then plaintiff is entitled to a reversal. But the proposition is essential to plaintiff's success; and if it cannot be sustained, the plaintiff cannot prevail.
The action is predicated upon Section 5086 of the Code, which is as follows:
"A libel is a malicious defamation of a person, made public by any printing, writing, sign, picture, representation or effigy, tending to provoke him to wrath or expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits of public confidence and social intercourse; * * *"
This is a definition of criminal libel, for which the offender may be prosecuted and punished by the state. It does not purport to supersede civil liability at common law for libel other than criminal, where special damages are shown to have resulted. It is doubtless true that a criminal libel, if proven and not justified, must be deemed libelous per se. It is not true that Section 5086 "makes any printing a libel if it tends to provoke to wrath or to expose to public hatred or ridicule." It is to be conceded that this is contradictory to some expressions to be found in the discussion of some of our cases, and it will be our purpose here to correct such expression.
The crime of libel consists of two elements: (1) Malicious defamation of a person; (2) publication of such defamation "by any printing, writing, sign, picture, representation or effigy, tending to provoke him to wrath or expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits of public confidence and social intercourse." Code Section 5086.
Both of these elements must concur, in order to constitute statutory libel. Defamation is not criminally libelous, unless published in the manner indicated. Publication is not criminally libelous, unless the matter published be defamatory. Some of our cases seem to assume that the subject-matter of a publication may be rendered defamatory by the publication itself, where such publication tends to provoke the injured person to wrath or to subject him to ridicule. But the publication of nondefamatory matter will not render such matter defamatory, however provocative to wrath or ridicule it may seem to be. The first requisite of statutory libel is that the published matter be defamatory, in a legal sense. If it is not defamatory in such sense before publication, it does not become so by publication. If it be defamatory, then the method of publication which will render it libelous is sweeping and comprehensive. It need not be by printed words. It may be by cartoon, caricature, effigy, or sign, provided that the method adopted does tend to provoke to wrath and to subject to ridicule or to public hatred and contempt.
"Defamation," like "fraud," has no concise definition. Broadly speaking, it is an attack upon the reputation of another. "Reputation" is also a broad and indefinite term; but in the law of libel, reference is had thereby in general to the integrity and moral character of the injured party. If one were to assail the good reputation of another as a skillful golfer, it would not be defamation, and could not be libelous under the statute; and this is so even though the attack were contemptuous, and were published in the Golf Column, and were provocative of great wrath. Publications may, and often do, provoke a person to wrath which do not impugn his integrity or his moral character. Neither the publication nor the wrath provoked thereby is the criterion which determines the character of the published matter as defamatory or nondefamatory. The rule, as gathered from many authorities, has been stated as follows:
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