Ffic v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
Decision Date | 21 December 2001 |
Docket Number | No. F034714.,F034714. |
Citation | 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 26,94 Cal.App.4th 842 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANIES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent. |
McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth, James P. Wagoner, Lynne Thaxter Brown, Robert K. Landen, Todd W. Baxter, Fresno, and Staci D. Campbell, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Wild, Carter & Tipton and Russell G. VanRozeboom, Fresno, for Defendant and Respondent.
This case concerns the extent of insurance coverage provided under an "additional insured" endorsement to a commercial general liability policy. The trial court held the policy covers the additional insured for the factual circumstances presented here as constituting "liability arising out of the work of the named insured. At issue are (1) whether the notice of appeal was timely filed and (2) whether Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) is covered by the additional insured endorsement obtained by the named insured of Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies (FFIC), Crider Construction, Inc. (Crider), for liability to a Crider employee who injured his back when a wooden stair on ARCO's premises gave way as he stepped on it while performing work for his employer. We affirm.
FFIC appeals from a judgment entered in favor of respondent ARCO on October 22, 1999. The judgment was entered after the trial court granted ARCO's motion for summary judgment on FFIC's claims for reimbursement of the costs of settlement and defense it paid on ARCO's behalf. The notice of entry of judgment was filed on November 2, 1999. FFIC's notice of appeal was served by regular mail on December 23, 1999, but was not file-stamped by the clerk's office until January 3, 2000. The trial court ruled notice was presumptively received on December 27, 1999.
The material facts of this case are undisputed. None of the facts set forth by ARCO in its separate statement of material facts in support of motion for summary judgment were disputed by FFIC. The following summary of relevant facts derives from the trial court's order granting defendant ARCO's motion for summary judgment.
On or about July 1, 1997, FFIC paid $400,000 in full settlement of the Underlying Action while reserving to itself the right to seek reimbursement of settlement and defense costs from ARCO." (Brackets in original.)
The trial court granted ARCO summary judgment based on the analysis and holding in Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Syufy Enterprises (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 321, 81 Cal. Rptr.2d 557 (Syufy), which it found "strikingly similar factually to the present action and the policy terms in question are identical."
The standards applicable to a motion for summary judgment are well established. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c.) We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment. (Northland Ins. Co. v. Briones (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 796, 802, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 127.)
The standards applicable to the interpretation of an insurance policy were recently reiterated by the Supreme Court in Palmer v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1109, 1115, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 647, 988 P.2d 568:
At the heart of this controversy is the meaning of the clause of the additional insured endorsement protecting ARCO against "liability arising out of [Crider's work] for [ARCO] by or for [Crider]." The same endorsement language was interpreted in Syufy, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th 321, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 557, and the First District held the "additional insured is covered without regard to whether the injury was caused by the named insured or the additional insured." (Id. at p. 330, 81 Cal. Rptr.2d 557.)
FFIC asserts the holding in Syufy and, by implication, the majority rule1 which it...
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