Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Joiner
Decision Date | 16 June 1915 |
Docket Number | (No. 1481.) |
Parties | FIDELITY & CASUALTY CO. v. JOINER.<SMALL><SUP>†</SUP></SMALL> |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Grayson County; W. M. Peck, Judge.
Action by James Roe Joiner against the Fidelity & Casualty Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
The suit was by appellee, the beneficiary named in an accident policy issued to his father, J. R. Joiner, by appellant.
In his petition appellee alleged that:
Appellee prayed for a recovery against appellant of the aggregate of the sums specified and interest thereon, and in addition thereto for a recovery of the penalty and attorney's fees provided for by article 4746, Vernon's Statutes.
In its answer appellant denied that the assured "suffered immediate total disability, which total disability continued until December 9, 1913, upon which date he died, as the direct result of said bodily injury received while riding in or on a public conveyance provided by a common carrier for passenger service," and denied that the total disability and death of the insured "was the direct result of and proximately caused by the wreck of an automobile, which automobile was being operated for passenger service by a common carrier," as charged by appellee; and, after setting out provisions in the policy quoted above, alleged that it was not liable because "the injuries received by the plaintiff did not result in his death within 90 days from the date of such injuries," and because said injuries "did not result in total disability as defined in the policy, as hereinbefore set out, and such total disability did not continue from the date of said accident until the date of the death of the assured."
Appellant further alleged that the death of the assured "was not caused by bodily injuries sustained by him and resulting directly, independently, and exclusively of all other causes," and the injury to the assured was not sustained by him "while in or on a public conveyance (including the platform, steps, or running board thereof) provided by a common carrier of passengers for hire, and that it is not liable to the plaintiff herein for double indemnity under the terms of said policy."
The insured traveled as a salesman for a firm of wholesale groceries in Sherman, Wednesday afternoon, June 4, 1913, accompanied by a boy as driver and one Wilson, also a traveling salesman, he left Whitesboro in an automobile, intending to go to Southmayd, Gage, and other nearby towns, to see customers there. While moving rapidly, a short distance out from Whitesboro, the automobile turned over, throwing the insured, Wilson, and the boy to the ground, injuring each of them. Wilson testified:
On special issues submitted to them, the jury found the facts to be: (1) That on June 4, 1913, near Whitesboro, the insured, as the result of an accident while riding in an automobile belonging to one U. G. White, sustained bodily injuries which directly, independently, and exclusively of all other causes resulted in immediate, continuous, and total disability that ever thereafterward prevented him from performing any and every kind of duty pertaining to his occupation, and in his death on December 9, 1913. (2) That the automobile in which he was riding was a public conveyance provided for passenger service by said U. G. White, who prior to and at the time of the accident held himself out to the public as ready and willing to carry for hire all persons indifferently who might apply to him for passage.
On the facts so found, the court rendered the judgment in appellee's favor against appellant for $15,006.45, from which the appeal is prosecuted.
Thomas & Rhea, of Dallas, for appellant. Head, Smith, Maxey & Head, of Sherman, for appellee.
WILLSON, C. J. (after stating the facts as above).
There are 37 assignments, but as we view the record the disposition which should be made of the appeal depends upon the answers to these questions: (1) Was there evidence to support the finding that the death of the assured was due "directly, independently, and exclusively of all other causes" to the injuries he sustained? (2) Was there evidence to support the finding that said injuries...
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