Fiber Crete Homes, Inc. v. Division of Administration, State, Dept. of Transp., s. 74--1173
| Citation | 315 So.2d 492 |
| Decision Date | 27 June 1975 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 74--1173,74--1180,s. 74--1173 |
| Parties | FIBER CRETE HOMES, INC., et al., Appellants, v. DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION, STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Anne C. Booth, of Hall & Booth, Tallahassee, Toby Prince Brigham, Miami, and Patrick L. Bailey, of Sullivan, Cochran, Ranaghan & Bailey, Pompano Beach, for appellants.
Winifred Sheridan Smallwood, Atty., and Geoffrey B. Dobson, Gen. Counsel, Dept. of Transp., Tallahassee, for appellee.
These are consolidated appeals by Fiber Crete Homes, Inc., defendants below, from an order granting motions for a new trial to the Department of Administration, plaintiff below.
Pursuant to eminent domain proceedings instituted by the plaintiff, final judgments were rendered on January 24, 1974 in favor of the defendant as to certain parcels (553 and 337). Within ten days thereafter plaintiff filed motions for new trial as to parcels 553 and 337 which the trial court subsequently Denied on July 10, 1974.
On July 22, 1974, plaintiff filed a motion for as to parcels 553 and 337, calling the court's attention to the case Behm v. Division of Admin., State, Dept. of Transp., Fla.App.1974, 292 So.2d 437, decided March 29, 1974. The court denied plaintiff's motion for a limited rehearing but proceeded Sua sponte under Rule 1.540(b), F.R.C.P., to amend its orders on rehearing of July 10, 1974, granting new trials as to parcels 553 and 337 based upon the Behm case. Defendants seek review of this order.
Upon due consideration of the pertinent rules of civil procedure and the applicable judicial authorities we are of the opinion that the able and learned trial judge erred in amending his prior orders denying plaintiff's motion for new trial inasmuch as such order was beyond the power and jurisdiction of the court.
The trial court correctly recognized that it had no authority to entertain or consider a subsequently filed motion or petition for rehearing directed to a Denial of a new trial. DePadro v. Moore, Fla.App.1968, 215 So.2d 27; Volumes in Value, Inc. v. Buy Mail International, Inc., Fla.App.1965, 177 So.2d 511. Simply stated, there is no provision in the rules of civil procedure for a rehearing of a denial of a motion for a new trial and rehearing. The trial court, therefore, appropriately denied plaintiff's motions 'for limited rehearing'.
However, the court then proceeded on its Own motion to grant a new trial under Rule 1.540(b) predicating its action on the authority of In re Estate of Weymer, Fla.App.1967, 199 So.2d 495. While the Weymer case stands for the proposition that a court may act Of its own motion under Rule 1.540(b); nevertheless, the court can do so Only for those reasons and under such circumstances as set forth in the rule. 1 The trial court's order does not set forth the specific reasons for granting relief as delineated in Rule 1.540(b); it appears, however, that the judge's order was traveling upon the premise that the final judgment was based upon 'mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect,' apparently occasioned by the court's subsequent discovery (and interpretation) of the decision in Behm, supra. 2 In essence, however, the trial judge sought to utilize Rule 1.540(b) to correct what he perceived to be a 'mistaken view of the law'.
Rule 1.540 was intended to provide relief from judgments, decrees or orders under a limited set of circumstances; it was neither intended to serve as a substitute for the new trial mechanism prescribed by Rule 1.530 nor as a substitute for appellate review of judicial error. Kuykendall v. Kuykendall, Fla.App.1974, 301 So.2d 466; Constant v. Tillitson, Fla.App.1968, 214 So.2d 91; Volumes in Value, Inc., supra. As was observed in Weymer, supra, 'a decision is inadvertent if it is the result of oversight, neglect or accident As distinguished from judicial error'.
It appears that the trial court's sua sponte order (after its denial of rehearing) was an effort on its part to grant relief from a final judgment because of what the trial court perceived to be a judicial error as distinguished from 'mistake,...
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