FGL & L Property Corp. v. City of Rye

• Decision Date: 24 October 1985
• Citation: 485 N.E.2d 986,495 N.Y.S.2d 321,66 N.Y.2d 111
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 485 N.E.2d 986 FGL & L PROPERTY CORP., Respondent, v. CITY OF RYE et al., Appellants.

Page 321

495 N.Y.S.2d 321

66 N.Y.2d 111, 485 N.E.2d 986

FGL & L PROPERTY CORP., Respondent, v. CITY OF RYE et al., Appellants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 24, 1985.

Henry J. Smith and James G. Fine, White Plains, for appellants.

Peter Gruenberger, Lesley E. Goldberg, Robbie Narcisse and Theodore S. Steingut, New York City, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

MEYER, Judge.

Nothing in the zoning enabling provisions of the General City Law, the historical preservation provisions of the General Municipal Law or the Landmarks Preservation provisions of the Rye City Code empowers the City to mandate the manner in which property may be owned or held or to impose upon the owner of a tract containing historic structures, or purchasers of properties neighboring the tract, the cost of rehabilitation or enhancement of the properties. The order of the Appellate Division should, therefore, be affirmed, with costs.

I

Plaintiff is the owner in fee of a parcel of land situated in the City of Rye (City) of approximately 22 acres on which are located the Jay Mansion, built in 1838 by Peter Jay, son of John Jay, the first Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, and another building known as the Carriage House, built around 1912 in the Colonial Revival style. There is some dispute between the parties concerning the historic or landmark significance of the Carriage House, but for purposes of this opinion we assume that both buildings have such significance. It is unnecessary to detail the negotiations carried on from 1979 until 1983 between the City and plaintiff's predecessor in title ¹ and between the City and plaintiff, and the various rezoning proposals that were made during those negotiations, although a few pertinent and uncontested facts developed during those negotiations are referred to below.

When acquired by plaintiff's predecessor the property was zoned R-2, as were neighboring properties, some of which were used, however, for public purposes or office use under nonconforming uses. R-2 zoning permits single-family detached homes on not less than one-half-acre plots, and plaintiff's property would have accommodated 38 such dwellings. In June 1983, the City Council adopted Local Law No. 5-1983, which added a new section 197-13.2 to the City Code creating the Alansten Landmarks Preservation District (LPD-A). As the revised zoning map demonstrates, and defendants do not deny, the only property zoned LPD-A was plaintiff's 22 acres. Plaintiff then began the present action which in seven causes of action sought an injunction against enforcement of the section, a declaration that it is invalid as ultra vires, unconstitutional, site specific, spot zoning and not in accordance with a well-considered zoning plan, and money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants moved for summary judgment declaring the local law constitutional and otherwise dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff cross-moved for partial summary judgment in its favor. Supreme Court held that there were issues concerning constitutionality requiring trial, but that the ordinance, as a hybrid containing elements of both zoning and historic preservation regulation, was not invalid as site-specific or spot-zoning and had not been shown not to be in accordance with the City's comprehensive plan, and that the section 1983 action would not lie with respect to legislative action. Defendants' motion for summary judgment was, therefore, granted unless plaintiff demonstrated at a plenary trial that the section prevented it from realizing any economic benefit from its property. Plaintiff's cross motion was denied. Plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Division, as limited by its brief, from Special Term's order except as to the section 1983 cause of action; defendants appealed from so much of that order as directed a trial on constitutionality and denied summary judgment declaring the section valid and constitutional. The Appellate Division, 486 N.Y.S.2d 333, 109 A.D.2d 814, in a memorandum which referred only to the zoning aspect of the section, reversed and declared the section "invalid as it constitutes an improper regulation of the form of ownership of property." (109 A.D.2d, at p. 815, 486 N.Y.S.2d 333.) We agree that it is unnecessary to consider the constitutional issues and that the zoning enabling provisions under which the City acted do not authorize it to regulate ownership, and hold further that nothing in the historical preservation provisions of the General Municipal Law or the Landmarks Preservation chapter of the City Code, upon both of which the City relies, whether considered separately or in conjunction with the zoning enabling provisions of the General City Law, empowered the City to enact the section in its present form. We, therefore, affirm.

II

The section as enacted declares that in order to provide for flexibility in the City's zoning "so that the significant historic buildings, the Jay Mansion and the Carriage House, and site features which characterize this site * * * are preserved for the future and that new construction be undertaken with care and consideration for these features and the environment", the new district is adopted. Subdivision B establishes standards for the new district, which include that "lot as approved shall have a minimum area of twenty-two (22) acres and shall be and remain in single ownership"; that "exterior of the Jay Mansion and Carriage House shall be rehabilitated and the interiors converted to residential use", for the Jay Mansion not to exceed three units and for the Carriage House not to exceed six; that there be a trapezoidal view way 90 feet in width at the rear of the Jay Mansion and 300 feet in width at the southerly property line; that the new dwelling units may not be occupied until the exteriors of the Jay Mansion and the Carriage House have been restored and the interiors converted to residential use and available for occupancy and that a bond be posted to assure such rehabilitation and conversion; and that the application for site plan approval be accompanied by, among other things, a draft condominium offering statement together with a draft of an easement and/or agreement for perpetual maintenance of the exteriors of the Jay Mansion and the Carriage House. Neither the statutes authorizing enactment of zoning provisions nor those dealing with historic landmarks empower the City Council to adopt a local law with such provisions, nor does anything in the Landmarks Preservation chapter of the City Code support its so doing.

A

Zoning laws are to be given a strict construction because they are in derogation of common-law rights (Matter of 440 E. 102nd St. Corp. v. Murdock, 285 N.Y. 298, 304, 34 N.E.2d 329; see, Matter of Frishman v. Schmidt, 61 N.Y.2d 823, 473 N.Y.S.2d 957, 462 N.E.2d 134). Moreover, there being no inherent power to enact zoning or land use regulation, an ordinance or local law provision for which legislative delegation of power cannot be found is ultra vires and void (Matter of Kamhi v. Planning Bd., 59 N.Y.2d 385, 465 N.Y.S.2d 865, 452 N.E.2d 1193). Power to adopt provisions not expressly forbidden by the enabling authorization may, however, be implied where there exists independent justification for provisions within the spirit of the enabling legislation (Collard v. Incorporated Vil. of Flower Hill, 52 N.Y.2d 594, 602, 439 N.Y.S.2d 326, 421 N.E.2d 818).

The enabling provision for residential zoning in cities is General City Law § 20(24). ² That subdivision empowers a city "To regulate and limit the height, bulk and location of buildings hereafter erected, to regulate and determine the area of yards, courts and other open spaces, and to regulate the density of population in any given area, and for said purposes to divide the city into districts. Such regulations shall be uniform for each class of buildings throughout any district, but the regulations in one or more districts may differ from those in other districts. Such regulations shall be designed to secure safety from fire, flood and other dangers and to promote the public health and welfare, including, so far as conditions may permit, provision for adequate light, air, convenience of access, and the accommodation of solar energy systems and equipment and access to sunlight necessary therefor, and shall be made with reasonable regard to the character of buildings erected in each district, the value of land and the use to which it may be put, to the end that such regulations may promote public health, safety and welfare and the most desirable use for which the land of each district may be adapted and may tend to conserve the value of buildings and enhance the value of land throughout the city." (Emphasis supplied.)

Nothing in that subdivision speaks to ownership rather than use, and while it does not expressly forbid provisions relating to ownership, the City suggests nothing within the spirit of zoning legislation generally or this subdivision specifically that offers justification for implying such power. Indeed, the cases are legion, in this State and elsewhere, which hold that "zoning * * * in the very nature of things has reference to land rather than to owner" (Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 500, 121 N.E.2d 517) and that it is a "fundamental rule that zoning deals basically with land use and not with the person who owns or occupies it" (Matter of Dexter v. Town Bd., 36 N.Y.2d 102, 105, 365 N.Y.S.2d 506, 324 N.E.2d 870; accord, Matter of Weinrib v. Weisler, 27 N.Y.2d 592, 313 N.Y.S.2d 407, 261 N.E.2d 406, affg. 33 A.D.2d 923, 307 N.Y.S.2d 603; Allen v. Town of N. Hempstead, 103 A.D.2d 144, 146, 478 N.Y.S.2d 919; North Fork Motel v. Grigonis, 93 A.D.2d 883, 461 N.Y.S.2d 414; see, Matter of Park W. Vil. Assoc. v. Abrams, 65 N.Y.2d 716, 492 N.Y.S.2d 27, 481 N.E.2d 567). Most of the out-of-State cases hold, as did the North Fork Motel case, that a zoning ordinance cannot be used...