Fiedler v. OCEAN PROPERTIES, LTD.

Decision Date08 February 2010
Docket NumberNo. CV-08-236-B-W.,CV-08-236-B-W.
Citation683 F. Supp.2d 57
PartiesMarc FIEDLER, Plaintiff, v. OCEAN PROPERTIES, LTD., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maine

David G. Webbert, Elizabeth L.J. Burnett, Johnson & Webbert, LLP, Augusta, ME, for Plaintiff.

Katharine I. Rand, Margaret C. LePage, Pierce Atwood LLP, Portland, ME, for Defendant.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR., Chief Judge.

This case presents the difficult question of when a disabled plaintiff has standing to sue under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Marc Fiedler claims he is deterred from staying at Ocean Properties' hotel because of an ADA violation and would stay there should the hotel become ADA compliant. Cognizant of the need for Mr. Fiedler to point to specific facts to establish standing to sue, applying the procedural obligation to view those facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Fiedler, aware of the congressional mandate not to overburden ADA claimants, and consistent with the Supreme Court's directive to take a broad view of standing in civil rights cases, the Court concludes that Mr. Fiedler has survived by the very barest of margins the hotel's motion for summary judgment on standing grounds.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS1

In late June or early July 2006, Marc Fiedler, a Washington D.C. resident, made a week-long reservation (from August 8-16) to stay in a ground floor, wheelchair-accessible room with an ocean view at The Harborside, a luxury hotel located in Bar Harbor and owned by Ocean Properties. Def.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 1, 5, 8 (Docket # 22) (Def.'s SMF).2 Mr. Fiedler states that he selected the hotel based on its website and a review in Fodor's Travel Guides, based on its location, harbor views, and recent renovations. Id. ¶ 4.

Mr. Fiedler is confined to a wheelchair, and after making the reservation, he requested information to confirm the accessibility of the room. Id. ¶¶ 2, 12. In particular, Mr. Fiedler requested information regarding the entrance-door clearance, clearance around the bed, height of the bed, the height of the tracks for the exterior sliding door, size of the balcony, bathroom knee clearance, height of the towel rack, width of the closet, height of the closet rack, and knee clearance of the desk. Id. ¶ 13.3

On July 12, 2006, Chris Moulton, an Assistant General Manager at The Harborside, gave Mr. Fiedler the requested information by email. Id. ¶ 14. Mr. Moulton stated that the exterior sliding door to the balcony was set on tracks raised five and one-half inches above the floor but Mr. Fiedler would be able to access the balcony via a portable ramp that The Harborside would install. Id. ¶ 15; Pl.'s SAF ¶ 91. In a telephone conversation the next day, Mr. Moulton told Mr. Fiedler that the ramp would have the following characteristics: it would have no handrails, extend 66 inches into the room, block access to one side of the bed, and reach 66 inches over the balcony onto an uneven lawn. Pl.'s SAF ¶ 93.

On July 18, 2006, Mr. Fiedler spoke by telephone with General Manager Matt Brestle about his concerns regarding the adequacy of the ramp. Id. ¶ 98. Mr. Brestle confirmed that the ramp would extend 66 inches into the room, but he stated that the ramp would not compromise the room area and would lead to a "pseudo-balcony" built on the lawn. Id. ¶ 99. On July 19 and 21, 2006, Mr. Fiedler spoke with Eben Salvatore, whom Mr. Fiedler believed was an architect or engineer. Def.'s SMF ¶ 21; Pl.'s SAF ¶ 101.4 Mr. Salvatore informed Mr. Fiedler that the 5 and one-half inches high track "was not necessary to protect guest rooms from wind or water damage." Pl.'s Objection.5 Mr. Salvatore told Mr. Fiedler that the ramp was 66" long with a 60" landing in the guest room and a platform on the balcony; he also said it would not block access to either side of the bed. Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 24, 25. Mr. Fiedler requested that Mr. Salvatore send him scaled drawings of the proposed ramp; Mr. Salvatore did not comply with Mr. Fiedler's request. Id. ¶ 27; Pl.'s SAF ¶ 107.

During July 2006, in furtherance of his plan to vacation at The Harborside, Mr. Fiedler researched the availability and cost of various air-travel options between Washington, D.C. and Bar Harbor. Pl.'s SAF ¶ 104. He also researched attractions and restaurants in and around Bar Harbor. Id. On August 5, 2006, the last day he could cancel before incurring a cancellation charge and three days before he was set to stay, Mr. Fiedler canceled his reservation at The Harborside. Def.'s SMF ¶ 31. Mr. Fiedler states that he did so because he decided he should not risk expending time, money, and substantial effort traveling to The Harborside on the hope that the facility would be brought into ADA compliance. Pl.'s SAF ¶ 109. He believed that even if the ramp/landing/platform had been installed, the room still would not have complied with the ADA. Id. Mr. Fiedler did not contact any other Bar Harbor hotels to inquire about room availability and/or accessibility, either before or after the cancellation of The Harborside reservation, concerning the period from August 8-16, 2006. Def.'s SMF ¶ 37. He has never physically visited or visually inspected The Harborside. Id. ¶ 36.

Mr. Fiedler has never been to Bar Harbor and did not have plans to see any particular friend, acquaintance, family member or individual with whom he had a business relationship during his trip to Maine. Id. ¶¶ 3, 11. Mr. Fiedler has taken numerous similar vacations over the years to other oceanside resorts. Pl.'s SAF ¶¶ 83, 84. Mr. Fiedler has sworn under oath that he would vacation at The Harborside should the ADA violations be corrected. Def.'s SMF ¶ 46; Pl.'s SAF ¶ 120. At the time of the Complaint, he had no plans to visit Bar Harbor.

On July 14, 2008, Mr. Fiedler initiated a lawsuit against The Harborside for ADA and Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA) violations.6 On July 28, 2009, Ocean Properties moved for summary judgment on the sole ground that Mr. Fiedler did not have standing to bring the claim.7 Def's Mot. for Summ. J. (Docket # 21). On September 1, 2009, Mr. Fiedler filed a response objecting to Ocean Properties' motion. Pl.'s Objection. On September 21, 2009, The Harborside replied. Def.'s Reply to Pl.'s Resp. in Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. (Docket # 39) (Def.'s Reply to Pl.'s Objection). On December 21, 2009, Mr. Fiedler moved for Leave to File a Supplemental Declaration in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket # 43).

The Court held oral argument on December 28, 2009. The Court gave Marc Fiedler one week to submit additional case law to support his standing argument and Ocean Properties one week to respond. Mr. Fiedler submitted a Supplemental Memorandum on January 4, 2010. (Docket # 47). Ocean Properties responded on January 8, 2010. Supplemental Reply (Docket # 48) (Supp. Reply).

II. THE PARTIES' POSITIONS
A. The Harborside's Motion

The Harborside contends that Mr. Fiedler has not met his burden to demonstrate standing. First, The Harborside argues that to establish standing under the ADA, Mr. Fiedler must demonstrate that he has sustained an "injury-in-fact," proving that he has either "personally encountered the barrier to access" or that he "has actual knowledge of the barrier ... and has been deterred from visiting the public accommodation because of that barrier." Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 4 (quoting Panzica v. Mas-Maz, Inc., No. CV-05-2595 (ARL), 2007 WL 1732123, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 11, 2007)). As Mr. Fiedler does not claim that he personally encountered the barrier to access, The Harborside focuses on the second element, "actual knowledge of the barrier." The Harborside argues that when he filed his complaint, Mr. Fiedler "had no actual knowledge... that the ramp designed to make the patio accessible did not comply with the ADA" Id. at 6.

Furthermore, The Harborside contends that knowledge of an ADA violation is alone insufficient for constitutional standing: "the `proper analysis for standing focuses on whether the Plaintiff suffered an actual injury, not whether a statute was violated.'" Def.'s Reply to Pl.'s Objection at 1 (quoting Doe v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Examiners, 199 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 1999)). Because The Harborside would have provided a portable ramp to the balcony, there was no barrier. Thus, Mr. Fiedler could not have had knowledge "that the patio would not be accessible." Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 6.

In addition, The Harborside observes that to seek injunctive relief, an ADA plaintiff must "show a real and immediate threat that a particular (illegal) barrier will cause future harm." Id. at 7 (quoting Disabled Americans for Equal Access, Inc. v. Ferries Del Caribe, Inc., 405 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir.2005)). The Harborside points out that Mr. Fiedler "has never travelled to Bar Harbor before and has no friends or family there, but claims that he plans to spend a summer vacation in Bar Harbor and to stay at the Harborside Hotel if or when it is brought into compliance with the ADA." Id. at 7. Simply put, The Harborside says Mr. Fiedler's connections are "not enough." Id. The Harborside contends that Mr. Fiedler cannot seek injunctive relief because he has not demonstrated a threat of future harm.

B. Marc Fiedler's Response

Mr. Fiedler vigorously challenges The Harborside's position. First, he makes the general point that, unlike traditional constitutional standing analyses, the ADA relaxes the "Article III injury in fact requirement for standing." Pl.'s Objection at 14 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1)). The plain language of Title III of the ADA does not require persons with a disability to "engage in a futile gesture" by visiting establishments where they will be discriminated against. Id. Mr. Fiedler contends that to satisfy the constitutional injury-in-fact requirement for standing, "plaintiffs need only show that they have knowledge of unlawful barriers to accessibility and because of those...

To continue reading

Request your trial
20 cases
  • Breeze v. Kabila Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • 15 Diciembre 2021
    ...(quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 93 S.Ct. 364, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972) ); accord Fiedler v. Ocean Props., Ltd., 683 F. Supp. 2d 57, 65 (D. Me. 2010). Mr. Breeze needs to demonstrate only a plausible intention to return at the motion to dismiss stage, and the Co......
  • Gilkerson v. Chasewood Bank
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
    • 27 Febrero 2014
    ...returns to the location, the same discrimination will occur until the facility is made compliant.”). See also Fiedler v. Ocean Props., Ltd., 683 F.Supp.2d 57, 69 (D.Me.2010); Scherr v. Marriot Intern., Inc., 833 F.Supp.2d 945, 952–53 (N.D.Ill.2011) (Noting that the “ ‘deterrent effect doctr......
  • Lowell v. Lyft, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • 29 Noviembre 2018
    ...under the ADA, ‘complaints by private persons are the primary method of obtaining compliance with the Act.’ " Fiedler v. Ocean Prop., Ltd. , 683 F.Supp.2d 57, 65 (D. Me. 2010) (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins., Co. , 409 U.S. 205, 209, 93 S.Ct. 364, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972) ); see also ......
  • Me. Human Rights Comm'n v. Care
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maine
    • 14 Marzo 2011
    ...injunctive relief under the ADA “requires some ongoing harm (or, at least, a colorable threat of future harm)”); Fiedler v. Ocean Props., Ltd., 683 F.Supp.2d 57, 73 (D.Me.2010) (same). An organization may have standing solely as the representative of its members. Council of Ins. Agents & Br......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT