Fidelity & Guaranty Life Insurance Company v. Corley, No. W2002-02633-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. App. 12/31/2003)
| Decision Date | 31 December 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. W2002-02633-COA-R9-CV.,W2002-02633-COA-R9-CV. |
| Parties | FIDELITY & GUARANTY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. PATRICIA LEE FUTRELL CORLEY, ESTATE OF ROBERT LEON CORLEY, AND CHERYL ANN JONES PATTERSON. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Tennessee |
Robert I. Thomason, Jr., and Tracy L. Harrell, Waverly, Tennessee, for the appellant, Cheryl Ann Jones Patterson.
Clifford K. McGown, Jr., Waverly, Tennessee, for the appellees, Patricia Lee Futrell Corley and Estate of Robert Leon Corley.
Todd A. Rose, Paris, Tennessee, for the appellee, Fidelity & Guaranty Life Insurance Company.
OPINION
This is an interpleader action involving the doctrine of former suit pending. In 1995, the decedent purchased a term life insurance policy from the defendant insurance company and named his wife as the primary beneficiary. In 1999, the decedent changed the named beneficiary from his wife to another woman. In September 2001, the decedent died. At his death, the other woman was still the named beneficiary under the policy. The named beneficiary filed a complaint in the chancery court in Humphreys County against the insurance company seeking payment of the proceeds of the life insurance policy. The wife, however, had previously made a claim with the insurance company for the same proceeds. Consequently, less than two weeks after the first lawsuit was filed, the insurance company filed the interpleader action below in Henry County against the wife, the named beneficiary, and the estate, seeking a determination of the rightful beneficiary of the proceeds. The named beneficiary moved for dismissal of the interpleader action, based on the doctrine of prior suit pending. The trial court denied that motion, finding that the doctrine of prior suit pending did not apply in this situation. The named beneficiary was granted permission to file this interlocutory appeal from the order denying the motion to dismiss. We now reverse, concluding that this interpleader action should be dismissed based on the doctrine of prior suit pending.
Robert Leon Corley ("Corley") and his wife, Respondent/Appellee Patricia Lee Futrell Corley ("Wife"), were married in August 1967. During their marriage, they lived in Henry County, Tennessee. In 1994, Corley purchased a $75,000 term life insurance policy on his own life from Petitioner/Appellee Fidelity & Guaranty Life Insurance Company ("F & G"), naming Wife as the primary beneficiary. The premiums for that policy were paid by direct withdrawal from their joint bank account.
In January 1999, Corley moved out of his marital residence and moved in with Respondent/Appellant Cheryl Ann Jones Patterson ("Patterson") in her home in Humphreys County, Tennessee. In June 1999, Corley changed the primary beneficiary of his F & G life insurance policy from Wife to Patterson, and notified the company of his change of address. At some point, Corley learned that he was suffering from cancer. In January 2000, Corley moved back home to live with Wife. Corley lived with Wife in their Henry County residence until his death from cancer on September 1, 2001. However, at the time of Corley's death, Patterson remained the named beneficiary on his life insurance policy.1
As the named beneficiary under Corley's life insurance policy, Patterson notified F & G that she sought to claim the $75,000 in life insurance proceeds. Wife notified F & G that she asserted a claim to the life insurance proceeds as well, under theories of fraudulent change of beneficiary or constructive or resulting trusts. On December 14, 2001, Patterson filed a lawsuit in Humphreys County Chancery Court against F & G to recover the life insurance proceeds as the named beneficiary on the policy. On December 26, 2001, one day before F & G was served with process in the Humphreys County Chancery Court lawsuit, F & G filed an interpleader action in the Henry County Circuit Court below, naming Patterson, Wife, and Corley's estate as defendants. F & G sought to deposit the $75,000 in life insurance proceeds with the clerk of the Henry County Circuit Court and to have the trial court determine the lawful beneficiary of the proceeds. F & G's complaint also requested the trial court to "enjoin the Respondents from commencing any other actions regarding the [s]ubject matter of this action" and dismiss F & G "with the assurance that it will not be subjected to double or multiple claims arising out of the subject matter of this action."
On February 14, 2002, Patterson filed a notice of prior suit pending and a motion to dismiss in the Henry County trial court below, asserting that the chancery court in Humphreys County had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. In response, F & G argued that the doctrine of prior suit pending did not apply to the Henry County Circuit Court lawsuit because, while all necessary and indispensable parties were before the Henry County Circuit Court, two parties — namely, Wife and Corley's estate — were not before the Humphreys County Chancery Court. Therefore, F & G argued, the doctrine of prior suit pending would be inapplicable because the parties in both suits were not identical, and the Henry County action should not be dismissed on this basis. Wife joined F & G in contending that the interpleader action should not be dismissed, arguing that venue was proper in Henry County because all of the fact witnesses lived there. Wife claimed that maintaining the lawsuit in Henry County, as opposed to Humphreys County, was more convenient and practical. Wife further argued that it was improper for Patterson to fail to name Wife as a defendant in the Humphreys County action, despite Patterson's knowledge of Wife's competing claim to the insurance proceeds.
On April 3, 2002, the trial court ruled on Patterson's motion to dismiss. The trial court first noted that Patterson's filing of the Humphreys County lawsuit was "precisely correct," and observed that the Humphreys County Chancery Court and the Henry County Circuit Court had concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. The trial court then concluded that, although the Humphreys County lawsuit was filed first, Patterson's motion to dismiss should be denied because the case had more contacts with Henry County than with Humphreys County, and because "[a]ll parties to the dispute are presently before the [Henry County] Circuit Court." Therefore, the trial court rejected Patterson's reliance on the doctrine of prior suit pending and denied her motion to dismiss. On May 3, 2002, Patterson filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that Corley's estate was not properly before the trial court at the time the trial court ruled on her motion to dismiss. The trial court reconsidered the matter, but on May 31, 2002, reiterated its conclusion that "the case has more contacts with Henry County, Tennessee than with Humphreys County, Tennessee, and therefore this Court is not deprived of jurisdiction even though the Chancery Court case in Humphreys County was filed prior to this case." For those reasons, the trial court again denied Patterson's motion to dismiss. Patterson was granted permission by the trial court and by this Court to file an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's denial of her motion to dismiss.
On appeal, Patterson makes the same argument as she made in the trial court, that the application of the doctrine of prior suit pending requires that this lawsuit be dismissed. F & G, Wife, and the Corley estate argue that the trial court's denial of Patterson's motion to dismiss should be affirmed, because the parties were not the same in both lawsuits, that is, both Wife and the estate were properly before the trial court below, but were not parties in the lawsuit in the Humphreys County Chancery Court. Therefore, because the parties were not the same in both lawsuits, the respondents argue, the doctrine of prior suit pending is inapplicable.
The facts pertinent to this appeal are undisputed. The only issue raised on appeal relates to the applicability of the doctrine of prior suit pending, which is a question of law. Consequently, our review is de novo on the record, with no presumption of correctness in the trial court's decision. State v. Levandowski, 955 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Tenn. 1997).
The doctrine of prior suit pending, also called the doctrine of former suit pending, "has prevailed in this jurisdiction for over one hundred years." Metropolitan Development & Housing Agency v. Brown Stove Works, 637 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (hereinafter "MDHA"). Under that doctrine, where two courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a matter, the court first taking jurisdiction acquires exclusive jurisdiction over the matter, and the subsequent action must be dismissed. See id. The court in MDHA explained:
The rule has been stated in slightly different terms over the years but with a very uniform meaning. As an example, in American Lava Corp. v. Savena, 476 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tenn. 1972), it was held that the authority of the first court acquiring jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties continues until the matters in issue are disposed of, and no court of coordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. In Kizer v. Bellar, 192 Tenn. 540, 546, 241 S.W.2d 561, 563 (1951), the holding was that when courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the one that first acquires jurisdiction thereby acquires exclusive jurisdiction, and only the first suit can be allowed to stand. In Casone v. State, 176 Tenn. 279, 285, 140 S.W.2d 1081, 1083 (1940), the court noted "that when two courts have concurrent jurisdiction of a particular subject matter that tribunal which first obtains jurisdiction retains it."
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