Fiedler v. Potter

• Decision Date: 03 July 1943
• Citation: 172 S.W.2d 1007,180 Tenn. 176
• Parties: FIEDLER et al. v. POTTER et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

172 S.W.2d 1007

180 Tenn. 176

FIEDLER et al. v. POTTER et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

July 3, 1943

Appeal from Chancery Court, Shelby County; John E. Swepston Chancellor.

Action by James Roland Potter and others against Chris Fiedler and another to recover wages allegedly due under the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq. From a decree in favor of complainants, defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Decree of Court of Appeals modified, and, as so modified, affirmed.

C. B Tipton and C. S. Seay, both of Memphis, for complainants.

Robert M. Nelson and Graham Moore, both of Memphis, for defendants.

CHAMBLISS Justice.

This suit was brought to recover wages under the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq., by employees of Smith Ice Cream Company alleged to have been doing an interstate business. The Smith Company was a partnership in which Frank Smith, Sr., owned two-thirds and defendant Chris Fiedler one-third. The business was operated exclusively by Smith, Fiedler being otherwise engaged, and without any actual knowledge of who were the employees, the hours of work, or the wages paid. The business had become financially embarrassed and on November 8, 1940, apparently for his protection, Fiedler bought out Frank Smith, Sr., and in a written contract assumed all outstanding obligations of the business, and took over active control. M. I. Garber signed this contract as a guarantor of the obligations therein assumed by Fiedler, and he was made a defendant, along with Fiedler, in this suit. The complainants were Frank G. Smith, Jr., a minor son of Frank G. Smith, Sr., who sued for $1,444.68, Roland James Potter, who sued for $772.91, and Charles L. Ricks, Jr., who sued for $871.61, claiming these sums as unpaid wages, due them as employees of Smith Ice Cream Company, and each sued for statutory damages in amounts equal to the unpaid wages claimed, and also for attorneys' fees. Meanwhile, Smith, Sr., had left the State. He was not sued. Following a reference to the Clerk and Master, the Chancellor decreed wages and damages to each of the complainants as follows: Smith $1,060.28 and $349.92 attorney fees; Ricks $646.52 and $213.37 attorney fees; and Potter $565.74 and $186.71 attorney fees; the aggregate recovery for wages and damages being $2,272.54 and attorney fees of $750. The Court of Appeals affirmed. This Court granted certiorari and argument has been heard.

The petition in this Court challenges the decree on several grounds, relied on and overruled below, among them the following:

1. As to complainant Frank Smith, Jr., it is urged that he was a minor working for his father in this plant operated by his father, the bill, filed the 28th of January, 1941, charging that he was an "infant, nineteen years of age, and, therefore, files this bill by his mother and next friend, Lillie L. Smith"; and it is insisted, contrary to the holdings of the lower courts, that he had never been emancipated; that the undisputed evidence shows that if in any sense or degree he had been emancipated, such emancipation was not more than partial or limited; that his action would not lie against his father, by whom he was employed and for whom he was working at the time his alleged services were rendered and, therefore, does not lie against defendants.

2. It is next insisted that the claims asserted were exorbitant and unjust, being approximately three times the amounts decreed by the Chancellor, and that these grossly excessive claims were made in bad faith, with knowledge of their falsity and under circumstances which were wholly inequitable and called for the application of the doctrine of unclean hands and the refusal of a court of equity to grant any recovery; it being charged and shown by the testimony of complainant Smith himself that the bringing of the suit was designedly delayed and the existence of the claims concealed, until his father had sold out his interest in the business and procured the execution of the agreement with Fiedler and guarantee thereof by Garber.

3. It is also insisted that on the facts shown the case is not one for the allowance of damages, provided for by the statute, since it appears that the defendants were not the parties responsible for the operation of the business at the time of the alleged violations of the Fair Standards Act, but are successors only, without notice or knowledge of the facts relied on; that having brought their suit in a Court of Equity, they have elected to be governed by the equitable principles which control and that this drastic penalty will not be enforced.

4. And, also, it is urged that in no event should more than nominal attorney fees be allowed the complainants, in view of the excessive and unreasonable demands asserted in the suit and in consideration of the whole record; that this Appellate Court is not bound by the allowances for attorneys fees fixed by the trial court, but will review the record as a whole and reduce and fix the allowances of attorneys fees to such extent as justice may seem to this Court to require.

Considering, first, the right of this minor son to assert this claim, it is apparently conceded that his right rests upon the determination of the question whether or not he had been emancipated by his father at the time he was working under and for his father.

The authorities seem to agree, as said in Carthage v. Canton, 97 Me. 473, 54 A. 1104, that a case involving voluntary emancipation of a minor belongs to that class of cases in which the question must be determined upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case; that what is emancipation is a question of law, while whether or not there has been an emancipation is one of fact. If there is no conflict as to the facts, the issue is for the Court. The Chancellor found, and the Court of Appeals concurred, that the facts were undisputed, the evidence on this issue being all set forth in the depositions of Frank Smith, Jr., a complainant, and his father.

The general rule is that voluntary emancipation requires the consent, express or implied, of the parent and involves an entire surrender of all right to the care, custody and earnings of the child, as well as a renunciation of parental duties; and, further, that an agreement must be proven to support a voluntary emancipation, either in writing or in parol, and that proof thereof may be established by circumstances clearly showing a relinquishment by the parent of all parental responsibility and control. But it is well settled that no such agreement will be presumed. As said in one of the older cases (Hardwick v. Pawlett, 36 Vt. 320), frequently cited, "the emancipation of a minor is not to be presumed; it must be proved." This Court so holds. Wallace v. Cox, 136 Tenn. 69, at page 72, 188 S.W. 611, L.R.A. 1917B, 690. In the absence of a formal agreement, which there is no attempt to show in the instant case, the proof must show conduct wholly inconsistent with retention by the parent of any degree of parental responsibility or control. Mere relinquishment of the right to the minor's earnings is not enough to establish emancipation. 46 C.J., 342.

The foregoing principles and rules will be found fully treated in an elaborate note beginning on page 117 in Volume 35 of American Reports. Also, in the text and notes on p. 342 of Volume 46 C.J., and on pp. 1672 et seq., of 29 Cyc., where this is said:

"A parent may emancipate his minor child, either entirely or partially, for the whole minority or for a shorter term, or conditionally or unconditionally, and at what age he will emancipate his child rests in the discretion of the parent."

The text cites our own case of Tennessee Mfg. Co. v. James, 91 Tenn. 154, 18 S.W. 262, 15 L.R.A. 211, 30 Am. St.Rep. 865, and others. This text further reads: "The test to be applied is that of the preservation or destruction of the parental and filial relations." It is also said that in order to establish voluntary emancipation by a parent of his child, it must be shown that he conducted himself in a manner inconsistent with any further performance of his parental duties.

Among numerous cases cited in the note are our cases of Wallace v. Cox, 136 Tenn. 69, 188 S.W. 611, L.R.A. 1917B, 690; also, Memphis Steel Construction Co. v. Lister, 138 Tenn. 307, 197 S.W. 902, L.R.A. 1918B, 406. These Tennessee cases appear to be leading cases dealing with this subject. In both this Court found that emancipation had not been established, that the presumption against it had not been overcome. Lower courts were overruled in both.

It was said in Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa 151, 44 N.W. 295, 296, 7 L.R.A. 176, 18 Am.St.Rep. 353, a leading case, citing Schouler Dom. Relations, Sec. 268, that emancipation both relieves the child of subjection to the parent, with the right to manage his own affairs, and relieves the parent of all legal obligation to support the child. That was a case in which the Court found only a partial or limited emancipation, as was found in our case of Memphis Steel Co. v. Lister, supra. It was held that the mere relinquishment of the right to the child's services is not enough, that this made out a partial emancipation only, that the parent continued to have other parental rights. Said the Court: "A father frees his son from service. That does not waive the right to care, custody, and control, so far as the same can be exercised consistently with the right waived." This expression of the rule appears to fit the facts of the instant case, as will be hereinafter shown.

We have found no better discussion of the doctrine of emancipation as applicable...